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Introduction 
THE main objective of this thesis is to analyse the behaviour of rating 
agencies when they assess banks and the impact of ratings on financial 
markets during the crisis that began in 2007 with the onset of the subprime 
crisis. While numerous studies in the literature focus on the modelling of 
sovereign ratings and their impact on financial markets, analyses of these 
issues with regard to banks are virtually non-existent, particularly in the 
context of the current financial crisis. For this reason, the contribution of 
this doctoral thesis to the literature is twofold. First, it analyses the 
behaviour of ratings in the case of banks and, second, it takes into account 
the impact of financial stress arising as a result of the subprime crisis and 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This introduction outlines the chapters 
of the present thesis in the context of the bank rating literature.  
What are ratings? 
A rating is an indicator of the opinion of a rating agency on the relative 
ability of an entity to meet its financial commitments. More precisely, in 
May 2008 the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) defined credit ratings as  
[…] an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity, a credit 
commitment, a debt or debt-like security or an issuer of such obligations, 
expressed using an established and defined ranking system.  
Doctoral Thesis by Carlos Salvador Muñoz: Financial crisis and bank ratings 
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In this context, rating agencies order ratings according to expected loss or 
probability of default, and cannot be used as absolute measures of expected 
loss or probability of default. Standard and Poor’s and Fitch use scales 
based on the probability of default, while Moody’s uses expected loss, 
considering the possibility, the time and magnitude of the default and the 
probability of recovery. Table 1 shows the rating scales of the major rating 
agencies.  
Table 1. Ratings scale of the rating agencies 
Fitch  Moody's  Standard and Poor's 
Investment 
AAA  Aaa  AAA 
AA+  Aa1  AA+ 
AA  Aa2  AA 
AA-  Aa3  AA- 
A+  A1  A+ 
A  A2  A 
A-  A3  A- 
BBB+  Baa1  BBB+ 
BBB  Baa2  BBB 
BBB-  Baa3  BBB- 
Speculative 
BB+  Ba1  BB+ 
BB  Ba2  BB 
BB-  Ba3  BB- 
B+  B1  B+ 
B  B2  B 
B-  B3  B- 
CCC+  Caa1  CCC+ 
CCC  Caa2  CCC 
CCC-  Caa3  CCC- 
CC  Ca  CC 
C  C  C 
D  D  D 
WR  WR  WR 
Source: Own elaboration and methodological reports of rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) 
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Because the definition of rating depends on the rating agency 
considered, rating categories are not comparable; that is, there is no direct 
equivalence between them. However, they do share certain patterns. Rating 
scales are split into two main groups. At the top of the table are the ratings 
pertaining to degree of investment, which as Cantor and Packer (1995) 
state, are those with a low probability of default. In contrast, the bottom of 
the table shows the ratings associated with the degree of speculation in 
which the probability of default or expected loss is higher1. Some studies 
in the literature provide evidence for the hypothesis that the difference 
between rating categories becomes less robust as the credit quality rises, 
and the rating lies at the top of the rating scale. In this line, Galil (2003) 
and Kealhofer et al. (1998) demonstrate, for the case of corporate bonds, 
that there are virtually no significant differences between investment grade 
ratings. Despite this, both investors and regulators use ratings as absolute 
measures of probability of default or expected loss and therefore attribute 
a different meaning to each rating category. 
Indeed, the role granted by regulation has meant that the importance of 
the threshold between investment-grade and speculative-grade ratings has 
moved to the highest level of the rating scale, the AAA level. An example 
of this distinction can be found in financial regulation itself. Basel II, for 
instance, makes an important distinction when defining different 
regulatory capital requirement according to whether financial institutions 
are AAA rated, or rated in a category immediately below. Another example 
of the importance of obtaining the maximum rating is found in the internal 
                                                          
1
 As Losada (2011) notes, this difference originates in the US, where credit investors, collective 
investment institutions and mutual funds were historically obliged to invest in assets with a 
minimum rating level. 
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regulations of investment funds, insurance companies and pension funds, 
which are prevented from investing in assets that do not have the highest 
credit rating. Therefore, although the agencies insist that rating 
classification is merely ordinal and that it is no more than an opinion, in 
reality financial markets and regulators interpret it as a measure of absolute 
risk. 
The effect of ratings on financial markets 
Over the past two decades ratings have taken on an increasingly 
significant role in financial markets as a result of the growing number and 
complexity of financial products and their expanding role in different areas 
of financial regulation in the United States (US) and Europe.2 The mission 
of ratings is to reduce market failures arising from asymmetric information 
among investors, regulators and issuers.  
Ratings provide information for investors about issuers’ levels of credit 
risk. This allows the issuers to reduce the cost of financing (López, 1996), 
as the investors have more information and, consequently, the uncertainty 
associated with operations is lower. If an entity maintains a high rating, 
financing costs may be lower, and vice versa. As Partnoy (2006) states, 
ratings have a significant role in the financial markets not because of their 
accuracy and credibility, but because they are key to reducing the costs 
associated with regulation.  
Some of the latest and most noteworthy studies analysing the effect of 
rating changes on bond prices, and hence their returns, are Hand et al. 
                                                          
2
 The Joint Forum report (2009) provides a summary of how ratings are used in different 
countries’ financial regulations. 
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(1992), Goh and Ederington (1993), Creighton et al. (2007) and Afonso et 
al. (2012). On the other hand, outstanding studies analysing the effect on 
the equity markets include, among others, Gropp and Richards (2001), 
Brooks et al. (2004), Gande and Parsley (2005), Creighton et al. (2007), 
Hill and Faff (2010), Arezki et al. (2011) and Afonso et al. (2012). In 
general, all the studies that analyse the impact of rating announcements on 
bond and equity prices find evidence of a significant effect of downgrades 
on bond and stock returns, and a very weak effect in the case of rating 
upgrades. The second chapter of this thesis raises some questions related 
to the effect of ratings on financial markets: Do investors respond to ratings 
announcements? Is this response the same before and during the financial 
crisis? Are the rating agencies immune to market changes, and do they 
therefore actually follow a medium/long-term through-the-cycle strategy? 
Is there a relationship between rating agencies’ assessments of the financial 
condition of banks and country risk? To answer these questions, this 
chapter analyses the impact of rating announcements on banks in the 
Eurozone during the period 2002-2012. 
The results obtained in this second chapter provide evidence for the 
significant role of rating agencies in the financial markets. Specifically, 
findings show that investors respond and, therefore, take rating 
announcements into account when determining their investment strategies. 
Before the crisis, rating upgrades signals had a significant effect on banks’ 
returns. Since the onset of the crisis however, rating downgrades and/or 
changes in outlooks have had a significant effect. This chapter also 
analyses the causal relationship between ratings and changes occurring in 
abnormal returns and the risk premium. Findings show that rating agencies 
are not totally immune to variations in the financial markets, since the 
Doctoral Thesis by Carlos Salvador Muñoz: Financial crisis and bank ratings 
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ratings also respond to changes in abnormal returns and risk premiums. 
Consequently, this result provides evidence that ratings do not actually 
follow a through-the-cycle philosophy as the rating agencies defend in 
their methodology reports (e.g., Standard and Poor’s, 2003), and it is 
argued by other authors in the literature (e.g., Altman and Rijkmen 2004 
and 2006). Furthermore, the results provide evidence of the close 
relationship between the bank ratings and the perception of the investors 
about the country risk. This causal relationship between the banks ratings 
and the premium risk can be explained by the fact that with the financial 
crisis many governments of the Eurozone rescued some financial 
institutions. This increased the public debt, consequently, increased the 
probability of sovereign default and the risk premium. At the same time 
banks held substantial sovereign debt of their own country as it is noted by 
Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2010). Hence a change of the banks ratings 
can be interpreted by the investors as a change on the sovereign risk and 
vice versa. 
The results reported in this chapter therefore show that, although the 
rating agencies are in the crosshairs of regulators and investors, their 
ratings continue to have a significant impact on the financial markets (Bank 
of England, 2011).  
Criticisms of rating agencies 
Despite the importance of ratings in financial markets, rating agencies 
have found themselves under scrutiny in recent years for several reasons: 
mistakes made over the years, the business model in which the issuer pays, 
the oligopolistic structure of the industry, the lack of transparency in the 
methodologies used, the subjective nature of part of the rating process, the 
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over-reliance on ratings by both investors and regulators, and the absence 
of any regulation to ensure rating quality. 
In relation to the first of the above criticisms, over time the agencies 
have seen how actual circumstances have called into question their ratings. 
As early as the 1994-1995 Mexican crisis and the Asian crisis of the late 
90s, rating agencies were accused of reacting to changes that were 
happening rather than anticipating them (Reisen and Maltzan, 1999; Ferri 
et al., 1999). Their capacity as a forward looking indicator of risk was 
therefore called into question. Later, the Enron and Parmalat scandals once 
again put agencies in the spotlight for assigning these firms investment 
grade ratings in the days previous to their bankruptcy (Hill, 2004; Danvers 
et al., 2004). In 2008, the agencies were accused of relaxing their rating 
criteria during the period of economic growth up to the outbreak of the 
crisis, as attested by reports from the SEC (2008) and the IMF (Financial 
Stability Report, 2010). In 2010, with the sovereign debt crisis in the 
peripheral countries of the European Union (EU), rating agencies were 
again at the centre of attention for severely downgrading these countries. 
In this case they were accused of reacting too slowly, inaccurately and at 
the wrong time to the problems that were occurring (Alsakka and Gwilym, 
2013).3  
Rating agencies have also been criticised for conflicts of interest arising 
from their business model, as noted by, for example, the Bank of England 
(2011). Notable among these conflicts is that most of the agencies’ revenue 
comes from the same issuers requesting evaluation (Bolton et al., 2012). 
                                                          
3
 For example, Moody’s did not change Greece’s rating from 2003 until December 2009. In the 
subsequent 15 months Moody’s downgraded Greece’s rating by 15 points, situating it on a level 
close to default (from A2 to C). 
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This may induce a client, dissatisfied with the rating it has been assigned, 
to approach another agency in pursuit of a higher rating, in what is known 
as rating shopping (Bolton et al., 2012, Carbó et al., 2011; Mathis et al., 
2009; Sangiorgi et al., 2009; Skreta and Veldkamp, 2009). The agencies, 
aware of this behaviour, and in order not to lose market share, may have 
an incentive to issue lower quality ratings. In this line, Carbó et al. (2011) 
point out that this problem is higher in sectors more opaque as the banking 
sector. 
Another no less important conflict of interest stems from the fact that 
as well as issuing ratings, agencies also perform advisory or consulting 
services for the products that they subsequently assess. This encourages 
clients to contract these ancillary services in order to obtain a high rating. 
Hau et al. (2013) offer evidence of the relationship between these ancillary 
services and the ratings obtained. Specifically, they find evidence that 
agencies give higher ratings to large banks and entities that are most likely 
to provide the agency with additional business. 
The structure of the rating industry has also been criticised for being 
uncompetitive. As Dittrich (2007) points out, 92.1% of the market share is 
divided among the three firms known as the Big Three (Standard and 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch). The rest of the share is divided among small 
local agencies: Dominion Bond Rating Service, Japan Credit Rating 
Agency, Egan-Jones Rating Company, Baycorp Advantage, Dagong 
Global and Muros Ratings.  
One of the main negative effects associated with the oligopolistic 
structure is the lack of incentives among the established firms to develop 
new credit risk assessment methodologies. This may be one reason why 
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rating agencies failed in their assessment of complex structured products. 
The report of the Financial Stability Forum (2008) notes  
[…] weaknesses in rating models and methodologies; inadequate due 
diligence of the quality of the collateral pools underlying rated securities; 
insufficient transparency about the assumptions, criteria and 
methodologies used in rating structured products; insufficient information 
provision about the meaning and risk characteristics of structured financial 
ratings; and insufficient attention to conflicts of interest in the ratings 
process.  
McNamara and Vaaler (2004) argue that the entry of new firms into the 
rating industry could have positive effects such as increased competition, 
fewer conflicts of interest and increased rating quality. 
Another factor that explains why rating agencies have come under 
scrutiny is that unlike the case of audit firms, rating agencies, arguing that 
their ratings only reflect their opinions, have not been subject to any civil 
or criminal liability in carrying out their functions. Diamond (1984) states 
that the banks’ capacity to supervise their borrowers is based on their 
capital requirement, in that they invest part of their own assets when 
granting loans, and therefore they have their own motives to be diligent 
when assessing and monitoring risks. This is not the case of rating agencies 
since only their reputation is at stake. 
Regulatory changes 
All these criticisms of the rating agencies, together with the excessive 
role they have been granted in some areas of financial regulation, have 
alerted regulators in both the US and Europe in an industry that has 
Doctoral Thesis by Carlos Salvador Muñoz: Financial crisis and bank ratings 
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traditionally been characterised by the absence of strict regulation to ensure 
rating quality. 
Regulation of rating agencies in the US dates back to the 1930s. During 
that decade a number of regulations were introduced with the aim of protect 
investors against credit institutions and institutional investors (mutual 
funds and collective investment entities). Later, following the crisis of the 
70s and as a result of ratings being used as inputs in financial regulation, 
in 1975 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) created the 
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) system. 
This system established that rating agencies could issue ratings with 
regulatory value in the calculation of capital requirements for 
intermediaries of securities markets and credit institutions. Initially the 
only agencies that could issue ratings for regulatory purposes were 
Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch. This status gave these agencies 
an advantage over other competitors, and in time they became an oligopoly 
in the US and virtually everywhere else.  
Until 2004, there were no international regulations covering rating 
quality. Only after the collapse of Enron and Parmalat in 2002 did the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) begin to 
consider the need for regulations that would guarantee the highest rating 
quality. In December 2004, IOSCO published the Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Rating Agencies which defined a set of guidelines to be 
followed by agencies to ensure their ratings were of high quality. The 
guidelines included the need for agencies to guarantee, as far as possible, 
maximum integrity in the ratings process, together with increased 
transparency in their methodologies. This code of conduct was based on 
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self-regulation; its implementation was therefore left to market 
mechanisms rather than national regulations.  
In 2008, as a result of the subprime crisis and the recommendation of 
the Financial Stability Forum report (2008), this code of conduct was 
revised to introduce changes to increase transparency in the methodologies 
used in the ratings process and competition in the rating industry. It is 
therefore not until the beginning of the subprime crisis in 2008 that 
regulators in the US and Europe began to develop binding rules for ratings, 
as opposed to mainly self-regulatory measures. 
However, while advances in terms of regulation have been made on 
both sides of the Atlantic, different paths have been taken. Following the 
Enron and Parmalat scandals in 2002 the US decided to implement a series 
of reforms in the regulation of rating agencies. The first was the enactment 
of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, which came into force 
in January 2008. This measure included the modification of the NRSRO 
system, which went from a system of registration of rating agencies to a 
system of recognition, in an attempt to open up the market to more 
competition. With this system, any agency that met given criteria could be 
granted this status and issue ratings for regulatory purposes. These 
requirements included at least three years’ experience in issuing ratings. 
Agencies interested in applying for this status were also required to submit 
to the SEC the methodologies they used in their rating processes, as well 
as a set of statistics that demonstrated the quality of their ratings. Unlike 
the old register system, this reform included the possibility that if the 
quality of an agency’s ratings deteriorated significantly, it could lose its 
status to issue ratings for regulatory purposes. This reform led to an 
Doctoral Thesis by Carlos Salvador Muñoz: Financial crisis and bank ratings 
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increase in the number of agencies that could issue ratings with regulatory 
value. The number of registered agencies rose from three to ten.4 
This was not the only reform in the US. Later, in 2010 with the onset of 
the crisis and following the recommendations of the Financial Stability 
Board5, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was amended by 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 
This reform led to the creation of the Office of Credit Ratings, a body 
whose competencies include the right to evaluate the performance of 
NRSRO recognised agencies. In addition, this office could impose 
measures designed to avoid conflicts of interest, increase agencies’ 
transparency by disseminating the methodologies they use, and demand 
accountability and impose penalties on agencies for their failings. 
In Europe, on the other hand, regulation of rating agencies does not 
enjoy the long tradition it has in the US. Following the collapse of Enron 
and Parmalat, Europe began to consider the possibility of introducing 
regulations to monitor the rating agencies. In February 2004 the European 
Parliament held a consultation in the European Commission to determine 
whether there was a need to regulate the rating agencies. Following the 
consultation process, the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CRSE) published a report proposing a solution based more on self-
regulation than strict regulation of agencies (CRES, 2004, 2006). For this 
reason, in Europe, unlike the US, the only ratings agency regulation 
                                                          
4
 These agencies were: Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch, Egan-Jones Rating Company, 
Rating Agency Ltd., A. M. Best Company, Dominion Bond Rating Service Ltd., Japan Credit, 
R&I Inc., LACE Financial and Real point LLC. 
5
 The main recommendation, later endorsed by the G-20, was based on reducing the importance 
of ratings in financial regulation.  
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existing at that time was the IOSCO code of conduct that remained in force 
until 2009. However, it should be noted that because some EU member 
states had competencies in certain areas of financial regulation, countries 
like Spain and France implemented their own rating agency regulations, 
thereby imposing a set of mandatory standards.6 
In 2006, following the Basel II agreement in which ratings could be 
used to calculate the minimum levels of capital for financial entities, 
Directive 2006/48/EC came into force. This directive set out the criteria 
rating agencies had to meet to be considered as External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAI) and for their ratings to be used to calculate regulatory 
capital.7 Among the most significant of these requirements were 
transparency in the methodology rating agencies used, recognition in the 
market and credibility perceived by ratings users (Losada, 2009 and 2011). 
The competent authorities would assess agencies’ credibility based on the 
following criteria: 
• The income and financial resources generated by the agency.  
• The agency’s market share of the rating industry. 
• Use by issuers of financial products for the issue of bonds and, 
consequently, price fixing. 
• Use by issuers of financial products for assessment of credit risks. 
One of the criticisms of this recognition system was its similarity to the 
North American NRSRO register system; a system in which the main 
                                                          
6
 In Spain Law 19/1992 was in force. 
7
 The agency registration process corresponds to the competent authority for bank supervision in 
each country. In Spain, the ECAI recognition process was regulated by Norms 19 and 20 of 
Circular 3/2008, 22 May.  
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criterion for achieving status within financial regulation was based on the 
agency’s penetration in the market and took very little account of the key 
factor of rating quality. A further weakness of this register system was that, 
once a rating agency had been granted regulation status, it was very 
difficult to remove, even if the agency issued poor quality ratings. In 
response to these shortcomings, regulators in Europe proposed introducing 
reforms to ensure that the supervisors monitored the quality of the ratings. 
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, which entered into force on 7 
December 2009, tightened the rules on the registry system and agency 
supervision. All agencies had to register to operate within the EU. In 
addition, it established regulations intended to ensure adequate quality and 
transparency of ratings issued. Although the directive represented a step 
forward in the regulation of the rating agencies, it had some limitations; for 
instance it did not establish a procedure to monitor the rating quality and 
sanction rating agency malpractice. A further limitation was that agency 
supervision and registration was the responsibility of the member states. 
This meant that agencies were subject to different rules depending on the 
country where they sought registration to issue ratings for regulatory 
purposes. 
With the sovereign debt crisis in the peripheral countries of the EU, 
after 2010 it became clear that this reform was ineffective. As a result, 
Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 was amended in May 2011 by Regulation 
(EC) No. 513/2011, which established the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) and centralised supervision and registration of 
rating agencies. This regulation was a breakthrough in the following 
aspects: 
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• Responsibility: ESMA had powers to impose financial penalties and 
suspend ratings in the case of serious infringement of Regulation 
(EC) No. 1060/2009. 
• Promotion of competition: in an attempt to increase information 
transparency for issuers.  
This, however, was not the only reform affecting rating agencies in 
Europe. In November 2011, the European Commission, aware of certain 
limitations in the previous regulation, issued a new reform proposal 
(European Commission, 2011) in an attempt to reduce over-reliance on 
ratings by investors and regulators, and hold agencies responsible for their 
errors. This reform was also intended to mitigate the problems arising from 
conflicts of interest associated with the system of price fixing and the 
agencies’ ownership structure. Finally, it introduced a set of rules relating 
to the issuing of sovereign ratings. Subsequently, in October 2012 
Regulation (EC) No. 946/2012, which completed Regulation No. 
1060/2009, was implemented. This regulation established the procedural 
rules for the sanctions that the ESMA could impose for rating agency 
malpractice. 
Finally, as part of the European reforms, on January 16, 2013 the 
European Parliament adopted a new directive (2013/14/EU) in the 
regulation of rating agencies that came into force on 20 June 2013. The 
main objectives of this reform were to reduce over-reliance by investors on 
external public debt ratings; mitigate conflicts of interest caused by the 
agencies’ different activities; and increase transparency and competition in 
the sector. Among the new rules introduced by the reform, the following 
are worth highlighting: 
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• Agencies must justify their ratings. 
•  Agencies cannot make recommendations on the policies of 
sovereigns. 
• Unsolicited sovereign debt ratings can be issued two to three times 
a year. These ratings will only be published after the close of markets 
in the EU and at least one hour before they open. 
• Investors can claim damages resulting from agencies’ failings. 
•  All ratings, except those requested by private investors, must be 
published in a European rating platform in order to facilitate 
comparisons between agencies. 
•  Issuers of structured finance instruments must change rating agency 
at least every four years. 
•  An agency may not issue credit ratings for shareholders with a stake 
of at least 10% in the same agency, and in any case must inform the 
ESMA if it intends to do so. 
•  Holding a share of 5% or above in various agencies is prohibited, 
unless the agencies belong to the same group. 
In short, regulation has played a key role in the excessive importance 
of ratings in financial markets for two reasons. First, by granting excessive 
regulatory value in some areas, most notably their use in calculating the 
levels of capital that banks are required to hold (Basel II and Basel III). 
Second, as described in the preceding paragraphs, because of the historical 
absence of strict regulation to guarantee rating quality. To this must be 
added the dominance in the market of three rating agencies (Fitch, Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s). All these factors have led to the issuing of 
ratings on financial products that before the financial crisis enjoyed the 
highest credit rating according to the rating scale, only to later be proved 
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unworthy of it. This suggests that it is useful to analyse the behaviour of 
rating agencies, as agencies tend to state in their methodology reports that 
their opinions are based on long-term assessment (through-the-cycle), and 
ratings are not changed in light of any event or news that affects temporally 
the asset situation of the company that they are assessing (point-in-time 
strategy). However, the evidence of this type of behaviour is not clear, 
since their ratings tend to present a markedly procyclical behaviour, 
characterised by the issuing of high ratings during phases of economic 
growth and severe downgrades during periods of crisis. Studies in the 
literature finding empirical evidence for this hypothesis are Bangia et al. 
(2002), Catarineu-Rabell, et al. (2005), Amato and Furfine (2004), 
Zicchino (2006) and Deprés (2011). 
Changes in rating agency policies 
Continuing in this line of inquiry, the third chapter of the thesis, 
published in the Journal of Financial Stability (Salvador et al., 2014), seeks 
to answer the following questions: Have agencies responded to the 
criticism and changes in regulation by hardening rating criteria? And, if 
this is the case, what percentage of the downgrades is due to the worsening 
asset situation of banks and what percentage is due to changes in the 
agencies’ rating criteria? To answer these questions, in this chapter we 
analyse the rating behaviour of banks in Spain during the period 2000-
2009. 
The Spanish banking system offers a good laboratory to analyse rating 
agencies’ behaviour and their possible changes in criteria as a result of the 
crisis for two reasons. First, this banking system is situated in the context 
of an economy undergoing a complete economic cycle characterised by 
strong growth followed by recession. From the late 90s until the end of 
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2007 it grew significantly on the basis of lending to construction and 
property development related activities. The banks had high levels of 
profitability (above the European average), low levels of doubtful assets 
and unlimited access to international markets. In response to this situation, 
entities obtained high ratings. However, as evidenced by the Bank of 
Spain’s Financial Stability Report (2009, 2010) with the onset of the global 
crisis and the bursting of the housing bubble, the banks’ financial condition 
rapidly deteriorated, and with it, bank ratings also fell. Second, the specific 
analysis of a banking system enhances understanding and increases 
availability of information that, according to the rating agencies’ 
methodology reports, they take into account when issuing their opinions.  
It is obvious that with the financial crisis and the consequent 
deterioration of the banks’ financial condition, their ratings worsened, but 
what brings the quality of ratings into question is the fact that agencies 
modified their rating criteria by making them stricter, as stated in the 
reports of the SEC (2008) and the International Monetary Fund’s Financial 
Stability Report (IMF 2010). To test this hypothesis empirically, the 
evolution of ratings is disaggregated into two multiplicative components: 
the solvency effect and ratings policy change effect. This allows us to 
determine whether the rating agencies modified their rating criteria as a 
result of the financial crisis and the subsequent reforms that were being 
developed to regulate their operations. 
The results of this analysis reveal differences in the rating policies 
implemented by the main rating agencies. Each agency assigns a different 
weight to the factors that define the financial condition and the support 
banks might receive if they find themselves in difficulties. Second, 
findings show that with the crisis, ratings fell overall by 10.88%, mainly 
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due to the worsening of the asset situation of banks (75%), although the 
hardening of the rating criteria also plays a significant role (25%). This 
result, as in the second chapter, provides evidence for the hypothesis that 
ratings behave procyclically. 
Despite the advantages described above, the specific analysis of a 
banking system has two drawbacks. First, it does not consider the role of 
some variables that, according to the rating agencies’ methodology reports, 
are taken into account and affect the country in which the banks operate. 
For example, changes in sovereign credit ratings, the level of public deficit 
and/or the national GDP growth rate are not considered. Second, 
examining a single banking system implies that all banks are subject to the 
same banking shocks. The fourth chapter poses the same questions as in 
the third chapter, but for the case of a sample of international banks (US 
and Europe) during the period 2004-2011. The same methodology was 
used as in the third chapter to explore these questions, based on 
disaggregating the adjustment in ratings into two multiplicative factors: 
one associated with the deterioration in the asset situation of the banks and 
the other associated with changes in the agencies’ rating criteria. 
The results show that with the onset of the financial crisis, ratings issued 
by Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s fell by 5.35%, 4.19% and 
7.7%, respectively. This fall is due to both a worsening of the banks’ 
financial condition and the hardening of the rating criteria. Specifically, in 
Fitch, 79.66%, and in Standard and Poor’s 63.99% of the downgrades is 
due to stricter rating criteria. By contrast, in Moody’s the sharp 
deterioration of the entities’ asset situation is offset by a slight 
improvement in the rating criteria. These results provide empirical 
evidence for the hypothesis defended in the second and third chapters that 
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ratings are procyclical, and consequently, that agencies take into account 
the transient changes occurring in the banks’ financial condition. The 
different weight of the determinants of the rating and the different weight 
of the hardening of the rating criteria demonstrate that agencies apply 
different rating policies. 
Considering a sample of international banks also allows the following 
questions to be posed: Does the ratings adjustment occur equally in all 
banking systems? Do the stricter rating criteria and the deterioration of 
banks’ financial conditions have the same weight in all banking systems? 
In response to these questions, the results in this chapter suggest that 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch ratings are more intensely adjusted for US 
and PIGS8 banks, due to the greater weight of the stricter rating criteria. By 
contrast, in the case of Moody’s, the results also indicate that the largest 
downgrades occur in the US and the PIGS, but they are due to the 
significant deterioration in banks’ financial condition, which is partly 
offset by implementing somewhat more flexible rating criteria. 
The doctoral thesis is structured as follows. Following this introduction, 
the first chapter briefly describes the methodology used to address the 
issues raised in each chapter. In the second chapter the effect of ratings 
announcements is analysed for a sample of European banks. This chapter 
also explores the causal link between bank ratings changes, changes on 
shares returns and the premium risk. In the third chapter, the impact of the 
financial crisis on the behaviour of bank ratings in Spain is analysed. 
Fourth chapter explores the impact of the financial crisis for a sample of 
                                                          
8 Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
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international banks. Finally, the fifth chapter presents the main conclusions 
reached in each of the chapters. 
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1. Methodology 
THIS chapter briefly introduces the methodology used to respond to the 
questions raised in each chapter and outlined in this introduction, in order 
to comply with the Universitat de València requirements on the structure 
of doctoral theses. The specific methodology used is explained in detail in 
each chapter. 
As mentioned above, the second chapter analyses the effect of the 
rating changes for a set of European banks on their stock returns before 
and during the financial crisis. This analysis aims to answer the following 
questions: Do investors take ratings into account when defining their 
investment strategies? Has the degree of investor response to rating 
announcements changed with the financial crisis? Do rating agencies take 
into account changes in the financial markets and, therefore, do they not 
follow a through-the-cycle strategy as they argue in their methodology 
reports? 
To answer these questions, as in other studies (Hull et al., 2004; Hill 
and Faff, 2010), event methodology is used. First, abnormal returns, AR, 
are defined as the difference between the shares returns at day t and the 
expected return (equation (1)). 
 
=it it itAR R - E( R )  (1) 
where ARit  is the Abnormal Return for bank i at time t; and R it is the return 
on shares of bank i at day t expressed in logarithms. The expected return 
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of bank i at day t, E(Rit) is calculated following Hill and Faff (2010) as the 
average return between the 230 and 30 trading days prior to the day that 
the rating signal occurs, t-230 and t-30. Rating signals are defined as the 
change in the rating level, namely, when for example, an AAA rating is put 
on review for a possible downgrade in the short term (negative watchlist). 
To measure this change, the category scale (AAA / Aaa, AA/Aa1 ..... C, 
D) of the ratings from Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s is first 
transformed, following Alsakka and Gwilym (2010) and Williams et al. 
(2013), into a numerical scale of 20 categories. In order to take into account 
the current rating and the short-term (watchlist) and long-term (outlook) 
perspectives, an index is defined that takes values from 1 to 20, where 
higher values correspond to higher credit quality and there is therefore less 
likelihood of default. This index is defined as in Hill and Faff (2010) by 
adding (subtracting) 0.5 points to the current rating t, when a positive 
(negative) watchlist is issued, or adding (subtracting) 0.25 points a positive 
(negative) outlook is issued. This index is similar to the Comprehensive 
Ratings Index (CCR) proposed by Gande and Parsley (2005) in which one 
point is added to (subtracted from) the current rating if a positive (negative) 
outlook is issued. 
As a measure of robustness for the abnormal returns calculated, in this 
second chapter the average return for other periods and for the market 
model are also calculated. In this model the expected return is defined as 
  it i i tE(R )=α + β Rm where, as in Hill and Faff (2010), Rmt is the Thomson 
Datastream World share price index; αi and βi are the parameters of the 
market model obtained by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. 
Having calculated the abnormal returns, ARit, they are then accumulated 
for consecutive days to give what is known as Cumulative Abnormal 
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Returns (CARs). In this context, to analyse the impact of rating signals on 
AR, CARs are calculated for two periods. The first is defined as the event 
period (0, +1), which comprises the cumulative abnormal return between 
the day on which the rating agency issues the rating change and the 
following day (t=0 and t=1). The second period is defined as the pre-event 
period (-10,-1), which comprises the cumulative abnormal return over the 
ten days prior to the event, t=-1 and t=-10. Following Hull et al. (2004) 
and Hill and Faff (2010), this latter period allows us to determine whether 
the impact of the rating signals has previously been discounted by the 
market and, therefore, their effects are lower than expected. 
Having determined the variables that attempt to measure the impact of 
the bank rating signals on their abnormal returns, the following equation 
(2) is estimated: 
β β β β β
β β δ λ
γ γ γ ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it
5 it 6 it 1 it 1 it
1 it 2 it 3 it it
CAR Prating Nrating Pwatchlist Nwatchlist
Poutlook Noutlook Index BeforeCAR
Tpremium Year Trend
 
(2) 
where CARsit is the Cumulated Abnormal Return during the period in 
which the bank rating signal is issued; Pratingit (Nratingit) is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the rating of bank i is upgraded 
(downgraded); Pwatchlistit (Nwatchlistit) is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the rating is included in the watchlist for a possible upgrade 
(downgrade) or it has been confirmed after having been put on the watchlist 
for a possible downgrade (upgrade); Poutlookit (Noutlookit) is a dummy 
variable that takes a value equal to unity when a positive (negative) 
perspective is given, or it shifts from a negative to a stable (positive to 
stable) outlook; Indexit is defined as the rating level of bank i at the moment 
immediately before the event. To determine whether the markets have 
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previously discounted the information contained in the rating signals, as in 
Hull et al. (2004) and Hill and Faff (2010), in the equation (2) Cumulative 
Abnormal Return during the ten days before the event is included, 
BeforeCARit.  
In order to determine the impact of the financial crisis on investors’ 
behaviour and the effect of ratings on financial markets, equation (2) is 
estimated for the period before and the period of financial crisis. 
The second chapter also analyses the question of whether the bank 
rating issued by agencies responds to variations in stock markets and/or in 
risk premiums. This, in turn, allows the question to be raised of whether 
investors make their investment decisions by solely focusing on ratings or 
whether they also consider other factors such as the risk premium of the 
country in which the stocks are listed. Following the methodology 
proposed by Afonso et al. (2012), a Granger causality test is performed 
among the rating signals, the abnormal returns and the risk premium. To 
this end, the following equations are estimated separately:  
λ
ε+
∑ ∑ ∑
n n n
it 0 it-j it-j it-j
i=1 i=1 i=1
1 it 2 it
∆Index =β + α ∆AR +δ ∆Index + ∆Premium  
+ γ Year +γ Trend
 
(3) 
λ
ε+
∑ ∑ ∑
n n n
it 0 it-j it-j it-j
i=1 i=1 i=1
1 it 2 it
∆AR =β + α ∆AR +δ ∆Index + ∆Premium  
+ γ Year +γ Trend
 
(4) 
λ
ε+
∑ ∑ ∑
n n n
it 0 it-j it-j it-j
i=1 i=1 i=1
1 it 2 it
∆Premium =β + α ∆AR +δ ∆Index + ∆Premium  
+ γ Year +γ Trend
 
(5) 
where ∆Indexit is the rating changes in bank i between the day on which the 
rating change event occurs t and the previous day t-1; ∆ARit is the variation 
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of abnormal return of the bank i stock at day t; and ∆Premiumit is the 
variation in the risk premium between days t and t-1. If the coefficient 
associated with the changes in ∆ARit for n days in equation (3) is 
significant, changes in stock returns affect changes in ratings and therefore, 
the ratings are not totally independent of the changes occurring in the stock 
markets. Similarly, if the coefficient associated with the variation in risk 
premium, ∆Premiumit, is significant, the ratings are not independent of the 
changes that occur in the risk premium. Equations (4) and (5), as in 
equation (3), allow us to determine whether the variations occurring in the 
stock markets and the risk premium depend on changes in ratings. If in 
these equations the coefficient associated with rating changes, ∆Indexit, is 
significant, the variations in the ratings are associated with variations in 
stock returns and in the risk premium. 
The third chapter of this thesis analyses the impact of the financial 
crisis on the ratings of banks of the Spanish Banking System. The aim in 
this chapter is to answer the following questions: Have ratings been 
adjusted during the financial crisis? Have rating agencies responded to the 
criticism and regulatory changes by hardening their rating criteria? Do 
ratings adjustments and rating criteria depend on the legal form and size of 
the entities analysed? A two-stage methodology is developed to answer 
these questions. 
In the first stage bank ratings are modelled. This is done by considering 
the factors that the rating agencies look at when issuing their ratings on the 
banks’ probability of default and/or expected loss. Figure 1 shows the 
procedure rating agencies follow when preparing the issuer 
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Figure 1. Issuer rating and its components 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
rating as outlined in the agencies’ own methodology reports. First, the 
agencies differentiate between the level of intrinsic creditworthiness and 
the external support that the bank can receive from owners and/or the 
financial authorities if it faces a situation approaching bankruptcy. A bank 
can therefore be given two different types of ratings: an individual rating 
and an issuer rating. The bank rating process begins with the assessment of 
the entity’s asset situation based on the analysis of a set of qualitative and 
quantitative factors (Fitch, 2011; Moody’s, 2007a; Standard and Poor’s, 
2011). The main qualitative factors derived from the judgements of the 
rating committee analysts (Hilderman, 1999) are as follows: 
• The environment in which a bank operates, with reference to the 
regulatory framework and the sovereign risk. 
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• The corporate governance, which includes the organisational 
structure, management efficiency, and the quality and credibility of 
the defined strategies. 
• The franchise value. Among other factors this includes the 
diversification of the banking business and its market power as 
compared to other banks operating in the same environment. 
• Risk management and the effectiveness of the entity with regard to 
every aspect of its risk policies: credit, market, legal, operational and 
reputational. 
On the other hand, quantitative factors are derived from statistical and 
accounting analysis procedures. These variables are: profitability, level of 
capitalisation, liquidity, asset quality and the level of efficiency of the 
financial entity. 
All these variables used to model bank ratings, which aim to measure 
the abovementioned factors, have been widely discussed in the literature. 
Notable contributions in this field are Poon et al. (1999), Morgan (2002), 
Tabakis and Vinci (2002), Iannota (2006), Iannota et al. (2008), Bellotti et 
al. (2011), Caporale et al. (2011), Öğüt et al. (2012) and Shen et al. (2012). 
Although in their methodology reports (Fitch, 2011; Moody’s, 2007a; 
Standard and Poor’s, 2011) the rating agencies explicitly state that there is 
no predefined weighting for each of these factors, certain nuances can be 
observed. Specifically, Fitch (2011) states that when one factor is weaker 
than another, it tends to have a greater weight in the analysis. Moody’s 
(2007a) states that the weight of the qualitative factors depends on the 
market to which the financial entity belongs. If it is part of a mature market, 
the set of subjective qualitative factors derived from the analysts’ own 
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judgments may have a weight of up to 50%. However, in emerging 
markets, qualitative factors can have a weight of 70%. 
By considering all the individual factors, both subjective and based on 
quantitative information, the individual rating that only measures the level 
of bank creditworthiness can be determined. This rating is known as Bank 
Financial Strength Ratings (BFRS) in Moody’s, Rating Viability (VR) in 
Fitch and Stand-Alone Credit Profile (SACP) in Standard and Poor’s. 
The agencies then prepare the second rating, known as the issuer rating, 
which measures the probability of default or expected total loss of a bank, 
as in the previous rating but also including the support for the entity by the 
financial authorities and/or owners if it meets difficulties. This assessment, 
measuring the external support the entity would receive if it found itself in 
difficulty, is subjective since it is essentially based on the opinion of the 
rating agency analysts. In Moody’s this analysis is known as Joint Default 
Analysis (JDA) and in Fitch, Support Rating (SR). The incorporation of 
external support to the level of intrinsic creditworthiness of financial 
entities leads to what is known as the issuer rating in the case of Fitch and 
Standard and Poor’s, and bank deposits in Moody’s. 
In sum, ratings can take into account not only a financial entity’s level 
of creditworthiness, but also the external support it may receive in the event 
of running into financial difficulties, as indeed has happened in the latest 
financial crisis (Packer and Tarashev, 2011). For this reason the issuer 
rating is used in the third chapter, taking into account the probability of 
default and/or total expected loss. To estimate the probability of obtaining 
a particular rating from a set of explanatory variables that measure both the 
aspects that rating agencies outline in their methodology relating to 
financial condition, and the economic environment in which banks operate, 
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an ordered probit model with random variables is estimated considering 
the different rating categories as dependent variables. The specification of 
equation (6) is therefore: 
 
* '
it i it iY x u= + +   β ε  (6) 
where Y*it  is a linear function of the xi variables representing the factors 
that define the level of creditworthiness and the environment in which each 
bank operates; uit is the random error distributed according to a normal 
distribution; and εi is the individual effect of each bank. The explanatory 
variables are selected based on the factors outlined in the rating agencies’ 
methodology reports (Moody’s, 2007; Fitch, 2011; Standard and Poor’s, 
2011) and in some studies in the literature on bank ratings (Bellotti et al., 
2011; Caporale et al., 2011; Iannota et al., 2008). In order to test whether 
a structural change in the behaviour of bank ratings occurs with the onset 
of the financial crisis, equation (7) is estimated. In this equation the dummy 
variable SB is defined, which takes a value equal to unity for the financial 
crisis period and zero otherwise. The interaction of this dummy variable 
with the other explanatory variables allows us to compare whether a 
change in agencies’ rating policy occurred with the crisis. If the coefficient 
associated with the interaction of this variable with the other explanatory 
variables is statistically significant, the rating agencies do not assign the 
same weight to the determinants of the rating before and during the 
financial crisis and, therefore, they have adjusted their rating policies. 
 
* ' '
it it it it iY x SB x u= + ⋅ + +   β β ε  (7) 
In the second stage, after modelling the bank ratings and empirically 
testing for the existence of a change in the behaviour of the rating agencies, 
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a prediction exercise is performed, allowing the change in the ratings to be 
disaggregated into two multiplicative factors: one due to changes in the 
banks’ asset situation and the other to the change of the rating policies. To 
this end, in equation (7) the estimated coefficients (R), and the value of the 
variables that define the level of financial condition of the banks (x) are 
replaced, according to the period in which the prediction is made (before 
and after the onset of the crisis). It also defines the Rating Change Index 
(RCI) as the ratio between the rating obtained in the crisis period (t), Rt (xt), 
and that obtained in the period before the financial crisis (t-1), Rt-1(xt-1). 
This index, which measures the change in average rating before and after 
the crisis, can be disaggregated into two multiplicative components as 
stated in expression (8): one that measures the change in the rating policy 
associated with the change in the estimated coefficients; and the second 
component due to the change in the banks’ asset situation, that is, the value 
of each of the explanatory variables. 
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The fourth chapter also presents the hypothesis on the impact that the 
financial crisis has had on ratings behaviour for the case of a sample of 
international banks. To this end, the same methodology is used as in the 
third chapter. In the first stage equation (7) is estimated, which 
determines the probability of obtaining a particular rating according to the 
variables that determine the financial condition of the bank evaluated and 
the economic environment in which it mainly operates, testing whether 
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with the onset of the financial crisis, a structural change occurred in the 
variables that determine the probability of obtaining a particular rating, and 
consequently there is a change in the rating policy. In the second stage the 
Rating Change Index (RCI) is again calculated. This index disaggregates 
the observed change in the ratings into two multiplicative factors: one 
associated with the change in rating policy occurring as a result of the 
financial crisis, as indicated in the SEC report (2008), and the other 
associated with the change in the asset situation of the banks evaluated. It 
should be noted that, by using an international sample of banks, we can 
also answer the question of whether the adjustment in bank ratings 
occurred with the same intensity in all banking systems, or if not, whether 
there are differences between banks in the US, the EU and within the latter, 
between the PIGS and non-PIGS. This in turn reveals, by country groups, 
whether the asset situation and the hardening of rating policy at a global 
level had the same weight on the adjustment that originated in the ratings. 
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2. Effect of signals of bank ratings in stock returns 
before and during the financial crisis 
2.1. Introduction 
The subprime crisis in 2007 in the US and subsequently the sovereign debt 
crisis in the European Unión have again reopened the debate as to the role 
of the rating agencies and the excessive impact of their ratings on the 
financial markets. In this context, as referred to by the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report (2011) during the subprime crisis the agencies were 
accused of relaxing their rating criteria in the valuing of structured 
products. On the other hand, during the sovereign debt crisis in Europe the 
rating agencies were criticised for their inaccurate downgrading of the 
sovereign ratings of the countries with financial problems.  
Regulators, concerned about the systemic risks that may be caused by 
changes in ratings during times of financial instability, carried out various 
regulatory reforms. In 2008, the International Commission for the 
Securities Market (IOSCO) revised its code of conduct with the aim of 
increasing transparency, independence and competition among the rating 
agencies. In 2009, the European Parliament passed a new regulation 
(Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009) compelling agencies that operated in 
Europe to register with the Committee of European Securities Regulators. 
Subsequently, in July 2011, this competence was transferred to the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). On the other hand, 
in the US the SEC in 2009 also carried out a series of reforms in order to 
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impose some restrictions with the aim of avoiding conflicts of interest 
between the rating agencies and the issuers, demanding greater diffusion 
of the statistics on the performance of the ratings and increasing the 
transparency of rating methodologies. Furthermore, of these reforms in 
Europe and the US, the Basel Committee reviewed the role of the ratings 
in the calculation of regulatory capital. Other G-20 countries also 
introduced reforms in their regulation to increase the supervision of the 
rating agencies. Finally, the Financial Stability Board published a set of 
principles (FSB, 2010) to reduce the excessive reliance of investors, 
regulations and other agents on the rating agencies. 
Despite the criticism received and the succession of regulatory reforms 
described above, ratings continue to have a significant effect in the 
financial markets (Bank of England, 2011). In this sense, the effect of 
rating announcements (i.e. signals) on the financial markets has been 
amply discussed in the literature on sovereign ratings, but very few studies 
analyse this question for the case of bank ratings. Among the papers on 
sovereign ratings is worth mentioning those of Kaminsky and Scmukler 
(2002), Brooks et al. (2004), Martell (2005), Ferreira and Gama (2007), 
Arezki et al. (2011), Hill and Faff (2010) and Afonso et al. (2012). All 
these studies contribute evidence that while rating downgrades have a 
significant effect on the stock and bond markets, rating upgrades have a 
limited effect.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by analysing the effect of 
announcements of rating of the banks of the Eurozone on the returns of 
their shares. This permits us to determine whether investors respond to 
such announcements or if they focus on alternative indicators when setting 
their investment strategies. To analyse this question, we use the changes of 
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issuer ratings and their short and long term perspectives, i.e. the Watchlists 
and Outlooks, awarded during the period 2002-2012 by the three principal 
rating agencies: Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. The long period 
considered further permits analysis of the impact of the financial crisis. 
Also, through an analysis of causality in the Granger sense we analyse the 
causal relationship between banks ratings, stock markets and the premium 
risk.  
The results obtained show how investors modify their investment 
strategies in accordance with rating signals. Specifically, we find evidence 
that generally before the financial crisis only the positive bank’s rating 
signals have a significant effect on the return on its shares. On the other 
hand, with the worsening of the asset situation of banks in the crisis (see 
Financial Stability Report of the European Central Bank [2008a, 2008b]) 
the negative signals of banks’ issuer ratings have a significant effect on the 
shares returns.9 This result shows that with the financial crisis investors' 
risk aversion increases.   
We also analyse the causal relationship between rating signals, returns 
and the risk premium, to test if rating agencies also follow stock markets 
fluctuations when deciding their ratings. We find that the rating policies 
are not totally immune to the variations occurring in the financial markets. 
This shows that ratings agencies do not really completely follow a through-
the-cycle philosophy, as defended in their methodological reports (e.g. 
Moody’s, 2007a) and by some authors in the literature (e.g. Altman and 
Rijken 2004 and 2006). Furthermore, the results provide evidence that 
                                                          
9
 Part of the effect of rating announcements is discounted by the leaking of information, rating 
announcements issued by other agencies and/or the sovereign rating. 
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when defining their investment strategies obviously investors take into 
account not only the ratings, but also the variations occurring in another 
market indicator, particularly the risk premium. This result shows the 
relationship existing during the crisis between asset situation of the banks 
and the perception of the investors about financial situation of governments 
(IMF, 2011). 
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 briefly 
reviews the literature on the influence of rating announcements on the 
stock markets. Section 2.3 describes the sample used, performs a 
descriptive analysis of the behaviour of ratings during the period of 
analysis. Section 2.4 describes the methodology used both in the analysis 
of events (rating signals) and in the study of the causal relationship between 
the changes in ratings and abnormal stock returns. Section 2.5 presents the 
empirical results. Finally, the conclusions are presented. 
2.2. Review of the literature 
2.2.1. Expected impact of rating signals on shares returns  
In the literature two alternative hypotheses are used to determine how 
the financial markets respond to ratings signals (Abad et al., 2006): The 
Asymmetric Information Hypothesis and Wealth Redistribution 
Hypothesis. The first one is based on the fact that ratings contain 
information on firms’ future financial outlook that is unknown to the 
financial markets. Therefore, a downgrade (upgrade) in the rating due to a 
negative financial outlook for the bank implies a reduction (increase) in the 
price and in the returns of its shares. The second hypothesis focuses on the 
redistribution of wealth among bookholders and shareholders (Holthausen 
and Leftwich, 1986; Zaima and McCarthy, 1988). The existence of limited 
 Effect of signals of bank ratings in stock returns before and during the financial crises 
 
 
51 
 
liabilities may lead shareholders to adopt riskier strategies implying an 
increased variance in cash flows to obtain a higher return. These strategies 
may cause a rating downgrade and consequently a fall in the value of the 
bonds, causing a transfer of wealth from bookholders to shareholders, 
increasing the price and returns of the shares.  
Following the above two hypotheses Goh and Ederington (1993) point 
out that not all rating downgrades will necessarily imply a fall in share’s 
return, since the effect of these signals will depend on the nature of the 
changes. A rating downgrade resulting from an increased level of leverage 
and, therefore, of risk will cause an increase in the return on shares 
according to the Wealth Redistribution Hypothesis. On the other hand, a 
downgrade as a consequence of a worsening in financial outlooks causes a 
fall in the return on shares.  
Altogether, the effect of rating signals on the CARs of banks depends 
on the information that such signals provide to the market. Therefore, not 
all negative (positive) rating signals imply a fall (rise) in the returns on 
shares, as they may occasion an increase (reduction) if a transfer of wealth 
occurs between bookholders and shareholders due to investors’ increased 
appetite for risk. 
2.2.2. Effect of the sovereign ratings signals on the financial 
markets 
There is a large number of studies that analyse the effects of rating 
changes on bond and stock markets. Particularly, most of the studies that 
analyse the impact of rating signals on the financial markets have focussed 
on sovereign ratings, while very few have analysed this question 
exclusively for the case of banks. Outstanding among the studies of 
sovereign ratings are Brooks et al. (2004) who examine the effect of rating 
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signals on the returns of the national stock markets. Gande and Parsley 
(2005) study the effect of change in the sovereign rating of a country on 
the sovereign credit differentials of other countries (spillover effect). 
Ferreira and Gama (2007) examine the spillover effects of sovereign rating 
signals on international stock market returns. Afonso et al. (2012) analyse 
the effect of rating signals on bond yields, stock markets and the sovereign 
CDS spreads of the countries of the EU. All these studies find evidence 
that only negative rating signals have a significant effect in the financial 
markets. This suggests that governments tend to advance positive 
information to the financial markets on their financial situation, while they 
are reluctant to advance information of a negative character. 
More recent studies like Arezki et al. (2011), show that the spillover 
effect analysed by other studies in the literature depends on the type of 
rating awarded, on the country in which the downgrade occurs, and on the 
rating agency that issues the rating signal. In this study evidence is found 
that negative signals of ratings which are close to the speculative grade 
have a systematic spillover effect among the countries of the Eurozone. 
This shows that rating signals have a greater effect as the credit quality of 
the entities evaluated diminishes. 
In another recent study, Hill and Faff (2010) show that Standard and 
Poor’s is the rating agency that issues most rating signals and has greatest 
impact on the stock markets. This study finds that outlooks and watchlists 
have a greater influence than rating changes themselves on the returns on 
shares. Their study shows, that the reaction of the financial markets is more 
intense during periods of economic crisis. Finally, these authors, who also 
study lead-lag relationship among agencies, find evidence that Standard 
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and Poor’s is the agency that acts as leader in non-advanced economies, 
while Moody’s acts as leader in the advanced economies.  
2.2.3. Effect of the bank ratings signals on the financial markets 
There are few papers that deal with the effect of bank ratings on the 
stock market. Schweitzer et al. (1992) which examines the impact of rating 
changes on the share price of banks in the US. The results show that both 
positive and negative rating signals have a significant though limited effect 
on the returns of bank shares. When they compare these results with those 
obtained for non-financial firms, they observe that the differences are not 
significant with rating upgrades, but are significant different with rating 
downgrades. 
The second study that has to be highlighted in the field of bank ratings 
is Billet et al. (1998) which analyses the relationship between changes in 
bank risk and the use of guaranteed deposits during the period 1990-1995. 
The results obtained demonstrate the existence of a negative relationship 
between rating downgrades and the abnormal returns of the banks 
analysed. Richards and Deddouche (2003) analyse the effect of bank rating 
signals for the case of emerging markets during the period 1989-1998. 
Their results show that either rating signals have no significant effect on 
bank shares or the effect is contrary to what expected. 
Finally, Gropp and Richards (2001) examine the impact of rating 
signals for 32 European banks during the period 1989-2000. The results 
show that while the rating signals have a weak impact on the price of 
bonds, the impact on the stock price is significant. The effect of the signal 
on the stock price depends on the underlying reason. Specifically, in the 
case of the downgrade rating associated with an increase in the bank’s risk, 
they found a positive impact on the abnormal returns. On the other hand, 
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rating downgrades associated with a worsening of the outlook for solvency 
have a significant negative impact on abnormal returns. Therefore, these 
results contribute evidence in favour of the hypothesis that ratings provide 
relevant market information that is not completely discounted by investors. 
Hence, the market assumes that agencies have access to information which 
is not in the public domain and/or have a comparative advantage in the 
processing of public information. 
2.3. Data and sample 
This study analyses the relationship between the different rating 
announcements (i.e. signals) issued by the three principal rating agencies 
(Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) and the returns of the shares of 
234 banks belonging to the Eurozone. The period analysed consists in daily 
observations during the period from January 2002 to June 2012. This 
period is, in turn, disaggregated into two sub-periods, the period before the 
financial crisis (January 2002 to 1st August 2007) and the period of 
financial crisis (2nd August 2007 to 15th June 2012).10 This permits the 
analysis of the differential impact that the financial crisis had on the effect 
of the bank’s issuer signals on the returns of their shares.  
Previous studies in the literature (Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 
2012) show that the short and long term perspectives, i.e. the Watchlists 
and Outlooks, have an impact at least as significant as the rating changes 
                                                          
10
 The start of the crisis is dated on August 2007 due to the first strong liquidity tensions occurring 
in the markets, and the consequent injection of liquidity agreed by the European Central Bank, 
on 2nd August 2007. This period of crisis is also consistent with the study by Filardo et al. (2010) 
which defines the first turbulences in the financial markets as being from the third quarter of 
2007.   
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on the financial markets. Consequently, we define the rating signals on the 
basis of changes in ratings, Watchlists and Outlooks. The data on ratings 
were obtained from Reuters’ CreditViews database and were verified with 
some of the publications issued by the rating agencies themselves.  
Watchlists and Outlooks are defined as follows. Positive Outlooks refer 
to ratings under review for a possible upgrade in the long term and the 
changes occurring from a negative outlook to a stable outlook. Negative 
Outlooks, on the contrary, refer to ratings under review in the long term for 
a possible downgrade as well as changes occurring from a positive Outlook 
to a stable Outlook. Negative (positive) Watchlists contain the ratings 
included in this list for a possible downgrade (upgrade), and the action of 
confirming the rating having previously placed it in the watchlist for a 
possible upgrade (downgrade). 
The categorical scale (AAA /Aaa, AA/Aa1,…..C, D) of the ratings of 
Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, has been transformed into a 
numerical scale formed by 20 categories as specified in Appendix A.2 in 
this chapter following the study by Alsakka and Gwilym (2010) and 
Williams et al. (2013). In order to take into account the current rating and 
the perspectives in the short term (Watchlist) and in the long term 
(Outlook) an index is defined that takes values from 1 to 20, where the 
highest values represent a higher credit quality and consequently a lower 
probability of default. This index is defined as proposed by Hill and Faff 
(2010) on the basis of adding (subtracting) 0.5 points to (from) the current 
rating, when a positive (negative) Watchlist is issued, or adding 
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(subtracting) 0.25 points when a positive (negative) Outlook is issued.11 
This index is similar to the Comprehensive Ratings Index (CCR) proposed 
by Gande and Parsley (2005), in which one point is added to (subtracted 
from) the current rating if a positive (negative) Outlook occurs. 
In the index proposed by Gande and Parsley (2005) the different levels 
of rating with different perspectives may take the same value, when they 
are really not equivalent. For example, if a change occurs from A+ with 
positive Outlook to AA- with stable Outlook, the variation in the rating 
level is nil and the value of the index is equal to 17 according to the index 
proposed by these authors. This is because according to the numerical scale 
defined in Appendix A.2, the numerical value for a rating of A+ is 16 and 
with a positive Outlook one point is added. Consequently, with such a 
change a rating of A+ has the same value as a rating of AA- and stable 
Outlook, when really these ratings refer to totally different levels of 
solvency as the agencies point out in their methodological reports.  
Graph 1 presents the distribution of the bank rating signals issued 
throughout the period analysed. It shows a concentration of the signals 
issued during the period of financial crisis because before the crisis there 
was a certain stability in the ratings. This suggests, as pointed out by Arezki 
et al. (2011) that the rating agencies did not correctly predict the 
deterioration of bank’s balance sheets due to excessive credit growth and 
risk taking in the pre-crisis period. From the financial crisis onwards, with 
the bailout of Ireland and Portugal, and the downgrade of Greece’s rating 
                                                          
11
 0.5 points are added (subtracted) in the case of positive (negative) watchlists because these 
types of signals indicate the possibility of rating changes in the short term (three months). On the 
other hand, in the case of outlooks, 0.25 points are added (subtracted) since these signals indicate 
a possible upgrade (downgrade) of the ratings in the long term (from one to two years). 
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close to default, there is a significant increase in the number of rating 
signals issued.  
Graph 1. Evolution of the rating signals 
 
Note: Evolution of the total number of positive and negative and the stable signals issued. 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
If we analyse the distribution of rating signals we observe that before 
the financial crisis there were more positive than negative (Table 1) signals. 
Specifically, positive signals represent 26.4%, 14% and 44.4% of the total 
number of signals issued by Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, 
respectively. Conversely, the negative signals represent 15.9%, 8.6% and 
20.21% in Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively. This 
tendency is inverted during the financial crisis, since negative signals 
represent 49.2% in Standard and Poor’s, 40.9% in Fitch  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of bank issuer ratings 
 
Note: Distribution of signals regarding issuer ratings of the banks of the Eurozone before and since the start of the financial crisis. The last the rows show the weight of each type of signal among the total 
signals.  
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
N % N % N % N % N % N %
1 Number of countries 10 14 12 12 15 13
2 Number of banks 135 168 126 162 202 183
3 Negative change ratings 49 8.2% 50 5.0% 40 11.9% 396 39.4% 412 29.4% 472 87.6%
4 Positive change ratings 128 21.4% 104 10.4% 174 51.8% 32 3.2% 17 1.2% 11 2.0%
5 Stable ratings 421 70.4% 848 84.6% 122 36.3% 578 57.5% 973 69.4% 56 10.4%
6 Total signal ratings 598 100.0% 1002 100.0% 336 100.0% 1006 100.0% 1402 100.0% 539 100.0%
7 Negative watchlist ratings 25 16.6% 25 10.0% 56 53.8% 204 52.0% 199 53.4% 456 76.8%
8 Positive watchlist ratings 28 18.5% 17 6.8% 37 35.6% 54 13.8% 60 16.1% 20 3.4%
9 Stable watchlist ratings 98 64.9% 207 83.1% 11 10.6% 134 34.2% 114 30.6% 118 19.9%
10 Total signal watchlist 151 100.0% 249 100.0% 104 100.0% 392 100.0% 373 100.0% 594 100.0%
11 Negative outlook ratings 139 23.6% 61 18.5% 4 6.9% 480 60.2% 405 57.3% 671 82.3%
12 Positive outlook ratings 197 33.4% 100 30.4% 10 17.2% 60 7.5% 59 8.3% 46 5.6%
13 Stable change outlook 253 43.0% 168 51.1% 44 75.9% 258 32.3% 243 34.4% 98 12.0%
14 Total signal outlook 589 100.0% 329 100.0% 58 100.0% 798 100.0% 707 100.0% 815 100.0%
15 Total negative signals 213 15.9% 136 8.6% 100 20.1% 1080 49.2% 1016 40.9% 1599 82.1%
16 Total positive signals 353 26.4% 221 14.0% 221 44.4% 146 6.6% 136 5.5% 77 4.0%
18 Total stable rating 772 57.7% 1223 77.4% 177 35.5% 970 44.2% 1330 53.6% 272 14.0%
19 Total signals 1338 100.0% 1580 100.0% 498 100.0% 2196 100.0% 2482 100.0% 1948 100.0%
% Change rating signals 45% 63% 67% 46% 56% 28%
% Watchlist rating signals 11% 16% 21% 18% 15% 30%
% Outlook rating signals 44% 21% 12% 36% 28% 42%
Before the crisis period During the crisis period
SP Fitch Moody's SP Fitch Moody's
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and 82.1% in Moody’s. On the other hand, the positive signals in Standard 
and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s represent 6.6%, 5.5% and 4%, respectively.  
If we analyse this change of tendency by type of rating signal, we note 
the significant change that occurs with the financial crisis in the behaviour 
of the outlooks and the watchlists. In particular, during the crisis the 
negative watchlists represents between the 52% and 76.8% of the 
watchlists issued. Likewise, the negative outlooks represents between the 
60% and the 82% of the outlooks issued. However, we observe as in 
Standard and Poor’s and in Fitch, although the negative change ratings are 
higher than the positive changes, the stable ratings represents the 57.5% 
and 69.4% of the total change ratings. 
These results suggest a procyclic behaviour of bank rating, as pointed 
out by some authors in the literature (Bangia et al., 2002; Catarineu-Rabell 
et al., 2005; Amato and Furfine, 2004; Zicchino, 2006; and Salvador et al., 
2014). Furthermore, the differences in the weight that have each type of 
signal among the total suggest that the agencies adopt different signals 
policies.  For example during the crisis in Moody’s the outlooks represents 
the 42%, while in Fitch only represents the 28% on the overall signals. If 
we compare the change on ratings, in Fitch this signal represents the 56% 
against the 28% in Moody’s. Hence this suggest that Moody’s based its 
policy more in issuing outlooks and therefore it is more reluctant to rating 
changes than Fitch. 
The data on daily prices of the banks’ shares were obtained from the 
Datastream database of Thomson Reuters. The return (Rt) is defined as the 
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logarithm difference between the price of the shares on days t and t-1.12 
Both banks that operate all the period and those that have been unlisted are 
considered, thus avoiding a survival bias. The stock price is expressed in 
euros, so shares quoted in any other currency have been converted into 
euros using the exchange rate current on the day the share was traded. For 
this conversion, we used the foreign currency /euro exchange rate obtained 
from the Thomson 3000 Xtra database. 
Additionally, for shares listed in different stock markets, both shares 
listed in the country where the bank principally operates and those listed in 
other countries are taken into account. Among the different types of shares, 
only common stocks are considered. Consequently shares with special 
characteristics, such as Deposit Certificates (ADRs), real estate investment 
funds (REITs) and preference shares, are excluded from the analysis. 
2.4. Methodology 
2.4.1. Ratings signals and abnormal returns 
To analyse the impact of banks’ issuer rating signals (event) on shares 
returns, we use the event methodology (Hill and Faff, 2010). This 
methodology consists of analysing the behaviour of the Abnormal Returns 
(AR) of the shares at the moment of issue of the rating signal. The ARs are 
defined as the difference between the return at moment t and the expected 
return (equation 1). This latter is defined on the basis of the methodology 
                                                          
12
 In the case of public holidays, the price is taken to be that corresponding to the last day of 
quotation, t-1, for the calculation of the return on shares. 
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of adjusted mean return.13 The adjusted mean return is calculated following 
Hill and Faff (2010) as the mean return between 230 and 30 days of 
quotation previous to the day when the rating signal is issued.14 
 it it itAR R E( R )= −  (1) 
where the subscript t refers to the day of the trade and subscript i to the 
bank analysed. ARit refers to the Abnormal Return of bank i at day t. Rit 
refers to the return on shares of bank i at day t. Finally, E(Rit), refers to the 
expected return of bank i on day t.  
Abnormal returns, ARit, are cumulated during consecutive days to give 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). To analyse the impact of banks’ 
issuer rating signals on CARs, two reference periods are defined in relation 
to the day when the event occurs. The pre-event (-10, -1) period that 
includes the abnormal returns cumulated between the ten days prior to the 
event (t = -10 and t = 1). This period, as indicated by Hull et al. (2004) and 
Hill and Faff (2010), among others, allows us to determine whether the 
impact of the rating signals has been anticipated by the markets. So if when 
a rating signal is issued, the cumulated abnormal returns in the previous 
ten days have undergone a significant change, then these rating signals 
have been discounted by investors. The period defined as event includes 
                                                          
13
 As a measure of robustness we have also calculated the abnormal returns following the market 
portfolio model. In this model, the return on the market portfolio has been calculated using 
Thomson’s TR Global Dollar index. The window of estimation has been defined as 200 days 
previous to the event, t=-230 and t=-30. The results obtained using the market model are 
practically identical to those obtained by means of the adjusted mean return model.  
14 Although the results have been not included in this study as a measure of robustness, as in 
Brooks et al. (2004) we have used expected return between 120 and 21 days prior to the event. 
The results are fairly similar to those presented. 
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the abnormal returns cumulated between the day when the issuer rating 
signal was issued and the next day (t=0 and t=1). This period includes two 
days of quotation in order to reduce the contamination from other ratings 
signals (Gande and Parsley, 2005).  
To analyse the impact of rating signals on the abnormal returns of 
banks’ shares the following equation (2) is estimated.15 
β β β β β
β β δ λ γ
γ γ ε
= + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + +
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it
5 it 6 it 1 it 1 it 1 it
2 it 3 it it
CAR Prating Nrating Pwatchlist Nwatchlist
Poutlook Noutlook Index BeforeCAR Tpremium
Year Trend
 
(2) 
where CARit refers to the Cumulative Abnormal Return during the period 
in which the event occurs in bank i, that is, the day of the event. Pratingit 
is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if the rating of bank i 
is upgraded. Nratingit  is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one 
if the rating of bank i is downgraded. Pwatchlistit is a dummy variable 
taking a value equal to one if the rating is placed on the watchlist for a 
possible upgrade or has been confirmed after having been placed on the 
watchlist for a possible downgrade. Likewise, Nwatchlistit is a dummy 
variable taking a value equal to unity if the rating has been placed on the 
watchlist for a possible downgrade or has been confirmed after having been 
                                                          
15
 These models are estimated following a data pool model. We also analysed if it was appropriate 
to consider a random effects model or a fixed effects model by analysing the proportion of the 
variance of the disturbance that is explained by the random effects. The results showed that in all 
cases this proportion is nil and consequently it is not appropriate to consider a random effects 
model. Furthermore, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian test of whether it is appropriate to 
consider a simple OLS with fixed effects as against a random effects model, indicates that in all 
cases it is preferable to consider a simple OLS with individual effects rather than a random effects 
model. To determine whether the individual effects associated with each bank are significant or 
not, different tests were performed. We considered if the individual effects were jointly 
significant. The results showed that they were not significant. Therefore, the different tests 
indicate that it is preferable to estimate a data pool model rather than a panel data model. 
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placed on the watchlist for a possible upgrade. Poutlookit is a dummy 
variable that takes the value unity when there is a positive outlook or the 
outlook changes from negative to stable. Noutlookit is a dummy variable 
taking a value equal to unity when there is a negative outlook or a positive 
outlook changes to stable. Indexit, is the rating —measured by the index 
defined previously— of bank i immediately before the event. 
With the aim of controlling for the economic cycle of the country in 
which the bank’s shares are listed, we introduce the variation of the risk 
premium, measured by the difference of the interest rate spread in the long 
term bond (10 years) with respect to the German Bond, Tpremiumit. We 
also consider a set of year dummy variables: Yearit, which takes a value 
equal to one if the share is quoted in a given year and zero otherwise. 
Furthermore, we consider a continuous time variable, Trendit, 
corresponding to the day on which the event occurs. 
As referred to above, and as indicated by Hull et al. (2004) and Hill and 
Faff (2010), there is a possibility that the markets may anticipate rating 
signals as a consequence of news published earlier, leaked information, 
speculations, signals from the ratings awarded by other agencies and/or 
signals from the sovereign rating in the days previous to the event. For this 
reason, equation (2) considers the CARs during the ten days previous to 
the event (BeforeCARit). Therefore, if the rating signals are anticipated by 
the markets, this variable will be significant and the impact of the rating 
signal on the CAR at the time of the event will be less than expected. 
2.4.2. Granger causality test: ratings signals, stock markets and 
premium risk 
A second question of interest is the possibility that the rating agencies 
are not immune to the pressure occurring in the financial markets, and 
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consequently react to variations in the abnormal return on the shares of the 
banks evaluated and in the risk premium. Furthermore, it is also worth 
studying whether investors make their decisions to invest in a bank’s shares 
according to the rating information or also take into account other market 
indicators such as the risk premium.  
To answer these questions we follow the procedure of Afonso et al. 
(2012) calculating a Granger causality test between rating signals, 
abnormal returns and risk premium. To this end, the following equations 
are estimated separately:  
 
λ
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∑ ∑ ∑
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(5) 
where ∆Indexit refers to the rating signals occurring in the bank analysed i 
between days t and t-1. ∆ARit refers to the variation of the abnormal return 
on the share (i) and ∆Premiumit  refers to the variation in the risk premium 
between days t and t-1.  
Once equations (3), (4) and (5) have been estimated, the causality test 
consists of testing the joint significance of all coefficients accompanying 
the lagged variables. If all lagged variables are significant it will mean that 
they cause (in the Granger sense) the endogenous variable. That is, if in 
equation (3) past values of the variation of abnormal returns and/or in the 
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risk premium are jointly significant, changes in the financial markets will 
cause, in the Granger sense, variations in the ratings. That would imply that 
the rating agencies react to the events occurring in the financial markets 
not following completely a medium/long term (through the cycle) 
perspective as they defend in their methodological reports. 
Likewise, if in equations (4) and (5), the past values of the rating 
changes are significant, then the ratings cause, in the Granger sense, 
variations in abnormal returns and in the risk premium. Consequently, the 
rating signals have a significant impact on the financial markets. 
In order to control for the possible time effects in which the shares of 
bank i are quoted, equations (3), (4) and (5) introduce a year dummies 
variables and a continuous variable (Trend) that refers to the year and the 
day of quotation. Because the causal relationship is analysed in short term 
context, the number of lags is restricted from one day, one week (5 working 
days) and to two weeks (10 working days). 
2.5. Empirical results 
2.5.1. Impact of rating signals on abnormal returns 
This section presents the results of the estimation of equation (2), which 
analyses the effect of bank rating signals on Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs). In order to analyse the possible impact of the financial crisis, 
equation (2) is estimated separately for the periods before and since the 
start of the financial crisis. It is evident that financial crisis suppose a 
structural change in the relationship of these variables. So, the estimations 
are carried out separately for the two sub-periods: before and after the 
outburst of the crisis. 
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Table 2 captures the results of the estimation of equation (2), which 
analyses the impact of the different rating signals issued by Standard and 
Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, on the CARs during the period before the 
financial crisis. The results indicate that in the three rating agencies, rating 
upgrades have a significant positive effect on CARs. Specifically, in 
Standard and Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s rating upgrades imply an increase 
in CARs of 1.7%, 1.19% and 4.1%, respectively. That means that an 
increase in our credit rating scale the abnormal return will increase between 
1.7 and 4.1 percentage points. The fact that only rating upgrades have a 
significant effect on CARs is explained by the fact that before the financial 
crisis, the majority of signals issued involving a change in the rating level 
are positive as shown in Table 1. The positive effect of these signals can 
be interpreted according to the Asymmetric Information Hypothesis as an 
improvement in the expectations of the financial situation of the entities 
evaluated. On the contrary, in the case of Fitch we also find that the 
negative long term outlook (Noutlook) has a significant negative effect on 
the CARs. Exactly, a negative outlook implies a fall in CARs of 1.9%. This 
result reflects how investors reduce their investment in the shares of those 
banks to which Fitch issues a negative long term outlook.  
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Table 2. Effect of rating signals on CARs before the crisis 
Dependent variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during the event 
  Standard and Poor's  Fitch  Moody's 
Constant -0.094 **  
  
-0.089 *** 
  
-0.061     
Prating 0.017 *     0.019 **  
  
0.041 *** 
Nrating 0.005       0.009     
  
0.022     
Pwatchlist -0.025       0.026     
  
0.014     
Nwatchlist -0.001       0.006     
  
0.015     
Poutlook -0.004       0.003     
  
-0.011     
Noutlook -0.009       -0.019 *   
  
-0.001     
BeforeCAR 0.004 **    0.003     
  
-0.054     
Index -0.009      0.002 *   
  
0.000     
Tpremium 0.197      -0.063     
  
0.017     
Trend 5.23E-05      8.09E-05 *** 
  
6.85E-05     
N 718      1,210     524   
ll 721.208      1503.675    455.374  
R2 Adjusted 0.006      0.007     0.008   
Note: Results of the estimation of equation (2) for Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s during the period before 
the financial crisis. CAR refers to Cumulative abnormal return at the time of the event. BeforeCAR refers to the 
cumulative abnormal return in the ten days previous to the event. Tpremium refers to the variation of the 10-year 
spread between the German bond and the bond of the country where the share is listed. Prating (Nrating) is equal to 
unity if the issuer rating of the bank is upgraded (downgraded) and zero otherwise. Pwatchlist (Nwatchlist) is a dummy 
variable taking a value equal to one if a rating is placed on a watchlist for a possible upgrade (downgrade) of the 
rating or if the rating has been confirmed after having been placed on a watchlist for a possible downgrade (upgrade). 
Poutlook (Noutlook) is a dummy variable taking a value equal to unity when a positive (negative) outlook is 
announced or there is a change from a negative (positive) outlook to a stable one. Index, refers to the bank’s current 
rating level according to the index defined in this study. Finally, we include a set of year dummy variables, as well as 
a tendency (Trend) referencing the day of quotation. All the equations are estimated by pooled OLS as different test 
are performed to determine if there the individual effects associated with each bank are or not significant. *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
In the case of Standard and Poor’s part of the upgrade ratings are 
discounted by the investors as it is reflected in the significant coefficient 
of the variable BeforeCAR. Therefore, the impact of the signals issued by 
this agency have a less effect at the time of the event than expected.   
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It must be highlighted that in Fitch the impact of the signals issued is 
greater for the higher rating levels, as reflected in the positive and 
significant coefficient of the Index variable. This can be justified by the 
fact that in the regulation, for instance Basel II, makes an important 
distinction when defining different regulatory capital according to whether 
financial institutions are AAA rated, or rated in a lower category. Another 
example of the importance of the signals in the higher levels of ratings is 
found in the internal regulations of investment funds, insurance companies 
and pension funds, which are prevented from investing in assets that do not 
have the highest credit rating, i.e. AAA.  
Finally, as the last row of the Table 2 shows, the adjusted R-squared in 
the three rating agencies is between 0.6% and 0.8%. These small value of 
R-squared in each regression are due to the most of the signals during the 
period before the crisis (Table 1) are stable signals (reference category in 
the equation (2)) and thus the rating changes represent a small percentage. 
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of equation (2) for each of 
the agencies analysed during the financial crisis. On comparing the results 
presented in Table 3 with the results before the crisis (Table 2), we observe 
that there has been a significant change in the effect of the rating signals 
on the CARs. In Standard and Poor’s with the start of the crisis, both the 
upgrades ratings and watchlist have a significant effect on the CARs. 
Specifically, rating upgrades (Prating) imply an increase of the CARs of 
3.8%, and both positive and negative watchlists imply a variation of the 
CARs of 3.8% and -2.6 percentage points, respectively. The significant and 
positive effect of the rating upgrades and positive watchlist can be 
interpreted according to the hypothesis of Asymmetric   
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Table 3. Effect of rating signals on CARs in the crisis 
Dependent variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) during the event 
  Standard and Poor's Fitch Moody's 
Constant -0.148 * -0.339 * -0.086   
Prating 0.036 ** 0.034  0.028  
Nrating 0.008  -0.023  0.009  
Pwatchlist 0.038 *** 0.009  0.056 *** 
Nwatchlist -0.026 *** -0.032 * 0.019 *** 
Poutlook -0.015  -0.017  0.000  
Noutlook 0.005  0.044 *** -0.004  
Index -0.001  -0.057 * 0.050 *** 
BeforeCAR -0.033 * 0.003  0.000  
Tpremium -0.035 *** -0.068 * -0.027 *** 
Trend 7.21E-05 * 1.43E-04 * 3.59E-05  
N 1207   1590   1140   
ll 1201.274  125.793  1400.634  
R2 Adjusted 0.055   0.011   0.034   
Note: Results of the estimation of equation (2) for Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s during the period of 
financial crisis. CAR refers to Cumulative abnormal return at the time of the event. BeforeCAR refers to the 
cumulative abnormal return in the ten days previous to the event. Tpremium refers to the variation of the 10-year 
spread between the German bond and the bond of the country where the share is listed. Prating (Nrating) is equal to 
unity if the issuer rating of the bank is upgraded (downgraded) and zero otherwise. Pwatchlist (Nwatchlist) is a dummy 
variable taking a value equal to one if a rating is placed on a watchlist for a possible upgrade (downgrade) of the 
rating or if the rating has been confirmed after having been placed on a watchlist for a possible downgrade (upgrade). 
Poutlook (Noutlook) is a dummy variable taking a value equal to unity when a positive (negative) outlook is 
announced or there is a change from a negative (positive) outlook to a stable one. Index, refers to the bank’s current 
rating level according to the index defined in this study. Finally, we include a set of year dummy variables, as well as 
a tendency (Trend) referencing the day of quotation. All the equations are estimated by pooled OLS as different test 
are performed to determine if there the individual effects associated with each bank are or not significant.   *** 
Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Information Hypothesis as an improvement in the expectations of the asset 
situation of the banks evaluated. Conversely, the negative and significant 
effect of the negative watchlist can be interpreted following the same 
hypothesis as a deterioration on the expectations about the asset situation 
of the banks evaluated. Lastly, in this agency it should be noted that the 
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ratings signals are not discounted by the markets as it is reflected in the not 
significant coefficient of the variable BeforeCARit. 
In the case of Fitch, and unlike the period before the crisis, negative 
watchlists (Nwatchlist) and negative long term outlooks (Noutlook) have a 
significant effect on the CARs of -3.2 and 4.4 percentage points, 
respectively. This implies that the investors interpret a negative watchlist 
according the Asymmetric Information Hypothesis as a deterioration in the 
expectations of the financial situation of the entities evaluated. One 
explanation for the positive effect of negative long term outlooks on CARs 
may be based on the Wealth Redistribution Hypothesis. Some investors 
may increase their appetite for risk and consequently increase their 
investment in the shares of the banks that present a greater risk in order to 
obtain a higher return. Another possible explanation may be that investors 
expected the rating to be downgraded when finally only a negative long 
term outlook has been issued.  
In Moody’s the rating signals that have a significant effect on the CARs 
are the short term perspectives (watchlist). In this context, positive 
(Pwatchlist) and negative (Nwatchlist) watchlists imply an increase in 
CARs of 5.6 and 1.9 percentage points, respectively.  
Therefore, these results show that the impact that the watchlist and 
outlooks have in the market is at least as important as rating changes (e.g. 
Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012; Alsakka and Gwilym, 2013). In 
this context the report of the IMF (2010) points out that the rating agencies 
have a certification role in the regulation mainly through issuing outlooks 
and watchlists about the possible change of the rating.  
The information contained in the rating signals issued by Fitch and 
Moody’s is partly discounted by the financial markets in the ten days 
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previous to the date of the event, as reflected by the significant coefficient 
of the variable BeforeCAR. Consequently, the impact of the rating signals 
on shares is less than it would be if the markets did not anticipate these 
signals. This fact can be explained that during the crisis, in Fitch and 
Moody’s the ratings changes are not significant and the sign of the outlooks 
and watchlists is contrary to the expected according to the Asymmetric 
Information Hypothesis. 
Furthermore, it has to be emphasised that in the three agencies the 
signals have a greater impact in those markets where the financial crisis 
occurs with less intensity, as reflected in the significant negative 
coefficient of the variation of the risk premium, for each percentage point 
of increase in the risk premium, the abnormal return decreases between 2.7 
and 6.8 percentage points. The significance of the premium risk also shows 
as the investors react to the variation in the risk of the countries where the 
banks’ shares are listed. 
Altogether, with the financial crisis there is a significant change in the 
effect of rating signals on the abnormal returns on banks. Investors react 
not only to rating upgrades and downgrades but also to the bank’s positive 
and negative outlooks. This implies that with the start of the financial crisis 
investors have increased their risk aversion in the crisis, as against the 
period before the crisis when only positive rating signals had a significant 
effect on CARs. Despite the significant effect of issuer rating signals, it 
must be pointed out that part of the information that these signals provide 
is previously discounted by investors due to the leak of private information, 
the effect of the signals previously issued by the competing agencies and/or 
those issued regarding the sovereign rating, or other market mechanisms.  
Doctoral Thesis by Carlos Salvador Muñoz: Financial crisis and bank ratings 
 
 
72 
 
2.5.2. Causal relationship between ratings signals, stock markets 
and premium risk 
This section presents the results of the analysis of the causal relationship 
between the variations occurring in abnormal returns, the risk premium and 
ratings based on the estimation of equations (3), (4) and (5). With this 
purpose, in Tables 4 and 5 we present the results of the Granger test for the 
periods before and since the start of the financial crisis, respectively. Each 
of these tables is divided into three panels that show the results for each 
agency. These panels are divided, in turn, into three sections (section A, B 
and C) that show the test of the joint significance of the coefficients of the 
lagged variables which explain each of the endogenous variables 
considered in equations (3), (4) and (5). 
In Tables 4 and 5 we observe that both in the period before and during 
the crisis, in Standard and Poor’s and in Fitch there exists a causal 
relationship between ratings and abnormal returns. In the subpanel A of the 
panel I and panel II, we can observe that the coefficients of the lagged 
values of the abnormal returns are jointly significant when estimating 
equation (3). Similarly, in the subpanel B of the Panel I and Panel II, lagged 
values of ratings changes are jointly significant in the estimation of 
equation (4). This result, similar to that obtained by Afonso et al. (2012), 
implies that the changes in ratings produce a change in the abnormal 
returns of their shares, and vice versa. Furthermore, this confirms the 
results obtained in the estimation of equation (2) that the ratings contain 
significant information that seems to be unknown by investors and 
therefore they change their strategies when the rating agencies issue a 
rating signal. The fact that the lagged values of the   
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Table 4. Granger causality test. Before the crisis 
 
Note: The Equations (3)-(5) are estimated taking into account the time effects when the share is listed. To test the 
jointly significance of the coefficients accompanying the lagged variables that cause in the sense of Granger the 
endogenous variable, we use F-Statistic and the corresponding p-value .The number of lags in each of the tests is 1, 
5, and 10, corresponding to one day, one week and two weeks, respectively. The Panels I, II, III refer to Standard and 
Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively. In each panel, A, B and C sections refers to the test of joint significance of 
coefficients of the lagged variables in the equation (3), (4) and (5), respectively. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant 
at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Panel I. S tandard and Poor's, Hypotesis:
Section I.A
Standard and Poor's ratings are not caused by F P-Value F P-Value F P-Value
Stock markets 0.01 0.94 2.12 0.06 ** 29.65 0.00 ***
Risk premium 0.03 0.86 0.03 1.00 90.04 0.00 ***
Section I.B
Stock markets are not caused by 
Standard and Poor's 4.61 0.03 ** 2.61 0.02 ** 2.99 0.00 ***
Risk premium 0.07 0.78 1.99 0.08 * 1.54 0.12
Section I.C
Risk premium are not caused by 
Standard and Poor's 0.16 0.69 0.05 1.00 0.02 1.00
Stock markets 0.11 0.74 0.80 0.55 1.03 0.41
Panel II. Fitch, Hypotesis:
Section II.A
Fitch ratings are not caused by F P-Value F P-Value F P-Value
Stock markets 1.47 0.23 2.90 0.01 ** 3.49 0.00 ***
Risk premium 0.01 0.94 0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00
Section II.B
Stock markets not caused by 
Fitch 4.35 0.04 ** 5.26 0.00 *** 3.34 0.00 ***
Risk premium 0.05 0.83 2.00 0.08 * 1.82 0.05 *
Section II.C
Risk premium not caused by 
Fitch 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.34 0.97
Stock markets 0.23 0.63 0.17 0.97 0.95 0.49
Panel III. Moody's, Hypotesis:
Section III.A
Moody's ratings are not caused by F P-Value F P-Value F P-Value
Stock markets 0.74 0.39 1.49 0.19 0.81 0.62
Risk premium 0.12 0.73 0.05 1.00 0.03 1.00
Section III.B
Stock markets are not caused by 
Moody's 2.35 0.13 1.65 0.14 1.61 0.10
Risk premium 0.31 0.58 1.30 0.26 1.50 0.13
Section III.C
Risk premium are not caused by 
Moody's 0.00 0.99 0.03 1.00 0.02 1.00
Stock markets 0.73 0.39 0.70 0.62 1.17 0.31
1 Lag 5 Lag 10 Lag
1 Lag 5 Lag 10 Lag
1 Lag 5 Lag 10 Lag
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Table 5. Granger causality test. Financial crisis 
 
Note: The Equations (3)-(5) are estimated taking into account the time effects when the share is listed. To test the 
jointly significance of the coefficients accompanying the lagged variables that cause in the sense of Granger the 
endogenous variable, we use F-Statistic and the corresponding p-value .The number of lags in each of the tests is 1, 
5, and 10, corresponding to one day, one week and two weeks, respectively. The Panels I, II, III refer to Standard and 
Poor’s, Fitch and Moody’s, respectively. In each panel, A, B and C sections refers to the test of joint significance of 
coefficients of the lagged variables in the equation (3), (4) and (5), respectively. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant 
at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Panel I. S tandard and Poor's, Hypotesis:
Section I.A
Standard and Poor's ratings are not caused by F P-Value F P-Value F P-Value
Stock markets 1.81 0.18 3.10 0.01 ** 2.92 0.00 ***
Risk premium 9.82 0.00 *** 4.98 0.00 *** 2.95 0.00 ***
Section I.B
Stock markets are not caused by 
Standard and Poor's 1.66 0.20 11.16 0.00 *** 8.20 0.00 ***
Risk premium 3.66 0.06 * 15.17 0.00 *** 21.74 0.00 ***
Section I.C
Risk premium are not caused by 
Standard and Poor's 2.75 0.10 3.74 0.00 *** 19.70 0.00 ***
Stock markets 10.55 0.00 *** 42.88 0.00 *** 32.79 0.00 ***
Panel II. Fitch, Hypotesis:
Section II.A
Fitch ratings are not caused by F P-Value F P-Value F P-Value
Stock markets 12.47 0.00 *** 6.53 0.00 *** 5.33 0.00 ***
Risk premium 4.17 0.04 ** 32.26 0.00 *** 21.30 0.00 ***
Section II.B
Stock markets not caused by 
Fitch 7.43 0.01 ** 8.07 0.00 *** 7.56 0.00 ***
Risk premium 0.71 0.40 9.92 0.00 *** 12.37 0.00 ***
Section II.C
Risk premium not caused by 
Fitch 0.53 0.47 1.33 0.25 1.65 0.09 *
Stock markets 7.38 0.01 ** 23.10 0.00 *** 18.33 0.00 ***
Panel III. Moody's, Hypotesis:
Section III.A
Moody's ratings are not caused by F P-Value F P-Value F P-Value
Stock markets 0.04 0.85 1.04 0.39 0.92 0.51
Risk premium 0.04 0.84 0.36 0.88 2.07 0.02 **
Section III.B
Stock markets are not caused by 
Moody's 1.38 0.24 1.42 0.21 0.82 0.61
Risk premium 7.20 0.01 ** 17.56 0.00 *** 19.34 0.00 ***
Section III.C
Risk premium are not caused by 
Moody's 1.02 0.31 1.71 0.13 2.24 0.01 **
Stock markets 9.16 0.00 *** 43.62 0.00 *** 35.39 0.00 ***
1 Lag 5 Lag 10 Lag
1 Lag 5 Lag 10 Lag
1 Lag 5 Lag 10 Lag
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change in the abnormal returns are significant on the equation (3) implies 
that the rating agencies are not immune to the variations occurring in the 
stock markets and therefore their ratings do not totally follow the through-
the-cycle strategy, despite what they claim in their methodological reports 
as pointed out, among others, by Bangia et al. (2002) and Salvador et al. 
(2014).  
With regard to the impact of the variations of the risk premium, we 
deduce from Tables 4 and 5 that their impact is different before and during 
the financial crisis. As we observe in sections B and C of Panels I and II of 
Table 4, before the financial crisis the null hypothesis of not significance 
of the lagged values of the premium risk change can only be rejected in the 
equation (3) for Standard and Poor’s, and for Fitch in equation (4). These 
results imply that before the crisis, the risk premium has a significant 
impact only on the rating changes of Standard and Poor’s and on the 
abnormal returns of the banks evaluated by Fitch. 
On the other hand, in Table 5 we observe in sections A and B of the 
three panels (I, II, III) that during the crisis the null hypothesis of not 
significance of the lagged values of premium risk can be rejected in the 
equations (3) and (4). Therefore, the changes in the risk premium have a 
significant impact on the rating changes and the abnormal returns of the 
three rating agencies. This result first provides empirical evidence of the 
relationship existing between the banks and the perception of the markets 
about the financial situation of governments during the financial crisis. 
Secondly, it shows that with the crisis, there is an increase in investors’ risk 
aversion because the investors react to the changes in the risk premium of 
the country where the banks’ shares are listed. Thirdly, this result shows, 
Doctoral Thesis by Carlos Salvador Muñoz: Financial crisis and bank ratings 
 
 
76 
 
as in the case of abnormal returns, that the ratings are not totally 
independent of the pressures occurring in the financial markets.  
In the same Table 5, the null hypothesis that both the abnormal returns 
and the ratings do not cause the premium risk is rejected. Thus, this result 
suggests that with the financial crisis the perception of the investors about 
the country risk that is measured by the premium risk depends on the 
abnormal returns and on the change of the ratings. 
The causal relationship between the bank ratings and the risk premium 
can be explained by the fact that with the financial crisis many Euro area 
governments (for example Spain) rescued some financial institutions that 
experienced a significant downgrade rating.16 This implied an increase in 
public debt and, consequently, an increase in the probability of sovereign 
default and the risk premium. At the same time, as it is noted by Blundell-
Wignall and Slovik (2010) banks held substantial sovereign debt of their 
own country.17 Thus a change on the banks ratings could be interpreted by 
the investors as a change on the risk of the country where the banks’ shares 
are listed and vice versa.  
Altogether, these results provide evidence of the existence of a 
significant relationship between the variations in the ratings of banks and 
the variations occurring in the stock markets and the risk premium. A 
relationship that intensifies with the start of the financial crisis and 
                                                          
16
 Some examples of the interventions was that performed in Spain on Caja Castilla La Mancha 
and Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo. In other countries the intervention of Royal Bank of 
Scotland, UBS, Morgan Stanley and Bank of Ireland stand out. 
17
 Blundell-Wignall and Slovik (2010) find evidence that the banks of the United Kingdom have 
a high exposure to the sovereign debt of the PIGS: Spain (5916 M. €), Italy (10029M. €), Portugal 
(2571 M. €), Ireland (5580 M. €) and Greece (4131 M. €). Consequently, a downgrade of the 
sovereign rating of these countries will affect the asset situation of the British banks. 
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demonstrates the greater risk aversion not only of investors but also of the 
rating agencies.  
2.6. Conclusions 
This study analyses the effect that banks’ issuer rating signals have on the 
returns on shares of the Eurozone banks during the period 2002-2012. This 
allows us to determine whether investors respond to the announcements of 
bank ratings. Furthermore, this period allows to determine the differential 
impact that the financial crisis had on the effect of the banks’ issuer rating 
signals on the returns of their shares. This is due to the change in the 
tendency of the ratings that occurs with the financial crisis. Before the 
crisis, stable and positive rating signals dominated. However, once the 
crisis began negative rating signals dominated. 
To analyse the impact of the bank rating signals on the abnormal shares 
returns we regress the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) on the 
changes on ratings, watchlists and outlooks during the period before and 
during the financial crises. The results obtained show that before the 
financial crisis only rating upgrades had a significant and positive effect on 
abnormal returns. On the other hand, during the crisis and with the financial 
uncertainty that occurs with the subprime crises and the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the negative rating signals have a 
significant negative effect. Therefore, these results show the change on 
tendency of the ratings and that with the crisis the investors have increased 
their risk aversion. Although it should be noted that part of the information 
contained in rating signals is anticipated by investors due to different 
reasons as can be the leak of private information, the signals issued 
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previously by the competing agencies and/or the signals issued regarding 
the sovereign rating.  
When analysing the possible causal relationship between banks’ issuer 
ratings, abnormal returns and risk premium, the results offer evidence in 
favour of the hypothesis that ratings do not remain totally immune to the 
changes occurring in the financial markets. This relationship is intensified 
with the crisis and the consequent turbulence in the financial markets. Thus 
these results suggest that the ratings do not present the through-the-cycle 
behaviour as the rating agencies defend in their methodological reports. 
Furthermore, in the financial crisis, abnormal returns have increased their 
response to the variations in the risk premium, demonstrating that 
investors, as well as rating agencies, take into account other market 
indicators when defining their investment strategies in stock markets. 
Lastly, the results obtained show that the risk premium also depends during 
the crisis, especially in Standard and Poor’s, on the banks ratings signals. 
This adds evidence that the investors and rating agencies note a close 
interconnection between the asset situation of the financial institutions and 
sovereigns during the financial crisis in both directions. 
Overall, these results provide evidence that although the rating agencies 
are in the firing line because of the mistakes made before the start of the 
crisis, their ratings continue to have a significant impact on the financial 
markets (Bank of England, 2011). This highlights the increasing interest of 
authorities in the regulation and supervision of rating agencies, since 
ratings have a significant impact on the stability of the financial markets. 
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Appendix A.2. Ratings scale of the rating agencies and the 
numerical scale defined  
 
Note: As numerical scale decreases, the credit quality also decrease with an increase of the probability of default 
increases. The bottom categories are grouped, due to the small number of observations in the sample. WR refers to a 
rating that is withdrawn 
Source: Own elaboration and methodological reports of rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch)
Rating  Scale Rating  Scale Rating  Scale
AAA 20 AAA 20 Aaa 20
AA+ 19 AA+ 19 Aa1 19
AA 18 AA 18 Aa2 18
AA- 17 AA- 17 Aa3 17
A+ 16 A+ 16 A1 16
A 15 A 15 A2 15
A- 14 A- 14 A3 14
BBB+ 13 BBB+ 13 Baa1 13
BBB 12 BBB 12 Baa2 12
BBB- 11 BBB- 11 Baa3 11
BB+ 10 BB+ 10 Ba1 20
BB 9 BB 9 Ba2 19
BB- 8 BB- 8 Ba3 18
B+ 7 B+ 7 B1 17
B 6 B 6 B2 16
B- 5 B- 5 B3 15
CCC+ 4 CCC+ 4 Caa1 14
CCC 3 CCC 3 Caa2 13
CCC- 2 CCC- 2 Caa3 12
CC 1 CC 1 Ca 11
C 1 C 1 C 2
D 1 D 1 D 1
WR - WR - WR -
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3. Impact of the subprime crisis on bank ratings: 
The effect of the hardening of rating policies and 
worsening of solvency 
3.1. Introduction 
THE outbreak of the subprime crisis in the summer of 2007 and the 
continued falls in the ratings of structured products and sovereign bonds 
have reopened the debate on the quality of ratings and the role of the Credit 
Rating Agencies (CRAs) in the financial markets. As mentioned in the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011) the rating agencies used wrong 
models before the crisis to rate the structured products issued by banks with 
the aim of increasing market share and profits. This is not the first time that 
the CRAs have been under scrutiny. As pointed out by Duff and Einig 
(2009), the debate began as a result of the rating agencies’ inability to value 
correctly the risks in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and in the 
bankruptcies of Enron and Parmalat at the beginning of this century.18 As 
the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (2010) indicates, the rating 
agencies undertook a review of the ratings issued, as well as updated the 
rating criteria and models in response to the criticisms received. 
Specifically, as pointed out in Deprés (2011), after having relaxed their 
                                                          
18
 For example, Enron in the days before its bankruptcy presented an investment-grade rating, 
which according to Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, reflected a good credit quality. 
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criteria in the year prior to the crisis, the rating agencies hardened their 
criteria, thus causing a general fall of ratings. This fall aggravated the 
economic situation even more, since for many governments and firms, 
which were in economic difficulties, it meant a significant hardening in 
conditions of access to the capital markets. 
At the same time, since 2007, financial institutions, especially in Europe 
and in the US, have suffered the effects of a financial crisis without 
precedent since the crash of ‘29. According to the Financial Stability 
Report of the European Central Bank (2008 a,b), profitability has been 
reduced, and problems of solvency and liquidity have arisen. The fall in 
profits has made internal generation of capital more difficult, thus 
increasing dependence on external financing. There has also been an 
increase in the cost of financing and a loss of credit quality. In these 
circumstances, together with an increase of general uncertainty in banking 
activity, the solvency levels of banks have deteriorated, particularly in 
those with greater need for short term liquidity, with excessive dependence 
on wholesale markets, with a below-average level of reserves, and/or with 
heavy exposure to structured products such as Asset-Backed Securities 
(ABS). In this sense, as pointed out in Higgins et al. (2009) the downgrade 
that occurred in ABS had an impact on the performance of the originating 
bank’s parent.  
The consequence of these processes has been a significant worsening 
of ratings. The adjustment has been so severe that doubts arise as to 
whether this is totally justified by the worsening of banks’ solvency, or on 
the contrary there has also been a change in the rating policies of the 
agencies, which following the criticisms received are much more 
scrupulous and prudent when issuing their ratings. It is consequently 
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hypothesised that the adjustment in the ratings is not justified in its entirety 
by the worsening of the solvency of the banks, but also in large part is due 
to the hardening of the agencies’ valuation criteria. In this context, the aim 
of this chapter is to design a methodology that will permit this hypothesis 
to be tested, separating the adjustment observed in the ratings into two 
additive components: one associated with the deterioration of the banks’ 
solvency and future perspectives, and another associated with the change 
in the agencies’ valuation criteria. 
To analyse this question we use as our laboratory the Spanish Banking 
System (SBS), during the period 2000-2009.19 This period permits us to 
analyse the impact that the subprime crisis has had, both on the solvency 
of banks and on the behaviour of the rating agencies. The SBS is an 
especially suitable market for analysing this question because from the 
mid-1990s to the year 2007 it experienced very strong economic growth. 
Specifically, as shown in chapter 4 of the Bank of Spain’s Statistical 
Bulletin (2011), between 1997 and 2007 the Spanish Banking Sector grew 
by 11.94% annually in terms of assets. This growth was grounded on the 
concentration of activities in credit and especially on activities related with 
construction and property development. In 2007, credit for construction 
(construction, real estate and purchase of dwellings) represented 61.3% of 
the total credit, nearly 20% more than 1997. This strong growth in credit 
was accompanied by high levels of profitability (ROA above the European 
average), low levels of doubtful assets and unlimited access to international 
markets. Responding to this reality, the rating obtained by the banks was 
high. However, as shown by several Financial Stability Reports of the 
                                                          
19
 The last year is 2009, because we have no more recent data from the database used. 
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Bank of Spain (2009, 2010), with the outbreak of the subprime crisis, the 
assets of the credit institutions deteriorated rapidly. Profitability, liquidity 
and coverage by provisions were drastically reduced. At the same time 
doubtful assets grew exponentially and greater capital resources were 
needed. As a consequence there was a restructuring process characterised 
by the merging of several savings banks and adjustment in the branch 
network. Thus the SBS allows us to study how the CRAs adjust their rating 
policy in a country that experienced a global crisis and a national crisis 
marked by a housing bubble. 
Among the different types of rating, in this study we use the banks’ long 
term issuer ratings issued by the agencies Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, and 
Moody’s. This choice is made fundamentally for three reasons. First, the 
ratings play an important role in the banking industry, because as affirmed 
by Morgan (2002), traditionally this sector has been described as non-
transparent and with problems of asymmetrical information, due to the 
uncertainty associated with the principal assets constituting the balance 
sheets of the banks (loans and other financial assets)20. In this sense, the 
ratings resolve part of the problem, allowing the banks to access the capital 
markets and the interbank markets on better terms, paying credit 
differentials more fitting to their credit risk profile. Second, the literature 
on identification of the determinants and prediction of banks’ ratings is 
limited, most of it focussing on sovereign risk and on other industries. In 
                                                          
20
 Morgan (2002) describes loans as opaque, illiquid and a source of uncertainty, because loans 
granted to retail customers are difficult to monitor. He also considers that negotiable assets 
present high uncertainty given the ease with which positions can change and the difficulty of 
monitoring them. According to this author, the dominance of these assets in the balance sheet, 
together with the banks’ high degree of leverage, create uncertainty for investors and analysts. 
This explains the discrepancy existing among the rating agencies when issuing a rating of these 
firms. 
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this sense, the studies by Morgan (2002), Godlewski (2007), Iannotta et al. 
(2008), Peresetsky and Karminsky (2008), Bellotti et al. (2011), Caporale 
et al. (2011) must be highlighted. Except Morgan (2002) and Iannotta et 
al. (2008), the rest of the studies use exclusively the individual ratings from 
Fitch or Moody’s. In this way, only the intrinsic financial situation of the 
banks is being measured, without taking into account the external support 
that these entities have from their proprietors and/or the economic 
authorities. This is important, because as observed in the subprime crisis, 
the economic authorities came to the rescue of the banks with difficulties 
with the aim of preventing their failure (Packer and Tarashev, 2011).21 
Therefore, as indicated by the methodological reports of the rating 
agencies, Fitch (2003, 2009, 2010 and 2011), Moody’s22 (2007 a, b), and 
Standard and Poor’s (2010 and 2011), individual ratings measure neither 
the probability of failure nor the total credit quality of the banks, but are 
the first step in evaluating the credit quality of financial institutions. 
Consequently, this study uses issuer ratings since we aim to analyse the 
impact of the subprime crisis on the behaviour of the banks’ ratings taking 
into account the support that they have from the authorities and from their 
proprietors. Furthermore these ratings are used because the objective is to 
                                                          
21
 An example of these interventions was that performed in Spain on Caja Castilla La Mancha 
and Caja de Ahorros del Mediterráneo. In other countries the intervention of Royal Bank of 
Scotland, UBS, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Bank of Ireland stand out. It should also 
be noted that some large institutions were compelled to merge with strong banks and to accept 
support from the authorities to prevent their failure. Among these entities are Caja Sur, Fortis, 
Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Dresdner Bank and Bear Stearns. 
22
 This report is considered because according to Moody’s (2007a) in the introduction on how to 
construct a bank rating, the first thing taken into account is the rating that evaluates only the 
bank’s intrinsic financial solidity (BFRS) and then after its conversion to the Baseline Credit 
Assessment scale (BCA) the external support (JDA) that the banks receive from their owners 
and/or from the economic authorities is incorporated. 
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carry out a homogeneous analysis of ratings among the three rating 
agencies considered (Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, and Moody’s).23 
To test the starting hypothesis we design a two-stage methodology. In 
the first stage we estimate the determinants of the probability that a bank 
will be allotted a particular rating. On the basis of these determinants we 
test whether the importance assigned to each of these determinants 
explaining the agencies’ rating policy has changed with the start of the 
financial crisis. From the results of this first stage, in a second stage the 
variation undergone by the banks’ ratings is decomposed into two 
components: one part due to the change in the creditworthiness of the banks 
and the other part deriving from the hardening of rating policies. To 
perform these analyses we use the long term issuer ratings of Fitch’s, 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. Furthermore we use Fitch’s ratings with 
lags, and the individual ratings of this agency and Moody’s. 
The results obtained show that with the subprime crisis there is an 
average fall in ratings of 10.88%. Of the total change in ratings, 74.85% is 
due to the worsening solvency of the banks, and 25.15% to the hardening 
of the rating policy of the CRAs. This hardening of the rating criteria 
confirms the procyclical character of the rating agencies, amply 
demonstrated by other studies in the literature.24 The results also show that 
size is an important factor for explaining the evolution of the rating. 
Specifically, the results indicate that small and medium sized banks have 
                                                          
23
 Most of the banks evaluated by the rating agencies considered in this study (Fitch, Moody’s 
and/or Standard and Poor’s) use the issuer ratings in their annual reports to show their credit 
quality at corporate level.  
24
 This procyclical behaviour has been expounded by other authors such as Deprés (2011), Bangia 
et al. (2002), Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2005), Amato and Furfine (2004) and Zicchino (2006). 
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suffered a greater fall in their ratings. Furthermore the results reflect the 
fact that the legal form of the banks also influences the behaviour of 
ratings. Thus the small and medium-sized savings banks have been 
penalized more intensely by the rating agencies. This last result is 
explained by the business model followed by a number of the savings 
banks, based on the traditional credit activity, and concentrated on 
activities relating to bricks and mortar, which were heavily punished with 
the outbreak of the subprime crisis and the property bubble. Another factor 
is that the rating agencies consider that the savings banks are politicised 
and thus their corporate governance is more rigid and conservative.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains a 
brief review of the literature on ratings prediction models. Section 3.3 
specifies the sample used and analyses the principal descriptive statistics 
that allow the behaviour of ratings to be analysed. Section 3.4 presents the 
empirical models with which we model the probability of obtaining a given 
rating as a function of the determinants that define banks’ credit quality. 
Section 3.5 sets out the empirical results of Fitch. Section 3.6 the observed 
evolution of the ratings is decomposed into one component derived from 
the banks’ financial and economic situation and another derived from the 
hardening of the rating agencies’ criteria. Section 3.7 analyses the results 
of Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and other types of ratings, and finally 
Section 3.8 sets out the conclusions. 
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3.2. A review of the literature on ratings prediction models  
The literature on modelling and prediction of banking ratings is sparse. As 
remarked above, very few studies focus exclusively on the modelling and 
prediction of bank ratings. Morgan (2002) analyses the factors explaining 
the discrepancies among rating agencies when issuing the ratings of 
financial institutions given the opacity and the problems of asymmetrical 
information presented by this type of entities. For this, this author uses a 
logit model with fixed effects and a probit model with ordered data, and 
concludes that the discrepancies are due to the uncertainty presented by the 
assets that principally form the banks’ balance sheets (loans and other 
financial assets). Iannotta et al. (2008) evaluate the influence of the 
ownership structure of banks in the EU on Standard and Poor’s issuer 
ratings and on Fitch’s individual and issuer ratings. Using an ordered logit 
model the authors find evidence that publicly owned banks receive a higher 
rating and therefore present lower risk of insolvency than private banks. 
Peresetsky and Karminsky (2008) use an ordered logit model to identify 
the determinants of Moody’s Foreign-currency long term Deposit Rating 
(DR) and Bank Financial Strength Ratings (BFSR). They find that 
Moody’s does not consider only the banks’ internal factors, but also takes 
into account external factors such as political risk.25 Bellotti et al. (2011) 
focus on the prediction and identification of the determinants of bank 
ratings through the use of an ordered logit model and of the technique 
known as Support Vector Machine (SVM). Caporale et al. (2011) try to 
                                                          
25 It should be noted that in Peresetsky and Karminsky (2008) the accuracy of the predictions of 
BFRS is greater than in DR because not all the non-financial factors determining DR are 
considered. 
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determine whether there are systematic differences in Fitch’s individual 
ratings, between the banks of different countries of the EU. Using ordered 
probit and logit models they identify the determinants of bank ratings and 
find that significant differences exist among the banks of different 
countries. This result together with that obtained by Peresetsky and 
Karminsky (2008) shows the influence of external factors (the legal 
framework, the support of authorities and/or owners, etc.) over the banks’ 
ratings. This shows the need to work with issuer ratings when measuring 
the credit quality of an entity and how individual ratings must be used as a 
complement to these. Finally, Packer and Tarashev (2011) analyse the 
behaviour of the three main rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s 
and Fitch) in the evaluation of banks. They find evidence that with the 
outbreak of the subprime crisis, the ratings fall and the differences between 
agencies decrease. These authors also highlight the importance of 
considering the external support that the banks received from the economic 
authorities.  
Most of the existing studies in the literature on identification of the 
determinants and prediction of ratings have focussed on the rating of 
sovereign risk. Consequently it is in this field where the precision of the 
different econometric techniques used has been developed and debated in 
greatest detail. As a starting point we take the study by Cantor and Packer 
(1996) which attempts to identify the determinants of sovereign ratings 
using a linear regression model (OLS) within a cross-sectional context. 
This same line has been followed by other authors. Specifically, Alexe et 
al. (2003) apply a non-recursive multiple regression model, Butler and 
Fauver (2006) use a two-stage ordinary least square model (2SLS) and 
Ratha et al. (2011) use a simple linear regression model. The main 
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limitation presented by earlier studies is that they do not take individual 
effects into account, so the results may be biased. For this reason, other 
studies use panel data models which take into account these individual 
effects. Among these studies we would highlight Monfort and Mulder 
(2000), Eliasson (2002), Borio and Packer (2004) and finally Canuto et al. 
(2012). 
The disadvantage of the above techniques is that they are based on a 
linear representation of ratings, thus ignoring the fact that ratings are 
ordinal measures, are not continuous in their distribution, and the distances 
between the different categories are not identical. It must be emphasised 
that though this distance may be identical, biased results may occur when 
there are ratings at the extremes of the rating scale. To overcome this 
problem Reisen and Maltzan (1999) use a logistic transformation, while 
Afonso (2003) also applies an exponential transformation of ratings. This 
problem can also be overcome by using a probit model with ordered data, 
as done by Treviño and Thomas (2001), Hu et al. (2002), Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick (2005), Afonso et al. (2009), Hill et al. (2010) and Alsakka and 
Gwilym (2009, 2010).  
Another field on which the literature on identification of the 
determinants and prediction of ratings has focussed on has been the rating 
of the bond issues of different industries. In this field, as in the valuation 
of sovereign risk, special emphasis has been placed on comparing the 
accuracy of the different econometric techniques when predicting ratings. 
In this sense it should be mentioned that the techniques traditionally used, 
as indicated by Altman and Saunders (1997), have been multivariate 
discriminant analysis, the logit model and the probit model. Kamstra et al. 
(2001), on the other hand, suggest the combination of different methods 
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for predicting bond ratings. These methods are the combination of OLS 
models, Multinomial Discriminant Analysis (MDA) models with equal 
proportional probabilities, and ordered models (logit and probit). 
Specifically, this author uses his own model (Kamstra and Kennedy, 1998), 
which is a combination of an MDA model and an ordered probit model. 
The results obtained in their study show that this model and a modification 
of it improve the accuracy of predictions over the standard models. Kim 
(2005) uses a non-parametric artificial intelligence technique to model the 
dynamic relationship among the variables that define the determinants of 
the ratings for bonds. With this technique this author identifies the 
determinants of the ratings for bonds, and also performs prediction 
exercises with high precision. Other authors, Huang et al. (2004) and Lee 
(2007) have recently used the Support Vector Machine (SVM) technique, 
reaching the conclusion that this non-parametric technique does not enable 
better predictions than the ordered models (logit and probit). 
Among the works that study the bond ratings of different industries, 
Altman and Rijken (2004 and 2006) stand out. These authors try to value 
the importance of the through-the-cycle policy, based on the prediction of 
the probability of failure in the long term, and the prudent ratings migration 
policy as against the point-in-time rating policy focused on predicting the 
probability of failure in the short term. For this reason, by means of a logit 
model, they estimate the probability of default in the short and long term. 
Furthermore, using a logit model with ordered data that permits prediction 
of the rating, these authors demonstrate that the rating agencies focus on 
the prudent through-the-cycle rating policy, modifying only the regulatory 
environments when a permanent change occurs in the credit quality of the 
issuer.  
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Poon and Chan (2010) analyse the relationship between solicited and 
unsolicited ratings and the level of creditworthiness of non-financial 
companies. To do this, these authors use the long-term issuer ratings of 
Standard and Poor's for the period 1998-2003 and Wooldridge's 
instrumental variables technique. The results show that companies with a 
solicited rating have a higher level of solvency than the entities that have 
an unsolicited rating. Specifically, these entities tend to have a higher level 
of profits, liquidity and lower leverage than the entities with unsolicited 
ratings.  
Finally, one group of studies focuses on analysing the behaviour of 
ratings, and predicting them, using the so-called transition matrices. 
Outstanding in this sense are the study by Jafry and Schuermann (2004), 
which sets out the different methodologies for the implementation of this 
technique, and the study by Nickell et al. (2000) which demonstrates the 
importance of considering the economic cycle when analysing the 
probabilities of transition of the ratings and defines a system for defining 
the different states of the economic cycle. Other studies that analyse the 
influence of the economic cycle on the behaviour of the ratings are Bangia 
et al. (2002), Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2005), Amato and Furfine (2004), 
Zicchino (2006) and Deprés (2011). The result that they obtain is that the 
agencies present a procyclical character, characterised by a relaxation of 
the rating criteria during times of economic expansion and by a hardening 
of the criteria at times of economic recession. Deprés (2011) stands out 
among these studies for its relationship with our study, as it incorporates 
in its sample (1981-2009) the negative effect of the subprime crisis on the 
behaviour of the ratings. 
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3.3. Sample 
The sample contains 2379 observations of quarterly long term issuer 
ratings from three of the main rating agencies in the world (Fitch, Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s).26 We use quarterly ratings because these can be 
changed during the year, and the accounting information that measures the 
creditworthiness of banks and saving banks is available each quarter. The 
period is from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2009 and 
includes 1681 quarterly accounting observations of 44 credit institutions27, 
representing 90.33% of the total assets of the SBS in 2009. This period of 
time allows us to analyse the behaviour of the ratings before and after the 
subprime crisis in the three principal CRAs.28 The type of financial 
institutions analysed are banks and savings banks. The ratings were 
obtained from the databases CreditViews of Reuters and Bankscope of 
Bureau van Dijk. The accounting information relating to the statistical 
yearbook was obtained from the Spanish Banking Association (AEB) and 
the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA). 
The categorical scale of ratings has been transformed into a numerical 
scale, formed of 6 categories, as specified in Appendix A.3 of this 
                                                          
26
 The type of rating used is the so called issuer rating. This reflects the credit quality of the 
issuers evaluated by Fitch, Standard and Poor’s or Moody’s, taking into account the external 
support that they may receive in event of difficulties (situation of failure) with the aim of 
preventing default on their obligations.  
27
 Outliers detected have been excluded from the sample. The initial number of quarterly 
accounting observations was 1912. 
28
 The period before the subprime crisis is established as the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth 
quarter of 2007. The period after the subprime crisis includes from the first quarter of 2008 to 
the fourth quarter of 2009. The return on assets of the Spanish banks presents an increasing 
profile precisely until December 2007 and from then onwards the trend is inverted. 
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chapter.29 The numerical values of the scale become higher as credit quality 
improves. 
Table 1 shows the principal descriptive statistics and shows that Fitch 
is the most important CRA in the SBS, issuing 63.01 % of the ratings. This 
high market share is due to the fact that Fitch was the first agency to be set 
up in Spain, thus accumulating greater experience in the valuation of 
banks, which is valued positively by those that ask to be evaluated. 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, on the other hand, present very low 
market shares. For these two agencies we have a relatively smaller number 
of observations, especially when analysing the post-crisis period. For this 
reason, the results presented will be for Fitch, using the results for Standard 
and Poor’s and Moody’s as additional results. 
From Table 1 we also deduce that throughout the period analysed, 
2000-2009, the average rating of the banks is A/A2 (on the numerical scale 
defined, 4.09 in Fitch, 4.88 in Moody’s and 4.93 in Standard and Poor’s). 
This result reflects the opinion of the three CRAs on the financial strength 
of the commercial banks and savings banks of the SBS. 
If we focus on analysing the effect of the subprime crisis on the 
distribution of the ratings, in Graph 1 we observe an adjustment in the 
ratings issued by the three agencies, as the number of observations of the 
lower rating categories increases. This same effect is observed also in 
Table 1 from the reduction of the mean rating that occurs in each of the 
three CRAs analysed. 
                                                          
29
 The rating categories are grouped due to the small number of observations in some of them. 
Thus, if the categories are not grouped the results are less accurate. These results are available 
from the authors on request. Ratings below BB+/Ba1 are excluded from the representation since 
there is no entity with a lower rating. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of issuer ratings 
Numerical 
scale Rating 
2000-2009 2000-2007 2008-2009 
Fitch S&P Moody’s Total Fitch S&P Moody’s Total Fitch S&P Moody’s Total 
6 AAA- AA+/Aaa- Aa1 - - 6.47 27 - - 2.80 9 - - 18.75 18 
6 AA/Aa2 5.47 14.47 12.23 200 5.15 10.70 14.02 146 6.69 30.34 6.25 54 
6 AA-/Aa3 10.54 16.41 5.76 258 10.97 16.84 7.48 217 8.92 14.61   41 
5 A+/A1 18.55 35.21 44.60 627 19.49 38.24 51.71 540 14.97 22.47 20.83 87 
4 A/A2 29.95 30.02 25.90 696 31.98 30.21 23.99 569 22.29 29.21 32.29 127 
3 A-/A3 30.62 3.89 4.32 495 31.73 4.01 - 391 26.43 3.37 18.75 104 
2 BBB+/Baa1 3.80 - 0.72 60 0.68 - - 8 15.61 - 3.13 52 
1 BBB/Baa2 0.60 - - 9 - - - - 2.87 - - 9 
1 BBB-/Baa3 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1 BB+/Ba1 and lower 0.47 - - 7 - - - - 2.23 - - 7 
Mean Rating 4.09 4.93 4.88 4.63 4.19 4.89 5.00 4.69 3.73 5.09 4.46 4.43 
Sd   1.17 0.87 0.85 0.97 1.07 0.85 0.70 0.87 1.43 0.94 1.15 1.17 
Obs. (Ratings issued) 1,499 463 417 2,379 1185 374 321 1,880 314 89 96 499 
Rated firms 42 13 12 47 42 12 12 46 39 13 12 44 
Market Share 63.01% 19.46% 17.53% 100% 63.03% 19.89% 17.07% 100% 62.93% 17.84% 19.24% 100% 
Note: This table shows for the period 2000-2009, and for the pre-crisis period (2000-2007) and post subprime crisis period (2008-2009): the percentage distribution of the issuer ratings, 
the mean rating, the number of ratings, the market share, and the number of firms rated, for each of the CRAs and for all of them together. The mean rating was calculated from the numerical 
scale defined from 1 to 6, so that the higher the score the better the credit quality on average. 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
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Graph 1. Distribution of ratings between the pre- and post-subprime crisis 
periods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Distribution of the ratings issued by each of the rating agencies for the commercial banks and savings banks of 
the SBS. This distribution differentiates between the period before the subprime crisis (period 2000–2007) and the 
period after it (period 2008–2009). 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration.  
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To observe with greater precision the adjustment in the ratings, Table 2 
shows the matrices of transition for pre-crisis period (a) and post-crisis 
period (b). The comparison between matrices (a) and (b) shows that after 
the subprime crisis the ratings become less stable, as the probabilities that 
appear on the main diagonal are lower. We also observe a downward 
adjustment, with an increased probability of being located in the lower 
rating categories, i.e. below the main diagonal. 
To sum up, the results show that with the outbreak of the subprime crisis 
there is a downward adjustment in the ratings, the magnitude and intensity 
of which depends on the CRA analysed. In the following sections the 
explanatory factors of the ratings are defined, an econometric model is 
estimated and different prediction exercises are performed with the aim of 
determining the contributions of the change in behaviour and the 
worsening of solvency to the adjustment in the ratings.  
3.4. Methodology 
According to the methodological reports of Fitch (2003, 2009, 2010, 
2011), Moody’s (2007a, b) and Standard and Poor’s (2010, 2011), the 
rating agencies carry out the valuation of the banks’ credit quality taking 
into account quantitative/objective and qualitative/subjective factors. 
Leaving aside the qualitative determinants, arising from meetings between 
the analysts of the rating agencies and the managers of the banks, we focus 
on the quantitative determinants. 
The quantitative determinants refer to both internal and external 
objective factors that affect the solvency of the banks assessed. Among the 
internal factors we consider aspects as varied as profitability, equity,
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Table 2. Transition matrices 
 
Note: Transition matrices are shown for each of the rating agencies considered (Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s), (a) Transition matrix for the period defined as pre- subprime crisis. 
(b) Transition matrix for the period defined as post- subprime crisis. These matrices have been calculated as the total number of transitions between quarters t-1 and t of the sample defined in 
each matrix. The ratings are ordered from lower to higher credit quality. EN and EX refer respectively to a rating’s entry into and exit from the sample. 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 EX 1 2 3 4 5 6 EX 1 2 3 4 5 6 EX
1 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - -
2 -        0.875   0.125   -        -        -        -        2 - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - -
3 -        -        0.981   0.019   -        -        -        3 - - - - - - - 3 -        -        0.933   0.067   -        -        -        
4 -        -        0.008   0.986   0.005   -        -        4 -        -        -        0.973   0.027   -        -        4 -        -        -        0.964   0.036   -        -        
5 -        -        -        -        0.991   0.009   -        5 -        -        -        0.006   0.981   0.006   0.006   5 -        -        -        0.022   0.949   0.029   -        
6 -        -        -        -        0.005   0.995   -        6 -        -        -        -        0.013   0.987   -        6 -        -        -        -        0.010   0.990   -        
EN -        -        -        -        0.006   -        - EN -        -        -        0.002   0.005   0.003   - EN -        -        -        -        0.002   -        -
1 2 3 4 5 6 EX 1 2 3 4 5 6 EX 1 2 3 4 5 6 EX
1 1          -        -        -        -        -        -        1 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - -
2 0.132   0.842   -        -        -        -        0.026   2 -        1          -        -        -        -        -        2 - - - - - - -
3 -        0.156   0.844   -        -        -        -        3 -        0.083   0.917   -        -        -        -        3 -        -        -        -        -        -        1          
4 -        0.038   0.090   0.859   -        -        0.013   4 -        -        0.212   0.788   -        -        -        4 -        -        0.130   0.870   -        -        -        
5 -        -        -        0.061   0.939   -        -        5 -        -        -        0.200   0.800   -        -        5 -        -        -        0.250   0.750   -        -        
6 -        -        -        -        0.020   0.961   0.020   6 -        -        -        -        -        1          -        6 -        -        -        -        0.048   0.952   -        
EN -        -        -        -        -        -        - EN -        -        -        -        -        -        - EN -        -        -        -        -        -        -
Standard and Poor's
2000-2007 (a) 2000-2007 (a) 2000-2007 (a)
t-1 t-1 t-1
Fitch Moody's
2008-2009 (b)
t t t
t t t
t-1 t-1 t-1
2008-2009 (b) 2008-2009 (b)
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liquidity, sources of financing, the credit risk assumed, market power, the 
diversification of the banking business, the quality of the corporate 
governance and the level of efficiency. Among the external factors, on the 
other hand, we consider basically the economic cycle and the market in 
which the bank operates. 
As commented above, the aim of this study is to analyse the behaviour 
of the CRAs and to develop a methodology to allow our starting hypothesis 
to be tested, i.e. whether as a result of the subprime crisis and the criticisms 
received for the rating policy for structured products, the CRAs have 
changed their criteria for evaluating banks. For this reason, it is necessary 
first to model the process of assignation of ratings, and second to design a 
test that will allow us to infer whether there has been a change in the 
behaviour of the rating agencies. 
To model the behaviour of ratings we use an ordered probit with 
random effects.13 This specification seems to be the most suitable 
according to Treviño and Thomas (2001), Bennell et al. (2006), Afonso et 
al. (2009) and Alsakka and Gwilym (2010). When specifying the data 
panel model we consider the existence of idiosyncrasies characteristic of 
each commercial bank and savings bank. The ordered probit models 
estimate the probability of obtaining a given rating as a function of the 
variables with which the decision to grant a rating is modelled. Two models 
are defined. The first specifies the rating defined according to the 
characteristics of the banks and of the environment in which they operate. 
                                                          
13
 All the models are estimated in STATA by means of the REOPROB procedure created by 
Frechette (2001a, b). 
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The second uses a model that permits us to test whether there is a structural 
change in the agencies’ rating policy in response to the financial crisis. 
The first model, which estimates the decision by the rating agencies to 
grant a rating to a bank, depends on a latent variable *itY  which is a linear 
function of a set of explanatory variables according to the following 
equation: 
 
* '
it i it iY x u= + +   β ε  (1) 
where X are the k explanatory variables for bank i at the moment t; uit is 
the random error which is distributed according to a normal distribution; 
and εi refers to the individual effect of each bank. 
Once this model has been estimated we test for the existence of 
structural change in all the parameters estimated. That is, we test whether 
the importance of each of the explanatory variables is different before and 
after the outbreak of the subprime crisis. For this reason, we introduce a 
dummy variable (SB) which takes the value of one for the quarters after the 
start of the crisis (December 2007). This variable interacts with all the 
explanatory variables. The effect of interaction indicates whether, 
subsequent to the crisis, each explanatory variable has a different 
importance. 
 
  
* ' '
it it it it iY x SB x u= β + ⋅β + + ε  (2) 
Following the methodological reports of Fitch (2003, 2009, 2010, 2011 
a), Moody’s (2007a, b), and Standard and Poor’s (2010, 2011), and some 
previous studies such as Bellotti et al. (2011), Caporale et al. (2011) and 
Iannota et al. (2008), the vector of explanatory variables is made up of 
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variables that measure profitability, liquidity, efficiency, capital, size, 
credit risk management, diversification of banking business, market power, 
the economic environment and the quality of corporate governance.  
Of the quantitative/objective factors that, according to the 
methodological reports, the agencies usually consider, profitability stands 
out as a key factor in evaluating a bank’s credit quality, as it generates 
resources that protect from the risks inherent to the activity that it performs. 
To capture the current profitability as done by Altman and Rijken (2004, 
2006) we use the average return per asset (ROA) based on the quotient 
between pre-tax profits and total assets. As said before, all the accounting 
information comes from AEB and CECA. 
The level of capital is the fundamental characteristic for analysing its 
solvency level, as it acts as a measure of absorption of losses in the event 
of running into difficulties. This factor is measured as the quotient between 
equity and total assets (Capital). 
Liquidity is a fundamental aspect in the valuation of credit quality, 
because it reflects the bank’s capacity to face its commitments in the short 
term. The higher the liquidity the less exposure to the risks derived from 
intermediation in investment in long term assets and short term deposits. 
The variable Liquidity is defined as the sum of cash, deposits in central 
banks and deposits with other credit institutions, all divided by total assets. 
This is not enough to measure a bank’s liquidity level; it is also necessary 
to evaluate the different sources of financing available to it. A bank whose 
principal source of finance is the wholesale markets is more susceptible to 
problems of liquidity than one specialised in retail banking, which obtains 
a higher percentage of finance through deposits. Therefore, we also use the 
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ratio between deposits and total assets as indicator of the specialisation of 
retail banking (Deposits). 
Another aspect fundamental to evaluating a bank’s future solvency 
problems is its exposure to credit risk, which is measured by the percentage 
that loans represent in the balance sheet (Loans). This factor also allows us 
to determine the specialisation adopted by the bank being assessed. Retail 
banking has traditionally focussed on granting credits, this type of assets 
being the most important in the balance sheet. As well as the importance 
of credits in the balance sheet another variable is introduced to measure the 
quality of them. Given the fact that we do not have information of doubtful 
assets, we use the percentage of provisions over total assets (Provisions). 
This ratio is a proxy of the ratio of doubtful assets to total loans.14 
In addition to the quantity and quality of loans, another important 
characteristic for measuring the credit risk is the degree of geographical 
diversification of the bank’s activity. Excessive concentration of a bank’s 
activity in a particular region increases its risk profile, as it will be subject 
to a greater extent to the shocks of the region where it operates. That is to 
say that the geographical concentration of a bank implies that the different 
economic cycles to which the region in which it concentrates its activity is 
subjected will affect the bank more. This factor is measured by means of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of the provincial distribution of the 
branch network of each bank. This information also comes from the AEB 
and CECA. 
                                                          
14
 Pastor and Serrano (2005) use the provisions as proxy for doubtful assets, on the assumption 
that the greater the volume of doubtful credits the greater will be the provisions. 
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The high competition normally faced by credit institutions, the 
standardisation of banking products and the reduction of banking margins, 
make it increasingly important to control and reduce costs, and hence 
increase efficiency. To measure the cost efficiency of each bank in each 
period (Efficiency) we use the non-parametric technique DEA (Data 
Envelopment Analysis).15 The application of this technique permits us to 
measure efficiency by comparing the distance between the frontier of cost 
efficiency generated by the banks that produce the same banking output 
with the lowest possible costs, and the cost of the rest of the banks. This 
technique, as pointed out by Pastor and Serrano (2005), allows us to isolate 
the effects of size, specialisation and risk. This implies that it is a less 
biased measure of efficiency than other indicators such as the ratio of cost 
to income. 
Market power is also included. This factor reflects the bank capacity to 
set prices over marginal costs. The greater the market power, the greater 
the bank’s capacity to generate income and thus maintain or improve its 
protection against the different risks that it faces. Market power is 
measured by the Lerner Index (Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 2009; 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 2011)16, which measures a bank’s 
capacity to set a price above its marginal cost (Market Power). This index 
is calculated on the basis of average output prices obtained from the profit 
                                                          
15
 To calculate the index of efficiency we used as outputs: total credits, total deposits, other 
earning assets, and commissions received. As inputs we used: cost of lendable funds, cost of 
labour and the price of capital. 
16
 In the calculation of the marginal cost on the basis of the translog function we used as inputs: 
the price of labour (wages/number of workers), the price of capital (other operating costs/fixed 
assets) and the price of deposits (financial costs/deposits). We also include a trend to capture the 
technical progress, which is reflected with movements of the cost function over time. As output 
we used total assets and as costs, total costs, operating costs and financial costs. 
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and loss accounts and marginal costs estimated from a translog total cost 
function for all banks operating in Spain in the period 2000-2009. We 
follow the same specification as in Fernández de Guevara and Maudos 
(2009). Data used comes from AEB and CECA. 
We also include the variable Size to test the too-big-to-fail hypothesis 
which establishes a negative relationship between the size of the banks and 
the probability of failure (Altman and Rijken, 2004, 2006). This 
relationship is explained by the large size of the banks and the possible 
systemic effects that their failure might have. The authorities will always 
come to the rescue of the largest banks, due to the contagion effect that 
their failure might have on the rest of the financial system and the rest of 
the economy.  
Another factor to be considered is the economic environment in which 
a bank operates. A recessive economic cycle will inevitably have negative 
consequences for the credit quality of a bank, because it will mean a 
deterioration of the quality of its assets and of its profits. To capture the 
economic cycle we use the unemployment rate by provinces 
(Unemployment), weighting for each bank according to the provincial 
distribution of branches.17 The unemployment rate is taken from the 
Spanish National Statistical Institute (INE). 
Finally, we introduce a dummy variable (Bank) that captures multiple 
characteristics related with the legal form. There is some evidence for the 
                                                          
17
 The rating agencies indicate in their methodological reports that they consider macroeconomic 
environment variables (GDP, Unemployment, Public deficit, for instance) at national level. 
However, in this chapter the unemployment rate at regional level is considered because most of 
the entities in SBE concentrate their activity in the regions where they historically began to 
operate. In this sense, the CR5 concentration ratio of the regional branch distribution is over 70% 
on average for all banks. Results are quite similar when national unemployment rate is used 
instead of regional unemployment rate.  
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idea that saving banks have less quality in their management due to 
excessive dependence on regional government. Another characteristic is 
that the savings banks are riskier due to their specialization in granting 
credits related to activities such as construction, real estate and mortgages. 
Furthermore, these latter institutions may have more difficulties in raising 
capital due to their legal status. This variable takes the value of one if the 
entity is a commercial bank and zero if it is a saving bank. 
Table 3 shows the average of each factor that determines the 
creditworthiness of the banks and saving banks evaluated by each rating 
agency. We can observe that with the subprime crisis there is a worsening 
of the creditworthiness of entities that are evaluated by each rating agency. 
This result is due to the worsening on average of the level of capital, 
liquidity, profitability, market power and deposits. On the contrary, there 
is an increase of the level of provisions, of exposure to credit risk and of 
unemployment. Despite these negative effects, the banks have experienced 
a reduction in the geographical concentration of their activity (HHI) and 
an increase in size and levels of efficiency. These last two results can be 
justified in the restructuring process that occurs after the onset of the 
financial crisis and is characterised by mergers and adjustments in the 
branch network. 
3.5. Empirical results 
In this section we present the results of the two empirical models (1) and 
(2), which estimate the probability of obtaining a certain rating, as a 
function of the internal and external factors affecting the solvency of the 
banks.  
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Table 3. Average values of the variables that define the banks creditworthiness 
a) Entities evaluated by at least a rating agency 
Variable   
All Entities   Banks   Savings banks 
  2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009  
Equity  
  
6.25%   6.40%   5.69%   5.70%   5.79%   5.37%   6.43%   6.60%   5.79% 
Liquidity  
  
10.98%   12.00%   7.13%   18.14%   19.07%   14.55%   8.67%   9.71%   4.81% 
ROA 
  
0.59%   0.64%   0.41%   0.64%   0.67%   0.53%   0.57%   0.63%   0.37% 
Size  
  
16.593   16.465   17.073   17.336   17.213   17.812   16.354   16.223   16.843 
Provisions  
  
0.27%   0.21%   0.50%   0.25%   0.20%   0.43%   0.27%   0.21%   0.52% 
Loans 
  
68.43%   67.48%   71.99%   60.59%   59.92%   63.15%   70.95%   69.93%   74.75% 
Efficiency  
  
75.85%   74.26%   81.86%   91.66%   91.28%   93.14%   70.77%   68.74%   78.34% 
Unemployment  
  
10.93%   10.10%   14.04%   10.48%   9.66%   13.68%   11.07%   10.24%   14.15% 
Market Power 
  
42.43%   42.85%   40.82%   41.87%   41.95%   41.55%   42.60%   43.15%   40.59% 
Deposits  
  
89.33%   89.48%   88.79%   89.06%   89.16%   88.68%   89.42%   89.58%   88.82% 
HHI 
  
36.51%   37.81%   31.60%   17.44%   17.33%   17.90%   42.64%   44.45%   35.88% 
                   
b) Entities evaluated by Fitch 
Variable 
  All Entities   Banks   Savings banks 
  2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009  
Equity  
  
6.18%   6.33%   5.59%   5.87%   6.00%   5.44%   6.27%   6.43%   5.64% 
Liquidity  
  
10.92%   11.87%   7.32%   19.27%   20.37%   15.31%   8.37%   9.32%   4.76% 
ROA 
  
0.59%   0.64%   0.40%   0.66%   0.70%   0.53%   0.57%   0.62%   0.36% 
Size  
  
16.602   16.474   17.083   17.450   17.330   17.882   16.343   16.216   16.828 
Provisions  
  
0.26%   0.20%   0.48%   0.22%   0.19%   0.36%   0.28%   0.21%   0.52% 
Loans 
  
68.45%   67.55%   71.83%   58.66%   57.73%   62.02%   71.43%   70.50%   74.96% 
Efficiency  
  
75.82%   74.16%   82.09%   92.81%   92.51%   93.92%   70.64%   68.64%   78.31% 
Unemployment  
  
11.09%   10.24%   14.26%   10.44%   9.51%   13.78%   11.28%   10.47%   14.42% 
Market Power 
  
42.31%   42.82%   40.39%   41.92%   42.29%   40.59%   42.43%   42.98%   40.33% 
Deposits  
  
89.36%   89.52%   88.76%   88.76%   88.79%   88.68%   89.55%   89.75%   88.78% 
HHI 
  
37.91%   39.23%   32.95%   18.74%   18.68%   18.97%   43.75%   45.41%   37.41% 
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Table 3. (cont.) 
c) Entities evaluated by Moody's 
Variable   All Entities   Banks   Savings Banks 
  2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009  
Equity  
  
5.95%   6.00%   5.78%   6.69%   6.70%   6.64%   5.70%   5.76%   5.49% 
Liquidity  
  
10.59%   11.68%   6.93%   12.55%   12.98%   11.11%   9.92%   11.24%   5.54% 
ROA 
  
0.55%   0.57%   0.45%   0.60%   0.59%   0.65%   0.53%   0.57%   0.38% 
Size  
  
17.544   17.411   17.988   18.414   18.266   18.920   17.248   17.118   17.677 
Provisions  
  
0.29%   0.22%   0.52%   0.30%   0.22%   0.57%   0.28%   0.22%   0.50% 
Loans 
  
65.63%   64.01%   71.04%   58.70%   58.75%   58.51%   67.99%   65.82%   75.21% 
Efficiency  
  
86.32%   85.28%   89.78%   92.75%   92.02%   95.25%   84.13%   82.97%   87.95% 
Unemployment  
  
10.08%   9.15%   13.18%   10.53%   9.65%   13.55%   9.92%   8.98%   13.06% 
Market Power 
  
42.48%   42.36%   42.89%   42.61%   41.40%   46.77%   42.44%   42.69%   41.60% 
Deposits  
  
88.50%   88.66%   87.96%   86.50%   86.56%   86.29%   89.18%   89.38%   88.52% 
HHI 
  
21.54%   22.82%   17.26%   7.35%   7.62%   6.43%   26.37%   28.03%   20.87% 
                   
d) Entities evaluated by Standard and Poor's 
Variable   All Entities   Banks   Savings Banks 
  2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009    2000-2009    2000-2007   2008-2009  
Equity  
  
5.97%   6.06%   5.57%   5.81%   5.88%   5.50%   6.20%   6.33%   5.67% 
Liquidity  
  
13.41%   14.26%   9.83%   15.76%   16.61%   12.09%   9.93%   10.73%   6.66% 
ROA 
  
0.61%   0.64%   0.50%   0.65%   0.66%   0.59%   0.56%   0.61%   0.37% 
Size  
  
17.852   17.699   18.496   17.987   17.833   18.652   17.653   17.498   18.278 
Provisions  
  
0.24%   0.21%   0.39%   0.23%   0.19%   0.37%   0.26%   0.22%   0.43% 
Loans 
  
65.18%   64.27%   69.03%   61.08%   60.24%   64.70%   71.23%   70.27%   75.12% 
Efficiency  
  
91.24%   90.53%   94.20%   94.22%   93.72%   96.36%   86.84%   85.77%   91.17% 
Unemployment  
  
10.03%   9.27%   13.23%   10.56%   9.85%   13.65%   9.24%   8.41%   12.63% 
Market Power 
  
42.74%   42.92%   41.98%   42.09%   41.98%   42.56%   43.70%   44.33%   41.16% 
Deposits  
  
88.79%   88.67%   89.31%   88.33%   88.19%   88.95%   89.48%   89.40%   89.81% 
HHI 
  
13.71%   14.39%   10.88%   8.18%   8.44%   7.08%   21.88%   23.28%   16.21% 
Note: This table shows the mean in percentages (except size, in logarithms) of the factors that define the creditworthiness of the entities evaluated by each rating agency, for the period 2000-2009, pre-
crisis period (defined as the period 2000-2007) and post subprime crisis (defined as the period 2008-2009). We disaggregate the means of each variable by the legal form of the entity.  
Source: AEB and CECA and own elaboration. 
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Model (1) of Table 4 captures the estimations by Fitch of the model that 
does not take into account the possible structural change originating from 
the outbreak of the subprime crisis. In this table we observe that both the 
internal and external factors affecting the solvency of credit institutions are 
significant, and in general the coefficients estimated have the expected 
sign. Specifically, we observe a positive effect of capital, liquidity, size, 
loans, market power, deposits and/or efficiency on the probability of being 
located in the higher rating category. This result is because an increase in 
these factors implies an improvement in the creditworthiness and/or lower 
risk. On the other hand, from the same model (1) of Table 4 we deduce the 
negative influence of the provisions, HHI index and/or unemployment, on 
the probability of obtaining the maximum credit score. The negative 
influence of these variables is explained by the fact that an increase in these 
factors implies a bad management of credit risk and/or worsening of the 
economic environment. ROA presents a negative coefficient although it is 
not significant. 
Among the above results the positive sign of the weight of loans in the 
balance-sheet must be emphasised. This can be interpreted not only as an 
increase of risk, but also as a measure of specialisation in traditional 
banking. Taking into account that until 2007 the growth of the SBS relied 
on loans, it is no surprise that this factor has a positive effect on the 
probability of obtaining a higher rating. Another result to be highlighted in 
model (1) of Table 4, is the positive and significant coefficient of the size 
effect. This allows us to accept, as do Altman and Rijken (2004, 2006), the 
too-big-to-fail hypothesis establishing a negative relationship between the 
size and the probability of failure of a bank.  
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Table 4. Ordered probit model with random effects. Eq(1)-(2). Fitch 
2000-2009 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
Capital 42.219 *** 34.203 *** 
Liquidity  3.126 *** 5.388 *** 
ROA -25.45   -29.841     
Size  1.884 *** 2.473 *** 
Provisions  -164.672 *** -146.309 *** 
Loans 1.509 *** 2.734 *** 
Efficiency  2.735 *** 3.338 *** 
Unemployment  -0.127 *** -0.071 *** 
Market Power 3.655 *** 1.957     
Deposits  11.453 *** -1.183     
HHI -1.44 *** -2.59 *** 
Bank 1.273 *** 1.716 *** 
SB     -22.293 *** 
SB*Capital     71.629 *** 
SB*Liquidity      -4.022     
SB*ROA     57.873 *   
SB*Size      0.972 *** 
SB*Provisions      57.343     
SB*Loans      -6.464 *** 
SB*Efficiency      -7.352 *** 
SB*Unemployment      -0.103 *** 
SB*Market Power     -6.32 *** 
SB*Deposits      15.5 *** 
SB*HHI     3.026 *** 
SB*Bank     2.87 *** 
Term2 0.192   0.136     
Term3 0.35 ** 0.187     
Term4 0.755 *** 0.516 **  
Time -0.07 *** -0.082 *** 
cut1 39.237 *** 36.904 *** 
cut2 41.021 *** 39.06 *** 
cut3 44.021 *** 42.561 *** 
cut4 46.875 *** 45.993 *** 
cut5 51.22 *** 50.788 *** 
Rho 0.666 *** 0.679 *** 
N 1499   1499    
LR chi2 592.792   758.546    
Log Lik -777.678   -661.482    
RV-Test     232.392   
P-value     0.00   
Note: Results of the estimation of the ordered probit model with random effects (Eq.1-Eq.2) for the rating agency Fitch, from 
the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2009. (1) Model that does not consider the possible structural change arising 
from the subprime crisis. (2) Model that does consider the possible structural change arising since the outbreak of the subprime 
crisis. Rho shows the importance of the unobservable effect in the random effects model. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant 
at 5%, * Significant at 10%. RV likelihood ratio test between the model (1) (the restricted model) and model (2) (the general 
model), i.e., 0 sb kH : 0β β = . 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 4 also presents a model that considers the possible structural 
change originating after the outbreak of the subprime crisis. The objective 
pursued with model (2) is to determine whether a change occurs in the 
behaviour of the rating agencies. To determine if there is a change in the 
influence of each factor after the subprime crisis, model (2) adds the 
interaction of each factor with the dummy variable SB. Hence, the 
influence of each variable on the rating in the period before the outbreak 
of the crisis is measured by its coefficient (without the interaction). But to 
calculate the effect of the variable on the rating after the crisis the 
coefficients both with and without the interaction with the SB dummy have 
to be considered. In this sense, if the coefficients that interact with the SB 
dummy are modified in terms of sign or significance, then there is a change 
in the behaviour of rating agencies. The results in Table 4 show how with 
the start of the crisis there is a change in the behaviour of Fitch because 
some factors modify its influence on the probability of obtaining a higher 
rating. Among these we have to highlight factors such as profitability, 
capital, size and deposits.  
To confirm that the subprime crisis causes a structural change and 
consequently a change in the influence of the determinants of the ratings, 
we perform a likelihood ratio test between model (1) that does not consider 
the effect of the subprime crisis (the restricted model), and  
model (2) that does consider the effect of subprime crisis (the general 
model). The results of the likelihood test in Table 4, allow us to reject the 
null hypothesis of joint non-significance of the variable SB and the cross 
effects between this dummy variable and the rest of the explanatory 
variables. It is therefore confirmed that with the subprime crisis there is a 
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structural change in the influence that each factor has on the ratings, and 
thus that the rating agencies changed their criteria.18 
From model (2) we observe that with the financial crisis there is an 
increase in the positive effect of profitability, capital, size, deposits and 
quality of the management on the probability of entering the higher rating 
category. On the other hand, there is an increase of the negative effect of 
unemployment and/or loans on the probability of obtaining a higher rating. 
The significance of the unemployment rate points to the idea that the rating 
agencies behave procyclically rather than through the cycle, as they claim, 
because ratings seem to respond to the cyclical evolution of economic 
activity, as other authors have already stressed (Bangia et al., 2002; Deprés, 
2011). 
This is explained by the strong correlation between the rate of doubtful 
assets and the economic cycle. The results obtained also show that the 
agencies penalise those banks that do not diversify their banking activity, 
concentrating the greater part of their balance sheet on credit activity. 
In order to analyse the effect of each variable on each of the rating 
categories before (SB=0) and after (SB=1) the subprime crisis, we calculate 
the elasticities of the change in the probability of obtaining a rating when 
each determinant changes. To calculate these elasticities we multiply the 
coefficients of Eq. (2) with the average value of each determinant rating. 
Thus the elasticities before the crisis are calculated by multiplying the 
coefficients that do not interact with the dummy SB in Eq. (2) with the 
values before the crisis. Likewise, the elasticities after the crisis are 
                                                          
18
 Salvador et al. (2011) also find evidence of a structural change with the outbreak of the 
subprime crisis, in SBS, by means of a logit ordered model with fixed effects.   
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calculated in the same way as in the period before the crisis plus 
multiplying the values of the coefficients that interact with the SB dummy 
variable and the mean values after the crisis. According to these elasticities 
(Table 5), we can clearly differentiate a change in the behaviour of the 
Fitch rating agency, due to the change in the elasticities. In general they 
are higher (in absolute value) when the effects of the crisis are considered. 
3.6. Prediction  
The estimation of the empirical model with structural change (2) makes it 
possible to carry out prediction exercises to confirm that the changes in 
ratings respond both to the worsening of the solvency level of the banks 
and to the hardening of the CRAs’ rating policies. To do this, we replace 
the values of the estimated coefficients (R), and the values of the variables 
that define the levels of solvency of institutions (x) in Eq. (2), depending 
on the period for which the prediction is made. 
Using the predictions of the ratings from model (2), Graph 2(a) and (b) 
presents the Kernel density functions that show the probability of obtaining 
a certain rating. This graph permits us to analyse the possible change in the 
distribution of ratings that occurs with the subprime crisis. For this reason, 
Graph 2 (a) and (b), establishes a comparison between the probabilities of 
obtaining a certain rating in the pre-crisis period P(Rt-1(xt-1))
 
and in the 
post-crisis period P(Rt (xt)). Where Rt-1 is the rating policy before the crisis 
and refers only to the coefficients that do not 
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Table 5. Elasticities Eq(2). Fitch 
a) Before the crisis 
 
Significative 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Capital *** -16.4741 -11.9073 -4.7980 -0.0782 4.4042 14.1965 
Liquidity  *** -4.8663 -3.5173 -1.4173 -0.0231 1.3009 4.1935 
ROA     1.4454 1.0447 0.4210 0.0069 -0.3864 -1.2456 
Size  *** -18.8126 -13.5975 -5.4790 -0.0893 5.0293 16.2116 
Provisions  *** 2.2735 1.6433 0.6621 0.0108 -0.6078 -1.9592 
Loans *** -14.0491 -10.1545 -4.0917 -0.0667 3.7559 12.1066 
Efficiency  *** -18.8307 -13.6106 -5.4843 -0.0894 5.0342 16.2272 
Unemployment  *** 5.5331 3.9993 1.6115 0.0263 -1.4792 -4.7681 
Market Power     -6.3746 -4.6075 -1.8566 -0.0303 1.7042 5.4933 
Deposits      8.0566 5.8232 2.3464 0.0382 -2.1538 -6.9427 
HHI *** 7.7288 5.5863 2.2509 0.0367 -2.0662 -6.6602 
Bank *** -3.0184 -2.1816 -0.8791 -0.0143 0.8069 2.6011 
        
b) Since the outbreak of the crisis 
 
Significative 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Capital *** -37.0768 -24.7415 -6.5422 3.1289 19.3254 46.4945 
Liquidity      -0.6262 -0.4178 -0.1105 0.0528 0.3264 0.7852 
ROA *   -0.7069 -0.4717 -0.1247 0.0597 0.3685 0.8865 
Size  *** -21.5805 -14.4007 -3.8078 1.8211 11.2483 27.0620 
Provisions      2.7023 1.8033 0.4768 -0.2280 -1.4085 -3.3887 
Loans *** 16.7828 11.1992 2.9613 -1.4163 -8.7476 -21.0457 
Efficiency  *** 20.6419 13.7744 3.6422 -1.7419 -10.7591 -25.8851 
Unemployment  *** 15.5458 10.3738 2.7430 -1.3119 -8.1029 -19.4945 
Market Power *** 11.0399 7.3670 1.9480 -0.9316 -5.7543 -13.8441 
Deposits  *** -79.6036 -53.1198 -14.0460 6.7176 41.4915 99.8235 
HHI *** -0.8999 -0.6005 -0.1588 0.0759 0.4690 1.1284 
Bank *** -6.9533 -4.6399 -1.2269 0.5868 3.6242 8.7195 
Note: Elasticities for each of the explanatory factors of the rating issued by Fitch, in model (2) which takes into 
account the possible structural change originating with the subprime crisis. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 
5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
interact with the dummy SB. Rt is the rating policy after the crisis and refers 
both to the coefficients which interact with the dummy SB and to those that 
do not. Likewise, xt-1 and xt refer respectively to the levels of solvency of 
banks before and after the subprime crisis. These two lines show the overall 
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effect of the crisis, that is, a leftward shift of the density function. With the 
financial crisis, the probability of reaching the higher rating categories is 
reduced whereas the probability in the lower rating classes increases. 
Graph 2. Change in the rating estimated by Fitch between the pre- and 
post-crisis periods.  
 
Note: Kernel density functions according the predictions from the model (2) that considers the possible structural 
change, applied to Fitch rating categories.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The model (2) estimated in Table 4 allows us to disentangle the overall 
reduction in ratings into the effect of the deteriorating of bank solvency 
and of the hardening of rating policies. To test this, in Graph 2 (a) the value 
of each determinant after the subprime crisis (xt) is used as a benchmark to 
compare the prediction in the rating with the rating policy before, Rt-1 (that 
is only the coefficients which do not interact with the dummy variable SB) 
and after the outbreak of the crisis, Rt (the coefficients which do not interact 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
1 2 3 4 5 6
Rating
P(Behavior Before_Solvency Before)
P(Behavior After_Solvency After)
P(Behavior Before_Solvency After)
(a)
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
1 2 3 4 5 6
Rating
P(Behavior Before_Solvency Before)
P(Behavior After_Solvency After)
P(Behavior After_Solvency Before)
(b)
 Impact of the subprime crisis on bank ratings 
 
 
117 
 
and the coefficients that do interact with the dummy variable SB). Given 
the level of the determinants evaluated at the average values after the crisis 
(xt), the probability of obtaining a certain rating with the pre-crisis policy 
is calculated, P(Rt-1(xt)). If this probability is higher than that derived from 
the post-crisis methodology (Rt) and the post crisis values of xt, that is if 
P(Rt-1(xt)) > P(Rt(xt)), we can conclude that Fitch had modified its 
behaviour, hardening its evaluations towards more conservative or stricter 
positions. As can be observed in Graph 2 (a), the density function P(Rt-1(xt)) 
is placed between the functions P(Rt-1(xt-1)) and P(Rt(xt)), indicating that 
given a certain level of solvency (x) Fitch assigns worse ratings than before 
the outbreak of the financial crisis. The distance between the two functions, 
P(Rt-1(xt-1)) and P(Rt-1(xt)) is an indicator of the lower bank creditworthiness 
before and after the subprime crisis, because the difference in probability 
is due only to the consideration of different solvency levels. Likewise the 
difference between P(Rt-1(xt)) and P(Rt(xt)) measures the hardening of the 
rating policy, by the difference in the probability of obtaining a particular 
rating depending on whether we consider the coefficients which interact 
with the dummy SB or those that do not interact with it. From this 
comparison, we can conclude that part of the overall worsening of the 
ratings is due to a large extent to the deterioration in the levels of solvency 
(x), although the effect of the change in the rating policy (R) is also 
important. Graph 2 (b) indicates that these results are maintained if instead 
of setting the solvency level (x) in the post-crisis period (xt) it is set in the 
pre-crisis period (xt-1) and the rating policy is set in the post-crisis period 
Rt. 
To determine analytically the adjustment in the ratings, and the 
contributions of the change in the agencies’ behaviour and the change in 
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the levels of solvency, we posit the Rating Change Index (RCI) as a 
quotient of the banks’ ratings in period (t), Rt(xt), and those obtained in 
period (t-1) , Rt-1(xt-1), which can be decomposed as follows:  
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This index offers values lower than unity if the rating has worsened with 
the subprime crisis, a value equal to unity if no change has occurred, and a 
value higher than unity if there has been an improvement. 
The RCI can be decomposed multiplicatively into two factors. The first 
one 
0 5
1
1 1
1
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.t t
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t - t -
t t-
R ( x ) R ( x )
R ( x ) R ( x )  is the geometrical mean of the change in 
behaviour occurring in the rating agency between the pre-crisis period, Rt-1, 
and the post-crisis period, Rt, evaluating the changes in the pre- and post-
crisis values of the determinants variables xt-1 and xt, respectively.19 The 
numerator of each ratio indicates the rating obtained with the rating policy 
                                                          
19
 The choice of period in setting the solvency and the behaviour components is not trivial. As 
pointed by an evaluator, it could happen that if the value of the variables is set in the period 
during the crisis (xt) the change in the rating policy could be higher than one, indicating that with 
the subprime crisis the CRA has implemented a more flexible policy. On the contrary, if we set 
the value of the variables in the period before the crisis (xt-1), the change in the rating policy could 
be less than one indicating that with the subprime crisis the CRA has hardened its policy. In the 
same vein, this result can also happen in the case of the solvency effect. In the sample, this result 
occurs in few cases. The RCI index is calculated as a geometric mean considering both the initial 
and final period to control for this possible arbitrariety of the benchmark period selected. This 
solution is based in the approach of Färe et al. (1994) which analyze the productive change 
according to the Malmquist productivity index (Malmquist, 1953) and Oaxaca (1973), Blinders 
(1973) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) when explaining the differences between groups in the 
context of educative outcomes (Mincer equations). 
 Impact of the subprime crisis on bank ratings 
 
 
119 
 
of the post crisis period (i.e. the coefficients which do not interact with the 
dummy variable that refers to the crisis, SB, plus the coefficients that do 
interact with it) and the value of the determinants of the post-crisis (xt) or 
pre-crisis (xt-1) period, Rt(xt or xt-1). The denominator indicates the rating 
obtained by a bank with the level of solvency after (xt) or before (xt-1) the 
crisis and the rating policy before the crisis (Rt-1), Rt-1(xt or xt-1). A quotient 
below one indicates that a hardening of the rating policy has occurred, 
because by setting the solvency level in the post-crisis (xt) or pre-crisis 
period (xt-1), the banks obtain a higher rating with the rating policy of the 
pre-crisis period (Rt-1). A quotient equal to one indicates that the rating 
agencies have maintained the same policy, because the rating remains 
constant between the two periods. On the other hand, a quotient higher than 
unity indicates that following the subprime crisis a more flexible rating 
policy has been implemented, since the rating increases. 
The second factor of the index, 
0 51
1
1 1
 
× 
 
.t - t
t t
t - t
t - t-
R ( x ) R ( x )
R ( x ) R ( x ) , refers to the 
variation of the rating due to the changes in the banks’ solvency levels 
between the pre- and post-crisis periods (xt-1 and xt, respectively) holding 
constant the rating policy. As before, a geometric mean is used to obtain 
an invariant indicator of the period. The numerators indicate the rating 
obtained by a bank with the pre-crisis or post-crisis rating policy (Rt-1 or 
Rt) and the post-crisis solvency level (xt), Rt-1 or t (xt). The denominator 
indicates the rating obtained with the different rating policies and the 
solvency level of the pre-crisis period (xt),
 
Rt-1 or t (xt-1). A ratio lower than 
one indicates that a worsening of solvency has occurred. A quotient equal 
to one indicates that the banks have maintained their solvency constant. On 
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the other hand, a quotient above one indicates that there has been an 
improvement in the banks’ solvency. 
Table 6 shows that on average the banks of the SBS present a RCI of 
89%. This result implies a worsening of the rating between the pre- and 
post-subprime crisis periods of 10.88%. The results of the decomposition 
indicate that 25.15% of this worsening is due to the hardening of Fitch’s 
rating policy and 74.85% to the worsening of the banks’ solvency level.20  
After verifying the worsening of the banks’ ratings and after 
quantifying that more than one fourth of it (25.15%) is due to a hardening 
of the rating policies, several further questions can be asked. In particular, 
has the worsening of the ratings behaved in the same way in all banks or 
are there differences by size or legal form? And has CRAs’ hardening of 
their rating evaluation policy been homogeneous or more severe in the case 
of small banks or of any legal form in particular? 
Table 6 permits us also to analyse these questions, showing the RCI and 
its components by size of bank and legal form. The results indicate that 
small and medium-sized banks experience a greater fall in their ratings. 
This effect is due to the greater worsening of their solvency and to the 
greater hardening of the rating criteria. Disaggregating the RCI according 
to legal form, we observe that the greater fall occurs in savings banks.  The  
downward  adjustment  that  occurs  in  medium  and  small 
                                                          
20
 As is mentioned in the report of the Securities and Exchange Commission (2008) and in Deprés 
(2011), the rating agencies relaxed their criteria in the rating policies before the outbreak of the 
subprime crisis, underestimating the risks. 
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Table 6. Size, RCI and its components to the banks evaluated by Fitch 
  Fitch Total  Fitch Commercial Banks Fitch Savings Banks 
  N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency 
Medium-
Small 30 0.86 -14.08% 18.72% 81.28% 5 0.99 -0.63% -1031.86% 1131.86% 25 0.83 -16.66% 26.44% 73.56% 
Big 10 0.93 -6.98% 58.03% 41.97% 5 1.02 2.36% 190.44% -90.44% 5 0.84 -16.16% 77.44% 22.56% 
Total 40 0.89 -10.88% 25.15% 74.85% 10 1.01 0.89% 618.09% -518.09% 30 0.84 -16.48% 34.64% 65.36% 
 
  Statistical t Critical value 
of t (one tail) 
Critical value 
of t (Two tails) 
Small-
Medium 
vs. Big 
1.34 1.72* 2.09 
Note: Disaggregation of the RCI, and of its explanatory factors (change in rating policy and change in solvency level), according to size and legal form of the banks evaluated by Fitch. 
Negative values of Behaviour or Solvency indicate that its contribution to RCI is negative. Adjustment is equal to 1-RCI, thus it measures the worsening or improvement of the ratings in 
terms of percentage. The size is defined on the basis of the size of each bank during the period 2000 - 2009. The small and medium entities include those of a size between quartiles 25 or 
less and 75. The large entities include those of a size above quartile 75. We show the test of differences in means, under the null hypothesis µ1= µ2. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 
5% and * Significant at 10%. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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savings banks is explained by their specialisation in the granting of credits 
to activities related with bricks and mortar, which have been heavily 
punished by the outbreak of the subprime crisis and the property bubble. 
They also have more difficulties in raising capital in the markets due to 
their legal status. 
3.7. Additional results 
In this section we present the results of the application of the methodology 
to the rating agencies Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. In addition we 
present the results for individual ratings from Fitch and Moody's that only 
evaluate the level of intrinsic solvency of banks. 
Table 7 presents the estimation of model (1), which does not take into 
account the possible structural change originating with the subprime crisis. 
In the case of Moody's the level of capital, profitability, size, market power 
and deposits have a positive effect on the probability of getting a higher 
rating. Instead, the provisions, the percentage of loans to total assets, 
unemployment and the geographical concentration of the bank’s activity 
have a negative effect. The results of Standard and Poor’s show that the 
factors that have a positive effect on the probability of getting a higher 
rating are the level of capital, liquidity, profitability, size, loans and 
deposits. On the other hand, geographical concentration of a bank’s 
activity has a negative effect. In these two agencies the banks are on 
average less likely to get a high rating as this is reflected in the negative 
and significant coefficient of the dummy variable Bank.  
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Table 7. Ordered probit model with random effects. Eq(1)-(2).  
  2000-2009 
  Moody's  Standard and Poor's 
  Model (1) Model (2)  Model (1) Model (2) 
Capital 95.19 *** 131.568 ***   34.332 *** 22.422 **  
Liquidity  -9.366 * -31.49 **   19.061 *** 30.239 *** 
ROA 355.861 *** 603.097 ***   206.085 *** 216.137 *** 
Size  5.001 *** 12.13 ***   3.443 *** 3.752 *** 
Provisions  -308.922 *** 3.351     -80.237     116.328     
Loans -9.971 *** -12.727     13.52 *** 17.071 *** 
Efficiency  4.837   6.854     0.94     3.5 *   
Unemployment  -0.633 *** -1.294 ***   -0.048     -0.206 **  
Market Power 14.687 *** 20.006 **   -2.248     -1.217     
Deposits  17.116 ** 48.905 **   19.91 *** 23.762 *** 
HHI -6.889 *** -18.385 ***   -4.956 *** -1.2     
Bank -1.403 *** -4.844 ***   -1.83 *** -2.873 *** 
SB     68.706         -18.074     
SB*Capital     232.714 ***       50.841 **  
SB*Liquidity      71.034 **       39.326 *** 
SB*ROA     643.202 *       -458.574 *** 
SB*Size      1.512         6.368 *** 
SB*Provisions      -228.098         -405.375 *** 
SB*Loans      26.535 *       44.642 *** 
SB*Efficiency      -19.111         -39.937 *** 
SB*Unemployment      -0.042         -0.288 *   
SB*Market Power     -24.794 *       -6.742     
SB*Deposits      -115.471 ***       -97.851 *** 
SB*HHI     -26.898 **       -11.15 *   
SB*Bank     -0.855         4.225 *** 
Term2 -0.736 * -1.931 **       -0.473     
Term3 -1.397 *** -3.943 ***       -1.185 *** 
Term4 -0.596   -3.654 *       -1.582 *** 
Time -0.167 *** -0.512 ***       -0.124 *** 
cut1 82.9 *** 205.282 ***   83.535 *** 94.285 *** 
cut2 86.764 *** 215.497 ***   88.606 *** 99.421 *** 
cut3 92.686 *** 230.147 ***   91.325 *** 103.277 *** 
cut4 103.57 *** 249.37 ***               
Rho 0.916 *** 0.983 ***   0.766 *** 0.87 *** 
N 417   417     463     463     
LR chi2 337.411   410.894     224.322    333.023    
Log Lik -87.395   -50.653     -219.231    -164.881    
RV-Test     73.484         108.7   
P-value     0.00         0.00   
Note: Results of the estimation of the ordered probit model with random effects (Eq.1-Eq.2) for the rating agencies Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s, from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2009. (1) Model that does not consider the 
possible structural change arising from the subprime crisis. (2) Model that does consider the possible structural change arising 
since the outbreak of the subprime crisis. Rho shows the importance of the unobservable effect in the random effects model. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5% and * Significant at 10%. RV likelihood ratio test between model (1) (the restricted 
model) and model (2) (the general model), i.e. 0 0β β =sb kH : . 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 7 also shows the results of the estimation of model (2) which 
considers the possible structural change that occurs with the outbreak of 
the crisis. The results demonstrate a change in the behaviour of the 
agencies, because some variables when interacting with the dummy SB 
modify its influence on the probability of obtain a higher rating. 
Furthermore, according to the likelihood ratio test, the effect of the 
subprime crisis is significant for these two CRAs, as the joint hypothesis 
of non-significance of the dummy variable (SB) and its cross effects with 
the rest of the determinants of the rating is rejected. Thus with the outbreak 
of the subprime crisis, as it already occurred in the case of Fitch, there is 
also a change in the behaviour of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s. If we 
compare these results with the results obtained for Fitch, we observe that 
there are some differences in the weight and the significance that CRAs 
assign to each factor. As is pointed out in Salvador et al. (2011) for SBS 
this implies that the rating agencies analysed adopt different rating 
policies.21 
Likewise, we make predictions of ratings, through analysis of the 
density functions and calculation of the Rating Change Index (RCI). In a 
similar manner to the case of Fitch, Graphs 3 and 4 show that Moody’s and 
Standard and Poor’s also carry out a lowering of ratings. In the case of 
Moody’s the reduction in the ratings is due both to the worsening of the 
banks’ solvency and to the hardening of their rating policy. In Standard 
and Poor’s, however, the fall in the ratings is due solely to the worsening 
of their creditworthiness. These results are confirmed by calculating the 
                                                          
21
 Although the rating agencies have a different rating policy there is a high correlation between 
the predictions of the ratings. For this reason, the results are quite similar in the regressions and 
prediction exercises. 
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RCI. According to this index, Moody’s ratings fell by 14.15% and 
Standard and Poor’s by 1.9%. If this adjustment is decomposed, in the case 
of Moody’s, 75.40% is explained by the worsening of solvency levels and 
24.60% by the hardening of the rating criteria. On the other hand, Standard 
and Poor’s is the only CRA that has not toughened its rating policy 
following the crisis. In this case, the lowering of the rating levels is due 
exclusively to the worsening of the banks’ solvency. If we disaggregate the 
RCI and its determinants according to entities’ size, we observe from Table 
8 that as in the case of Fitch, the greatest lowering of ratings occurs in the 
small and medium sized entities. Furthermore, if the results are 
disaggregated according to the legal form, we find that the biggest drop in 
ratings occurs in the savings banks. In this sense, we have to highlight that 
when we differentiate the entities according to the legal form and size in 
Standard and Poor’s, small and medium sized savings banks present a great 
fall in ratings and a significant hardening of the rating criteria. 
Altogether, the results obtained for Moody’s and to a lesser extent for 
Standard and Poor’s are similar to the behaviour pattern of the adjustment 
of ratings experienced in Fitch.22 This adjustment is characterised by a fall 
in ratings which occurs with greater intensity in savings banks of medium 
and small size. 
 
  
                                                          
22
 As Deprés (2011) shows there is a strong correlation between the ratings of three main agencies 
(Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s) due to the competition among them. Hence, the 
similarity of the results across rating agencies is not surprising. 
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Graph 3. Change in the rating estimated by Moody’s between the pre- and 
post-crisis periods 
Note: Kernel density functions according to the predictions from model (2) that considers the possible structural 
change, applied to Moody’s rating categories.  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Graph 4. Change in the rating estimated by Standard and Poor’s between 
the pre- and post-crisis periods 
 
Note: Kernel density functions according to the predictions from model (2) that considers the possible structural 
change, applied to Standard and Poor’s rating categories. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 8. Size, RCI and its components to the banks evaluated by Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s 
  Moody's Total Moody's Banks Moody's Saving Banks 
  
N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency 
Medium-Small 9 0.81 -19.00% 27.88% 72.12% 1 0.88 -12.50% 37.31% 62.69% 8 0.80 -19.81% 27.12% 72.88% 
Big 3 0.95 -4.56% 13.09% 86.91% 2 0.97 -2.52% 50.00% 50.00% 1 0.91 -8.74% -7.70% 107.70% 
Total 12 0.86 -14.15% 24.60% 75.40% 3 0.94 -5.90% 41.04% 58.96% 9 0.81 -18.61% 25.35% 74.65% 
 Statistical t Critical value 
of t (one tail) 
Critical value 
of t (Two tails) 
  
Small-Medium vs 
Big 2.58 1.81** 2.22** 
  
 
  Standard and Poor's Total Standard and Poor's Banks Standard and Poor's Saving Banks 
  N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency N RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency 
Medium-Small 11 0.98 -2.29% 93.55% 6.45% 5 1.06 6.44% 49.38% 50.62% 6 0.91 -9.29% 69.30% 30.70% 
Big 2 1.15 15.18% 117.58% -17.58% 2 1.15 15.18% 117.58% -17.58%           
Total 13 0.98 -1.90% -24.09% 124.09% 7 1.09 9.11% 81.88% 18.12% 6 0.91 -9.29% 69.30% 30.70% 
 Statistical t Critical value 
of t (one tail) 
Critical value 
of t (Two tails)   
Small-Medium vs 
Big 2.91 1.85*** 2.30** 
  
Note: Disaggregation of the RCI, and of its explanatory factors (change in rating policy and change in solvency level), according to size and legal form of the banks evaluated by Moody’s 
and Standard and Poor’s. Negative values of Behaviour or Solvency indicate that its contribution on RCI is negative. Adjustment is equal to 1-RCI, thus it measures the worsening or 
improvement of the ratings in terms of percentage. The size is defined on the basis of the size of each bank during the period 2000-2009.The small and medium entities include those of a 
size between quartiles 25 or less and 75. The large entities include those of a size above quartile 75. We show the test of differences in means, under the null hypothesis µ1= µ2. *** Significant 
at 1%, ** Significant at 5% and * Significant at 10%. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Another exercise is to estimate models (1) and (2) but taking the 
determinants of bank ratings in lags (from one lag to four lags) with respect 
to the rating, as accounting information is not usually available 
contemporarily when rating agencies issue their ratings. The results of the 
estimations (Table 9) are similar to those obtained in Table 4 and the RCI 
(Table 10) is also comparable to that of Table 6.  
In the line of the results obtained by Packer and Tarashev (2011), who 
highlight the importance of considering the external support that the banks 
received from the economic authorities in the subprime crisis, we also 
model and predict the individual ratings of Fitch and Moody’s (not shown). 
These ratings only consider entities’ intrinsic solvency level and thus do 
not take into account the possible support they can receive from the 
economic authorities and/or owners in order to avoid a possible 
bankruptcy. In the case of Fitch individual ratings, the RCI in Table 11 
shows a worsening of 24.13%, which is explained entirely by the 
worsening of the solvency level of the institutions evaluated. For Moody’s 
Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSR) the worsening of rating is 39.14%, 
of which 94.92% corresponds to the deterioration of the financial position 
and 5.08% to the hardening of rating criteria. Likewise, if we do the same 
exercise for Moody’s deposits ratings, we obtain a worsening of ratings of 
7.99% of which 38.32% is due to the deterioration of creditworthiness and 
61.68% to the hardening of rating criteria.  
Therefore, these results demonstrate that with the onset of the subprime 
crisis a worsening occurs in the level of ratings that is explained by the 
worsening of the banks’ creditworthiness and the hardening of 
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Table 9. Ordered probit model with random effects with determinants of ratings in lags. Eq(1)-(2). Fitch 2000-2009 
  1 Lag  2 Lags  3 Lags  4 Lags 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2) 
Capital 34.740 ***   46.633 ***   51.495 ***   22.833 ***   58.175 ***   13.134 **    52.323 ***   31.091 *** 
Liquidity  1.590 *   5.951 ***   0.076     1.905       2.776 ***   2.284 *     4.397 ***   8.517 *** 
ROA 10.465     -73.432 ***   -34.424     -78.012 ***   -33.390     -54.243 *     -43.783 *   -0.779     
Size  2.632 ***   2.785 ***   2.637 ***   2.475 ***   2.020 ***   2.881 ***   2.189 ***   2.550 *** 
Provisions  -257.748 ***   -188.119 ***   -249.945 ***   -233.844 ***   -207.662 ***   -198.234 ***   -196.784 ***   -136.316 **  
Loans 1.030 *   5.581 ***   0.486     0.442       0.186     5.077 ***   -0.990     5.168 *** 
Eficiency  1.428 ***   4.445 ***   1.635 ***   2.244 ***   2.959 ***   2.502 ***   1.414 ***   2.074 *** 
Unemployment  -0.093 ***   -0.005       -0.109 ***   -0.061 ***   -0.097 ***   -0.012       -0.061 ***   0.045 *** 
Market Power 5.904 ***   4.093 ***   7.645 ***   5.051 ***   10.649 ***   3.847 ***   10.793 ***   2.043     
Deposits  18.992 ***   -3.448       19.476 ***   -2.241       16.756 ***   -1.615       16.300 ***   -2.589     
HHI -0.638 **   -0.961 **    -0.624 *   -3.481 ***   -0.396     0.594       -2.690 ***   -0.956 **  
Bank 2.345 ***   1.053 ***   3.538 ***   3.140 ***   0.795 ***   3.588 ***   1.319 ***   2.960 *** 
SB       -30.543 ***         -52.933 ***         -43.279 ***         -38.448 *** 
SB*Capital       65.759 ***         67.098 ***         56.514 ***         53.116 *** 
SB*Liquidity        -8.199 **          -2.968             0.502             3.589     
SB*ROA       293.849 ***         233.558 ***         167.022 ***         113.393 *** 
SB*Size        0.696 **          1.004 ***         0.952 ***         0.899 *** 
SB*Provisions        -125.792 **          -77.566             -47.176             -75.308     
SB*Loans        -9.773 ***         -5.348 **          -3.345             -2.653     
SB*Eficiency        -6.591 ***         -7.884 ***         -8.818 ***         -9.977 *** 
SB*Unemployment      -0.094 ***         -0.094 ***         -0.076 **          -0.102 *** 
SB*Market Power     -3.673             3.141             5.671 **          9.237 *** 
SB*Deposits        30.244 ***         42.828 ***         30.714 ***         25.859 *** 
SB*HHI       2.822 ***         4.193 ***         4.976 ***         3.759 *** 
SB*Bank       2.573 ***         2.887 ***         2.684 ***         2.476 *** 
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Table 9. (cont.) 
 1 Lag  2 Lags  3 Lags  4 Lags 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (1)  Model (2) 
Term2 -0.785 ***   -0.964 ***   0.440 ***   0.509 ***   0.286 **   0.164       0.306 **   0.085     
Term3 -0.592 ***   -0.727 ***   -0.622 ***   -0.662 ***   0.642 ***   0.532 ***   0.625 ***   0.101     
Term4 -0.365 ***   -0.553 ***   -0.299 **   -0.389 ***   -0.271 **   -0.359 **    0.930 ***   0.277     
Time -0.099 ***   -0.091 ***   -0.109 ***   -0.086 ***   -0.085 ***   -0.100 ***   -0.099 ***   -0.059 *** 
cut1 55.668 ***   42.937 ***   58.364 ***   30.182 ***   49.509 ***   43.036 ***   49.763 ***   38.520 *** 
cut2 57.355 ***   45.318 ***   60.049 ***   32.604 ***   50.975 ***   45.243 ***   51.046 ***   40.558 *** 
cut3 60.344 ***   49.107 ***   63.015 ***   36.772 ***   53.645 ***   48.771 ***   53.750 ***   43.911 *** 
cut4 63.354 ***   52.792 ***   66.065 ***   40.719 ***   56.482 ***   52.606 ***   56.579 ***   47.505 *** 
cut5 68.957 ***   58.407 ***   71.405 ***   47.101 ***   60.866 ***   59.211 ***   61.539 ***   54.137 *** 
Rho 0.717 ***   0.691 ***   0.703 ***   0.783 ***   0.733 ***   0.797 ***   0.659 ***   0.691 *** 
N 1,458     1,458      1,417     1,417      1,376     1,376      1,335     1,335    
chi2 625.761     888.387      591.639     907.632      483.569     852.881      451.778     757.181    
ll -728.857     -597.544      -722.724     -564.728      -755.300     -570.644      -745.395     -592.694    
RV-Test 
    
  262.626       
    
315.992           369.312 
    
      305.402   
P-value 
    
  0.000       
    
0.000           0.000 
    
      0.000   
Note: Results of the estimation of the ordered probit model with random effects (Eq.1-Eq.2) for the rating agency Fitch with explanatory variables in lags (from quarter t-1 to quarter t-4). The period 
considered is from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2009. (1) Model that does not consider the possible structural change arising from the subprime crisis. (2) Model that does consider the 
possible structural change arising since the outbreak of the subprime crisis. Rho shows the importance of the unobservable effect in the random effects model. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, 
* Significant at 10%. RV likelihood ratio test between model (1) (the restricted model) and model (2) (the general model), i.e.   
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 10. Accuracy of Model (2), RCI and its components. Fitch 2000-2009 
Fitch 
Lags % Accuracy RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency 
0 68.91% 90.09% -9.91% 29.19% 70.81% 
1 63.31% 88.97% -11.03% 40.69% 59.31% 
2 62.95% 91.00% -9.00% 29.37% 70.63% 
3 71.22% 90.12% -9.88% 48.99% 51.01% 
4 69.74% 91.02% -8.98% 63.78% 36.22% 
Note: In this table are presented the percentage of correct predictions, the results for the RCI, and its components, for 
Model (2) in contemporary values and with lags (from quarter t-1 to quarter t-4) in explanatory variables. Adjustment 
is equal to 1-RCI, thus it measures the worsening or improvement of the ratings in terms of percentage. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Table 11. RCI and its components for individual and deposits ratings 
Type of Rating RCI Adjustment Behaviour Solvency 
Individual rating of Fitch 75.87% -24.13% -10.70% 110.70% 
Individual rating of Moody's (BFRS) 60.86% -39.14% 5.08% 94.92% 
Bank Deposits rating of Moody's 92.01% -7.99% 61.68% 38.32% 
Note: The results for the RCI and its components, to the Model (2) for individual ratings of Fitch and Moody’s, and 
for the Deposits ratings of Moody’s. Adjustment is equal to 1-RCI, thus it measures the worsening or improvement 
of the ratings in terms of percentage. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
rating policy, although this effect does not occur equally in all agencies 
and types of ratings considered. Specifically, as noted in the issuer ratings 
of Standard and Poor's and the individual ratings of Fitch, on average there 
has been a relaxation of the rating policy. 
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3.8. Conclusions 
This study analyses the impact of the subprime crisis on the behaviour of 
the ratings issued for commercial banks and savings banks of the Spanish 
Banking System (SBS), during the period 2000-2009. With this analysis 
we determine the contribution of the banks’ worsened solvency and the 
change in the behaviour of the rating agencies to the adjustment in ratings. 
For this reason, we designed a methodology based on the specification 
of an ordered probit model with random effects, permitting us to monitor 
the possible structural change occurring as a result of the subprime crisis. 
The evidence presented confirms that with the outbreak of the crisis there 
is a lowering of the ratings issued, due both to a hardening of the agencies’ 
rating policy and to a worsening of the banks’ creditworthiness. 
Specifically, we find that on average the ratings of the banks of the SBS 
have worsened by 10.88%. Of this adjustment, 74.85% is due to the 
deterioration of the banks’ solvency levels and 25.15% to the hardening of 
the rating policy. This important change in the rating policy questions the 
role of the rating agencies in reflecting at any time the true credit quality 
of the banks and savings banks. This provides evidence for the affirmations 
of the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report (2010) and of the study by 
Deprés (2011), about the updating of the rating models and the procyclical 
behaviour of the ratings.  
The disaggregation of the results according to the banks’ size and legal 
form shows that medium and small sized banks, and more specifically the 
savings banks, present a greater fall in their ratings. This is because of the 
savings banks’ specialisation in the granting of credits to activities related 
with bricks and mortar. 
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Appendix A.3. Ratings scale of the rating agencies and the 
numerical scale defined 
 
Note: Transformation of the categorical rating assigned by Moody’s, Fitch and Standard and Poor’s into the numerical scale 
defined in this study. As the score decreases, so does the credit quality, and consequently the probability of default increases. 
The top and bottom categories are grouped, due to the small number of observations they present. WR refers to a rating that is 
withdrawn 
Source: Own elaboration and methodological reports of rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch).  
Rating Obs Scale 16 Scale 6 Rating Obs Scale 16 Scale 6 Rating Obs Scale 16 Scale 6
AAA - 16 6 Aaa - 16 6 AAA - 16 6
AA+ - 16 6 Aa1 27 16 6 AA+ - 16 6
AA 82 15 6 Aa2 51 15 6 AA 67 15 6
AA- 158 14 6 Aa3 24 14 6 AA- 76 14 6
A+ 278 13 5 A1 186 13 5 A+ 163 13 5
A 449 12 4 A2 108 12 4 A 139 12 4
A- 459 11 3 A3 18 11 3 A- 18 11 3
BBB+ 57 10 2 Baa1 3 10 2 BBB+ - 10 2
BBB 9 9 1 Baa2 - 9 1 BBB - 9 1
BBB- - 8 1 Baa3 - 8 1 BBB- - 8 1
BB+ 7 7 1 Ba1 - 7 1 BB+ - 7 1
BB - 6 1 Ba2 - 6 1 BB - 6 1
BB- - 5 1 Ba3 - 5 1 BB- - 5 1
B+ - 4 1 B1 - 4 1 B+ - 4 1
B - 3 1 B2 - 3 1 B - 3 1
B- - 2 1 B3 - 2 1 B- - 2 1
CCC+ - 1 1 Caa1 - 1 1 CCC+ - 1 1
CCC - 1 1 Caa2 - 1 1 CCC - 1 1
CCC- - 1 1 Caa3 - 1 1 CCC- - 1 1
CC - 1 1 Ca - 1 1 CC - 1 1
C - 1 1 C - 1 1 C - 1 1
D - - - D - - - D - - -
WR - - - WR - - WR - - -
Rating Obs Scale 10 Scale 5 Rating Obs Scale 10 Scale 6 Rating Obs Scale 16 Scale 5
Aaa - 16 5
Aa1 51 16 5
Aa2 82 15 5
A - 12 6 Aa3 131 14 4
A- 24 11 6 A1 255 13 3
A - 10 5 B+ 70 10 6 A2 270 12 2
A/B 148 9 5 B 189 9 5 A3 114 11 2
B 415 8 4 B- 141 8 4 Baa1 37 10 1
B/C 342 7 3 C+ 254 7 3 Baa2 3 9 1
C 178 6 2 C 194 6 2 Baa3 6 8 1
C/D 44 5 1 C- 66 5 1 Ba1 - 7 1
D - 4 1 D+ 19 4 1 Ba2 - 6 1
D/E 3 3 1 D 15 3 1 Ba3 - 5 1
E - 2 1 D- 15 2 1 B1 - 4 1
F 4 1 1 E+/E 9 1 1 B2 - 3 1
B3 - 2 1
Caa1 - 1 1
Caa2 - 1 1
Caa3 - 1 1
Ca - 1 1
C - 1 1
D - - -
WR 10 - - WR 7 - - WR -4 - -
Speculative
Investment
Speculative
Other types of ratings
Fitch Individual Moody's Bank Financial Strength Moody's Deposits
Issuer rating
Fitch Moody's Standard and Poor's
Investment
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4. The adjustment of bank ratings in the 
financial crisis: International evidence 
4.1. Introduction  
THE outbreak of the subprime crisis in 2007 and the subsequent sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe has increased the doubts regarding the behaviour of 
the three principal rating agencies (Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s) and the quality of the ratings issued. Specifically, the rating 
agencies (CRAs) have been accused of relaxing their rating criteria during 
the period of economic growth up to the outbreak of the subprime crisis 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008). Furthermore of this 
accusation the agencies have been criticised because of the conflicts of 
interest deriving from their business model, lack of transparency and 
excessive credibility given by investors and regulators (Bank of England, 
2011). This is not new, as in past several episodes the agencies’ operation 
has also been questioned. First, in the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995, in 
which the rating agencies were blamed for reacting to the events that were 
occurring rather than anticipating them (Reisen and Maltzan, 1999). A 
similar criticism was made following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s 
(Ferri et al., 1999). Later, with the bankruptcies of Enron and Parmalat, the 
agencies were again in the firing line for having awarded these firms an 
investment grade rating in the days before their failure (Hill, 2004; Danvers 
et al., 2004).  
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In response to the criticisms received, the CRAs have defended 
themselves by arguing that their ratings are drawn up with a medium and 
long term perspective (through-the-cycle), and consequently ignore the 
transitory changes occurring in the solvency of the products that they 
assess, i.e. they do not issue ratings with a point-in-time perspective. In this 
context, numerous studies in the literature test whether indeed the rating 
agencies follow a through-the-cycle strategy or on the contrary a point-in-
time strategy. These studies show diverse results. On the one hand, Altman 
and Rijken (2004 and 2006) find evidence in favour of the through-the-
cycle strategy, whereas Bangia et al. (2002) and Salvador et al. (2014) find 
that ratings have a markedly procyclical character.23 Despite defending 
these arguments it is true that with the financial crisis the CRAs have 
adjusted their criteria (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2010).  
These criticisms have also touched the regulators, who have been 
accused of assigning an excessive role to ratings and of performing an 
ineffective supervision of the rating agencies. In this sense, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) revised its 
code of conduct with the aim of increasing transparency, independence and 
competition among the rating agencies and of reducing the conflicts of 
interest deriving from their business model. But this has not been the only 
reform: in 2009 the European Parliament passed a new regulation 
(Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009) compelling CRAs to register with the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). In 2009, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US also carried out a 
                                                          
23
 Other studies that demonstrate the procyclic character of ratings are: Catarineu-Rabell et al. 
(2005), Amato and Furfine (2004) and Zicchino (2006). 
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series of reforms imposing restrictions to the agencies to prevent the 
conflicts of interest deriving from their business model, as well as 
demanding greater transparency through publication of the rating 
methodologies and of the ratings issued. Lastly, the Basel Committee 
carried out a review of the role of the ratings issued by the rating agencies 
in the calculation of regulatory capital requirements (Sundmacher and 
Ellis, 2011). 
With the financial crisis, at the same time as the CRAs adjusted their 
rating criteria and regulators carried out different reforms to strengthen 
their supervision, banks experienced a significant worsening of their 
financial situation (Laeven and Valencia, 2013; BCE, 2008a, 2008b). A 
worsening that has been characterised by the substantial reduction of 
profitability, undermining the capacity to generate capital. The collapse of 
the financial markets has meant an increase in the need for liquidity. In 
turn, the financial crisis has generated a loss of quality of credits and an 
increase in uncertainty, causing an increased cost of financing. All these 
circumstances caused serious problems in the banks with greatest liquidity 
needs, with over-dependence on the wholesale markets or real estate assets, 
especially in the banks with major exposure to structured products and/or 
sovereign debt of the peripheral countries of Europe. In response to these 
problems, between late 2008 and early 2009, some countries took 
substantial measures to rescue and restructure their financial sectors, 
including recapitalisation packages and the nationalisation of some 
financial entities (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). 
Therefore, with the outbreak of the subprime crisis and the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis in the peripheral countries of the EU (Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece and Spain), bank ratings underwent a downward 
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adjustment due both to the hardening of rating policies and to the 
worsening of their asset situation. In this context, this chapter has a dual 
aim. First, we analyse the adjustment occurring in bank ratings, quantifying 
the contributions of the change in policy rating, on the one hand, and the 
worsening of the asset situation, on the other. For this reason, following 
the methodology proposed by Salvador et al. (2014) for the case of the 
SBS, we calculate the probability of a bank obtaining a certain rating as a 
function of the factors that the rating agencies describe in their 
methodological reports. On the basis of these results and by means of a 
prediction exercise, the Rating Change Index (RCI) is calculated, to 
quantify the adjustment in the ratings, as well as the percentage of the latter 
that is due to the change in the asset situation and that derived from the 
hardening of the rating policies. Secondly, we determine whether the 
adjustment in the ratings has occurred with the same intensity in all 
banking systems or, on the contrary, there exist differences between the 
banks of the US and the EU, and within the latter, between the PIGS and 
the non-PIGS. This permits us to determine, by groups of countries, 
whether the asset situation and the hardening of the rating policy at a 
general level have had the same relative importance in the adjustment of 
the ratings. This analysis uses the issuer ratings of a significant sample of 
US and EU banks, between the years 2004 and 2011.  
The results obtained show that with the financial crisis in 2008 there is 
a generalised fall in bank ratings, the intensity of which depends on the 
CRA considered. On average, a fall of ratings is estimated in Fitch, 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s of 5.35%, 4.19% and 7.70%, 
respectively. This fall in Fitch and Standard and Poor’s is due both to the 
worsening of the asset situation and to the hardening of rating policies. 
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Specifically, in Fitch 79.66% of the fall is due to the hardening of the rating 
policy and 20.34% to the worsening asset situation. In Standard and Poor’s, 
63.93% is due to the hardening of the rating policy and 36.07% to the 
worsening of the solvency level. In Moody’s, on the contrary, the whole of 
the fall in ratings is explained by the worsening of the financial asset 
situation of the banks evaluated, partly offset by the application of a more 
flexible rating policy. If this analysis is performed on the basis of the 
geographical area analysed, we find that, on average, ratings have 
worsened with greater intensity in the US and the European PIGS due to 
the hardening of the rating policy with the onset of the financial crisis. 
Consequently, these results suggest that although the financial crisis has 
led to a general hardening of rating policy, its relative importance in the 
downward adjustment of ratings varies depending on the group of 
countries analysed.  
After this introduction, the structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 
4.2 briefly reviews the literature on modelling of bank ratings. Section 4.3 
specifies the sample used and performs a descriptive analysis of the 
behaviour of ratings during the period analysed. Section 4.4 defines the 
methodology and the variables used on modelling bank ratings. Section 4.5 
presents the empirical results, and finally, the last section presents the 
conclusions.  
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4.2. Literature on modelling of bank ratings 
The literature on bank ratings has focussed on modelling and predicting 
ratings on the basis of various econometric techniques. In this sense, Poon 
et al. (1999) model the Bank Financial Strength Ratings of Moody’s 
(BFSRs), which consider only the intrinsic solvency of the entities 
evaluated. For this, they use an ordered logit model and define a set of 100 
factors that reflect the level of return, efficiency, risk, leverage and interest 
cover of the banks assessed. Using these models the authors achieve a 
percentage of correct predictions between 21% and 70%. Morgan (2002) 
also models bank ratings using ordered logit and probit models with the 
aim of determining the factors that explain the discrepancies between the 
different rating agencies when issuing ratings for financial entities. The 
results indicate that the discrepancies between the rating agencies are due 
to the opaqueness of the assets that define the bulk of the banks’ balance 
sheets (loans and other financial assets). In this same line of research, 
Iannotta (2006) justifies that the discrepancies between the agencies in 
their evaluations of the banks are due to the opaqueness of the assets that 
define the bank’s balance sheets. His results indicate that the opaqueness 
of financial entities increases with size and capital and on the other hand 
decreases with fixed assets. 
Estrella (2000) studies the relationships among a set of financial ratios 
that measure the probability of default of the banks of the US and the 
ratings of the debt issued by them, showing that the information available 
on balance sheets predicts accurately enough the ratings of the banks’ debt. 
Tabakis and Vinci (2002) model the bond ratings of 67 banks belonging to 
the EU, US and Japan, finding evidence that the ratings awarded by the 
three principal agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) depend 
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on the information available in the balance sheets, the specialisation and 
the country to which the banks belong. 
Other more recent studies in the literature have focussed on analysing 
the existence of heterogeneity among the ratings of the banks of different 
countries. Iannotta et al. (2008) assess the influence of the ownership 
structure of the banks in the EU on the issuer ratings of Standard and Poor’s 
and on the individual and issuer ratings of Fitch using an ordered logit 
model. These authors find evidence that publicly owned banks receive a 
higher rating than other banks. Likewise, Peresetsky and Karminsky 
(2008) use an ordered logit model to identify the determinants of Moody’s 
Foreign-currency long term Deposit Ratings (DR) and Bank Financial 
Strength Ratings (BFSRs). Their results indicate that Moody’s does not 
consider only the internal factors of the banks associated with their 
financial structure, but also other external factors such as political risk. 
Consequently, this result shows the importance of considering the 
heterogeneity among the different countries when modelling bank ratings. 
In the same line, Bellotti et al. (2011), using an ordered logit model and the 
technique called Support Vector Machine (SVM), find evidence of the 
existence of differential effects associated with the country in which the 
bank ratings are issued. More recently, Caporale et al. (2011), using an 
ordered model and controlling for the specific effects of countries by 
introducing different intercepts, find evidence of significant differences 
between the ratings of banks belonging to the new countries and old 
countries of the EU. Specifically, they find evidence that in general terms 
the latter banks receive a relatively higher rating than the former. 
Shen et al. (2012) model the issuer ratings of Standard and Poor’s, to 
determine the reason that explain why there is a variation in the ratings 
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between countries even when the financial variables remain constant. The 
authors reach the conclusion that the significance of the explanatory factors 
on the modelling of bank ratings is influenced by the existence of different 
degrees of asymmetric information among the different banking systems. 
Thus, the banks of different countries may have different ratings even 
though they present similar financial ratios. Öğüt et al. (2012) focus on 
modelling Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Ratings in Turkey. For this, 
they use different econometric techniques; the Support Vector Machine 
(SVM), Artificial Neural Network (ANN), Multiple Discriminant Analysis 
(MDA) and logit techniques. These authors also find evidence of the 
importance of considering, on modelling bank ratings, the environmental 
variables that capture the heterogeneity between the banks of different 
countries. 
Finally, other recent studies have focussed on analysing how the crisis 
has affected the behaviour of bank ratings. Packer and Tarashev (2011) 
perform a descriptive analysis of the effect of the crisis on the behaviour 
of the issuer and individual ratings awarded by the three principal CRAs 
(Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch). Their results indicate that with 
the onset of the crisis the generalised fall in bank ratings occurs with 
greater intensity in the case of individual ratings. This shows the 
importance of considering external support when assessing the credit 
quality of the banks and consequently the issuer ratings. In this same line, 
Salvador et al. (2014) using an ordered probit model with random effects, 
model the issuer and individual bank ratings of the three principal rating 
agencies in the SBS taking into account the possible effect of the crisis. 
These authors show that the principal factor explaining the adjustment in 
the ratings is the worsening of the asset situation, though the hardening of 
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rating policies have a significant contribution. Specifically, they find that 
three quarters of the downward adjustment in the ratings is due to a 
worsening of the solvency level and one quarter to the hardening of the 
rating policy. It should be emphasised that considering a single banking 
system, as these authors do, has possibly two limitations. Firstly, they 
possibly do not consider some significant variables in the modelling of the 
bank ratings, as the CRAs indicate in their methodological reports, and 
which refer to the banking system in which the banks operate; for example, 
in the financial crisis, the changes in sovereign credit ratings, the level of 
public deficit and/or the rate of growth of the national GDP. Secondly, the 
consideration of a single banking system implies that all the banks are 
subject to the same shocks occurring in the economy. Consequently, this 
study analyses the impact of the financial crisis on the behaviour of bank 
ratings for a set of international banks. 
4.3. Sample  
The sample is formed by 337 international banks, corresponding to 21 
countries (US and 20 countries of the EU) during the period from 2004 to 
2011. The type of rating used is the issuer rating, which is considered a 
better indicator than the individual rating because it captures the total 
probability of default, taking into account both the banks’ intrinsic 
solvency and the external support that they may receive in the event of 
insolvency. In order to capture the possible effect of the financial crisis, we 
consider only the banks for which it has been possible to obtain ratings 
both in the period before and in the period of financial crisis. The first year 
chosen for the sample is 2004, with the aim of avoiding the possible 
structural change after 1997 Asian crisis and the subsequent bankruptcies 
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of Enron and Parmalat. All those events called into question the role of the 
rating agencies and highlighted the need to implement stricter regulation. 
The total number of observations of rated banks with available accounting 
information is 2,322. Both the ratings information and the accounting 
information were extracted from the Bankscope database (Bureau van 
Dijk).  
As in Poon et al. (1999), Morgan (2002) and Caporale et al. (2011) 
among others, the categorical scale of ratings has been transformed into a 
numerical scale, as specified in Table 1. The numerical scale awards higher 
values as credit quality improves. The lower categories have been grouped 
together because they each contain only a small number of observations. 
24In Table 1, two groups of ratings can be differentiated depending on the 
degree of risk of default that they represent. Those in the investment grade 
(from AAA/Aaa to BBB-/Baa3) indicate a relatively low risk of default 
while ratings of the speculative grade (from BB+/Ba1 to D) indicate either 
a high default risk or that the default has already occurred. 
As reflected in Table 2, the sample consists of 4,093 ratings awarded 
by the three principal international rating agencies (Fitch, Standard and 
Poor’s and Moody’s). Of these three, as also shown in Table 2, the one 
presenting the highest market share by percentage of ratings issued is Fitch, 
with 46.37%, followed by Standard and Poor’s with 33.84%. 
                                                          
24
 The results presented in this chapter are fairly similar for the case where the rating categories 
are not grouped. Specifically, the correlation with the predicted rating is 0.99 in each of the three 
rating agencies. These results are available on request from the authors.  
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Table 1. Ratings and numerical score 
 
Note: Transformation of the categorical rating assigned by Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s into the numerical scale defined in this study (Scale 11). As the score decreases, so does 
the credit quality, and consequently the probability of default increases. The top and bottom categories are grouped, due to the small number of observations they present. WR refers to a 
rating that is withdrawn. 
Source: Own elaboration and methodological reports of rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch).
Rating  Scale 22  Scale 11 Number of 
ratings Rating  Scale 22  Scale 11 
Number of 
ratings Rating  Scale 22  Scale 11 
Number of 
ratings
AAA 22 11 AAA 22 11 13 Aaa 22 11 30
AA+ 21 11 8 AA+ 21 11 20 Aa1 21 11 61
AA 20 10 72 AA 20 10 88 Aa2 20 10 105
AA- 19 9 271 AA- 19 9 194 Aa3 19 9 116
A+ 18 8 629 A+ 18 8 254 A1 18 8 173
A 17 7 227 A 17 7 455 A2 17 7 149
A- 16 6 295 A- 16 6 130 A3 16 6 103
BBB+ 15 4 114 BBB+ 15 5 95 Baa1 15 4 15
BBB 14 4 118 BBB 14 4 72 Baa2 14 4 26
BBB- 13 3 78 BBB- 13 3 19 Baa3 13 3 9
BB+ 12 2 35 BB+ 12 2 9 Ba1 12 2 4
BB 11 2 13 BB 11 2 22 Ba2 11 2 5
BB- 10 2 12 BB- 10 2 7 Ba3 10 2 5
B+ 9 1 5 B+ 9 1 4 B1 9 1 8
B 8 1 13 B 8 1 3 B2 8 1
B- 7 1 3 B- 7 1 B3 7 1
CCC+ 6 1 CCC+ 6 1 Caa1 6 1
CCC 5 1 2 CCC 5 1 Caa2 5 1
CCC- 4 1 CCC- 4 1 Caa3 4 1 1
CC 3 1 1 CC 3 1 Ca 3 1
C 2 1 2 C 2 1 C 2 1
D 1 1 D 1 1 D 1 1
WR - WR - WR -
S
p
e
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u
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v
e
Fitch Standard and Poor's Moody's
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v
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Table 2. Market share of rating agencies 
Year 
 Number of observations  Market share 
 Fitch SP Moody’
s 
Total  Fitch SP Moody’s 
2004 
  
161 122 92 375   42.93% 32.53% 24.53% 
2005 
  
215 125 99 439   48.97% 28.47% 22.55% 
2006 
  
234 173 98 505   46.34% 34.26% 19.41% 
2007 
  
254 190 104 548   46.35% 34.67% 18.98% 
2008 
  
264 198 105 567   46.56% 34.92% 18.52% 
2009 
  
264 203 106 573   46.07% 35.43% 18.50% 
2010 
  
262 197 107 566   46.29% 34.81% 18.90% 
2011 
  
244 177 99 520   46.92% 34.04% 19.04% 
Total 
  
1,898 1,385 810 4,093   46.37% 33.84% 19.79% 
Note: This table shows for the period 2004-2011, the number of rating issued by each rating agency and the share 
market per year. 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration.  
Moody’s presents the lowest market share, its ratings representing only 
19.79% of the total number of ratings issued. Of these 4,093 ratings 
observations, as can be deduced from Table 3, most are concentrated in the 
cases of Fitch and Standard and Poor’s in the countries of the EU (63.1% 
and 68.6%, respectively). Specifically, the majority of the banks evaluated 
by these two agencies are located in Germany, Spain, France and Italy. 
Conversely, in the case of Moody’s most of the ratings are issued for banks 
located in the US (65.3%). 
With regard to the evolution of the rating issued by each of the rating 
agencies, it can be seen in Table 4 that from 2009 onwards with the 
financial crisis occurs a significant fall on ratings. In this table it can also 
be observed how the return on assets of the banks analysed worsens 
significantly between the years 2008 and 2009. In this context, Laeven and 
Valencia (2013) date the start of the financial crisis in the US and the 
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Table 3. Distribution of banks rated in the sample by countries 
Country Number of observations Number of banks Weight in the sample 
Fitch SP Moody’s Fitch SP Moody’s Fitch SP Moody’s 
Austria 30 9 0 6 2 0 1.6% 0.6% 0.0% 
Belgium 15 23 8 2 3 1 0.8% 1.7% 1.0% 
Bulgaria 20 24 0 3 3 0 1.1% 1.7% 0.0% 
Germany 440 340 31 68 60 4 23.2% 24.5% 3.8% 
Denmark 16 21 16 2 3 2 0.8% 1.5% 2.0% 
Spain 197 74 93 26 10 12 10.4% 5.3% 11.5% 
Estonia 8 0 0 1 0 0 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
Finland 16 23 23 2 3 3 0.8% 1.7% 2.8% 
France 106 144 30 15 21 4 5.6% 10.4% 3.7% 
UK 17 5 5 3 1 1 0.9% 0.4% 0.6% 
Greece 40 21 0 6 3 0 2.1% 1.5% 0.0% 
Hungary 7 15 0 1 2 0 0.4% 1.1% 0.0% 
Italy 90 99 28 14 16 4 4.7% 7.1% 3.5% 
Lithuania 15 4 0 2 1 0 0.8% 0.3% 0.0% 
Luxembourg 12 42 7 2 7 1 0.6% 3.0% 0.9% 
Norway 48 21 16 6 3 2 2.5% 1.5% 2.0% 
Poland 31 24 0 4 3 0 1.6% 1.7% 0.0% 
Portugal 32 21 0 5 3 0 1.7% 1.5% 0.0% 
Slovenia 33 8 0 5 1 0 1.7% 0.6% 0.0% 
Sweden 24 32 24 3 4 3 1.3% 2.3% 3.0% 
US 701 435 529 96 59 71 36.9% 31.4% 65.3% 
Total 1,898 1,385 810 272 208 108 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Note:  Distribution of the number of banks and observations by each rating agency (Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s) during the period analysed (from year 2004 to 2011). The last 
three columns show the weight of each country above the total number of rating issued by each rating agency during the period analysed.  
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
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Table 4. Evolution of average ratings 
 Average of ratings Growth rate 
Year Fitch SP Moody’s Fitch SP Moody’s 
2004 6.76 7.04 7.82    
2005 7.00 7.16 7.95 0.04 0.02 0.02 
2006 7.11 7.17 7.96 0.02 0.00 0.00 
2007 7.19 7.45 8.60 0.01 0.04 0.08 
2008 7.13 7.50 8.49 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
2009 6.92 7.31 8.21 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
2010 6.64 6.84 7.21 -0.04 -0.06 -0.12 
2011 6.27 6.58 6.77 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
Total 6.88 7.14 7.88    
Note: This table shows for the period 2004-2011, the mean rating issued by each rating agency per year. The mean 
rating was calculated from the numerical scale defined from 1 to 11. Furthermore this table shows the ROA and ROE 
ratios of all the banks considered in the sample and the banks of the banking system analysed. 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
United Kingdom (UK) in 2007, and for the rest of the cases in 2008. During 
2008 important events occurred that led to an increase in uncertainty 
regarding banks, outstanding among them the collapses of Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers in the US and the nationalisation of the Royal Bank 
of Scotland in the UK. Therefore, with the aim of responding to the 
question posed as to whether the reduction in ratings is due to a hardening 
of rating policies or to the asset situation of the banks, the sample is divided 
into two sub-periods: the period before (2004-2008) and the period of 
financial crisis (2009-2011). 
The downward adjustment of ratings occurring with the financial crisis 
can be appreciated more clearly in Table 5, which shows the transition 
matrices for each of the two sub-periods defined. Specifically, on 
comparing the matrices of the pre-crisis and crisis periods, the downward 
adjustment in the ratings can again be observed. We also observe that with 
the financial crisis ratings are less stable, implying that 
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Table 5. Issuer ratings transition matrices  
a) Fitch (Issuer) 
    Before the crisis 
    Final rating (t) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
In
iti
a
l r
a
tin
g 
(t-
1) 
1                         
2 3.6% 75.0% 21.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
3 0.0% 3.7% 74.1% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
4 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 86.3% 5.9% 3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
5 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 6.0% 66.0% 18.0% 6.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 88.7% 8.5% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 5.4% 88.3% 3.6% 1.8% 0.0%   0.0% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 95.1% 4.1% 0.7%   0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 91.0% 5.2%   0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 92.3%   0.0% 
11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 0.0% 
12                         
                            
    Since the start of the crisis 
    Final rating (t) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
In
iti
a
l r
a
tin
g 
(t-
1) 
1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%     0.0% 
2 29.4% 70.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%     0.0% 
3 21.2% 21.2% 54.5% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%     0.0% 
4 2.1% 10.4% 12.5% 66.7% 4.2% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1%     0.0% 
5 0.0% 0.0% 22.9% 18.8% 56.3% 2.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%     0.0% 
6 0.0% 0.8% 7.4% 6.6% 9.9% 72.7% 1.7% 0.8% 0.0%     0.0% 
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 2.2% 20.2% 73.0% 3.4% 0.0%     0.0% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 1.5% 4.8% 91.1% 1.1%     0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 18.1% 80.0% 1.0%   0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 17.9% 25.0% 57.1%   0.0% 
11                         
12                         
 
b) Standard and Poor's (Issuer) 
  
  Before the crisis 
  
  Final rating (t) 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
In
iti
a
l r
a
tin
g 
(t-
1) 
1             
2 0.0% 86.7% 13.3%    
3 0.0% 0.0% 60.0% 40.0%    
4 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 76.5% 17.6% 2.9%   
5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.0% 15.6% 4.4%   
6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 78.8% 21.2%   
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 89.0% 7.9% 0.6%   
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 0.9% 78.4% 18.1% 0.9%  
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.7% 82.1% 13.2%  
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 76.3% 15.8%
11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
12              
  
                          
  
  Since the start of the crisis 
  
  Final rating (t) 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
In
iti
a
l r
a
tin
g 
(t-
1) 
1 100.0%    
2 15.4% 76.9% 7.7%    
3 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 12.5% 12.5%    
4 4.2% 12.5% 16.7% 66.7%    
5 0.0% 5.0% 7.5% 20.0% 60.0% 5.0% 2.5%   
6 0.0% 4.3% 4.3% 10.6% 12.8% 59.6% 6.4% 2.1%   
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 1.4% 6.9% 88.9% 1.4% 0.0% 0.9%  
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.0% 19.4% 75.5% 1.0%   
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.5% 25.7% 60.8% 4.1% ####### 0.0%
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 11.4% 11.4% 74.3%  
11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 27.8% 55.6% 0.0%
12              
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c) Moody’s (Issuer) 
    
Before the crisis 
    Moody's (Issuer) 
    Final rating (t) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
In
iti
a
l r
a
tin
g 
(t-
1) 
1                         
2 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
3 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
4 0.0% 6.3% 6.3% 56.3% 0.0% 18.8% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
6 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 62.5% 25.0% 8.3% 0.0% 2.1%   0.0% 
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 72.9% 20.0% 5.7% 1.4%   0.0% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 11.1% 78.9% 6.7% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 76.5% 10.3% 10.3% 0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 70.4% 25.9% 0.0% 
11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 8.1% 91.9% 0.0% 
12                         
                            
    
Since the start of the crisis 
    Moody's (Issuer) 
    Final rating (t) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
In
iti
a
l r
a
tin
g 
(t-
1) 
1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
2 62.5% 37.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
3 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
4 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 57.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
5 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
6 0.0% 3.0% 3.0% 12.1% 9.1% 72.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
7 3.0% 7.5% 1.5% 0.0% 4.5% 31.3% 52.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 25.8% 67.7% 0.0% 0.0%   0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 11.6% 27.9% 58.1% 0.0%   0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 12.1% 9.1% 78.8%   0.0% 
11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.1% 4.1% 26.5% 63.3% 0.0% 
12                         
Note: Transition matrices for the period before and since start of the financial crisis for issuer ratings of each rating 
agency (Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s). These matrices have been calculated as the total number of 
transitions between year t-1 and year t of the sample defined in each matrix. The ratings are ordered from lower to 
higher credit quality. 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk) and own elaboration. 
the rating agencies review their ratings more frequently. These descriptive 
statistics therefore seem to point out that the ratings present a certain 
procyclical behaviour. 
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4.4. Methodology and variables used 
The aim of this chapter is to decompose the observed variation of ratings 
into two components: one associated with the worsening of the banks’ asset 
situation and another derived from a possible hardening of rating policies. 
To perform this decomposition a two-stage procedure is proposed. The first 
stage models bank ratings during the period analysed, taking into account 
the possible structural change occurring as a consequence of the financial 
crisis. In a second stage, by means of different prediction exercises, the 
adjustment that has occurred in ratings is quantified as well as the 
contribution of each factor. Once this decomposition has been performed, 
the differences among the banks of different groups of countries are 
compared in order to analyse the possible existence of heterogeneity of in 
the weight that respesents each factor that explain the adjustment of ratings 
among the different geographical areas. 
In the modelling of the ratings, as in other studies in the literature, an 
ordered probit model is used.25 With this model we calculate the 
probability of obtaining a certain rating according to the factors defining 
                                                          
25
 As referred to by Greene (2003) the results of the estimations with logit and probit models are 
practically the same. The difference between the two specifications lies essentially in the form 
of the accumulative distribution function. In this sense the probit model assumes a normal 
accumulative distribution function, while the logit model assumes a logistical accumulative 
distribution. The precision of this specification is demonstrated in previous studies of the 
modelling of bank ratings. Outstanding among them are Öğüt et al (2012), Shen et al. (2012), 
Salvador et al (2014), Caporale et al. (2011). 
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the asset situation of the banks evaluated. Consequently, the specification 
of equation (1) is as follows:26  
 
* '
it itit-1Y x u= +β
 (1) 
where *itY  is a linear function of the explanatory variables, Xt-1, that define 
the rating of the banks analysed. Like Altman and Rijken (2004) and 
Caporale et al. (2011), we introduce the values of the factors determining 
the ratings with a lag period, t-1. This is because accounting information is 
issued annually and is unknown when the rating is drawn up. For example, 
the rating of a bank in the first quarter of 2008, t, refers to the bank’s asset 
situation in the last year, 2007, t-1, since at that time the value of the factors 
referring to 2008 is unknown. The error term, uit, is a stochastic error term.  
To test the possible change in the rating policy arising as a consequence 
of the financial crisis, equation (2) is defined. In this equation (2) we 
introduce a dummy variable that takes a value equal to unity for the years 
of the financial crisis, and zero otherwise. This variable further interacts 
with the variables determining the rating of equation (1). 
 
* ' '
it it-1 it-1 itY x FC FC x uβ β= + + ⋅ +  
 (2) 
                                                          
26
 This model is estimated following a Data Pool model. Previously, we tested for the possible 
existence of unobservable characteristics associated with the i banks, i.e. whether it is more 
appropriate to estimate these models considering fixed effects or random effects. To determine 
if the individual effects associated with each bank are significant, we run a test of joint 
significance of the coefficients that refer to those effects. The results show in all cases that the 
individual effects are not significant. In addition, the Hausman test shows that the random effect 
estimators are not efficient. Consequently, these results point to the use of a data pool model. 
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The variable FC and its interaction with the rest of the explanatory 
variables permits us to test whether with the start of the financial crisis 
there was a change in the agencies’ rating policy. Thus, if the coefficient 
accompanying the interaction of this dummy with any explanatory variable 
is statistically non-zero, it means that the effect of this factor has changed 
and consequently the rating agencies have adjusted their criteria. 
At this point it is fundamental to select those explanatory variables that 
best represent the behaviour of ratings. For this we follow a dual criterion. 
On the one hand, we follow the methodological reports of the different 
rating agencies analysed, Fitch (2009, 2011), Moody’s (2007a, b), 
Standard and Poor’s (2010, 2011). According to these reports the agencies 
pay special attention to variables that measure profitability, own resources, 
liquidity, efficiency, size, credit risk management, the diversification of the 
banking business and the economic environment in which the banks 
mainly carry out their activity. But we also consider those variables that in 
other previous studies have shown greater capacity predicting ratings. 
These variables, which are included in equations (1) and (2), are listed 
below. 
In this sense, one of the most important factors in the measurement of 
the banks’ asset situation, as pointed out in the methodological reports of 
the rating agencies, is profitability. This factor has commonly been used in 
different studies on modelling bank ratings (Caporale et al., 2011; Hammer 
et al., 2012 and Salvador et al., 2014). Its importance, according to 
Moody’s (2007a), is that this factor measures a bank capacity to generate 
economic value and absorb the losses deriving from the risks assumed both 
by the bank and by the economic environment in which it operates. This 
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factor is measured by means of the ratio between pre-tax profits and total 
assets (ROA). Consequently, a positive sign is expected. 
Another key factor in the evaluation of banks’ asset situation is the 
capital ratio maintained. Capital acts as a cushion to absorb losses, 
preventing a bank from experiencing a default situation when it meets 
difficulties. This factor despite its importance, does not by itself determine 
a bank’s rating (Fitch, 2011), since a bank may maintain a solid level of 
capital but may be exposed to deterioration due to other factors. The capital 
level maintained by a bank is measured by the ratio between equity level 
and total assets (Capital). This factor is therefore expected to present a 
positive sign. 
Banks’ liquidity ratio is also included, since the lack of liquidity can 
lead to a bank’s failure (Fitch 2011; Moody’s 2007a). This factor is 
captured by means of the ratio between liquid assets and total assets 
(Liquidity). In this factor also, a positive coefficient is expected.  
The credit risk is another of the key factors in the evaluation of banks’ 
asset situation. As Fitch (2011) specifies, a key factor in measuring credit 
risk is the structure of the balance sheet. The banks that present a high ratio 
of credits to total assets (Credits) will have a higher credit risk and greater 
opaqueness (Morgan, 2002; Iannotta, 2006 and Iannotta et al., 2008). 
Conversely, as Iannotta et al. (2008) also point out, loans can make a 
positive contribution to ratings by offering more stable profits than other 
types of assets such as shares. Therefore, the effect of credits on banks’ 
economic financial situation is a priori indeterminate. In this sense, to 
capture the credit risk, it is also important to consider the quality of the 
credit portfolio. As no information is available on doubtful assets, we use 
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as proxy the ratio of the provisions for doubtful credits to total assets 
(Loanloss). Therefore, the sign expected for this last factor is negative.  
The increase in banking competition and the standardisation of banking 
products have led to banks reducing their operating margin, and with it 
their profit margin. For this reason, banks attempt to optimise costs, and be 
more efficient, with the aim of achieving an increase in profits without 
adopting risky strategies. Thus, these two variables, competition and 
efficiency, are important for the determination of the rating. Efficiency is 
captured through the operational efficiency ratio (Shen et al., 2012) defined 
as the quotient between operating expenses and the ordinary margin 
(Efficiency). According to this ratio a higher value means a higher level of 
inefficiency, because a higher percentage of the ordinary margin will be 
used to cover operating expenses. Consequently, this factor is expected to 
present a negative coefficient. 
As has been demonstrated in earlier studies on the modelling of bank 
ratings (Caporale et al., 2011; Shen et al. 2012 and Salvador et al., 2014), 
size is an important factor for the rating agencies. This is because greater 
size is assumed to imply greater external support from the economic 
authorities in the event of the bank getting into difficulties (too-big-to-fail 
hypothesis). This hypothesis is based on the argument that the economic 
authorities will try to avoid the failure of the big banks due to the possible 
systemic effect on the economy as a whole. Size is measured by means of 
the logarithm of total assets (Size). Therefore, the expected sign of this 
factor is positive. 
As pointed out by Fitch (2011), analysis of the economic environment 
is the starting point for the analysis of the banks’ asset situation. In this 
context, as it is emphasised by Moody’s (2007a) the banks can be victims 
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of the environments where there is a weak legal and/or political 
environment. In turn, this factor allows us to capture the heterogeneity in 
the behaviour of ratings between the different banking systems.27 For this 
reason, to capture the conditions of the economic environment in which 
banks operate, two variables are introduced. The first is the indicator of 
government effectiveness (Government) drawn up by the World Bank. 
This indicator measures the level of quality of public services and of the 
public administration, as well as the level of political stability. Therefore, 
the higher the level of government effectiveness, the greater the probability 
of obtaining a higher rating, since the banks that operate in that country 
will enjoy a more stable environment. The sign expected for this factor is 
positive. 
The second variable capturing the conditions of the economic 
environment is the economic cycle of the country in which the bank mainly 
operates. A contractive economic cycle has negative effects on the bank’s 
asset situation because it implies a worsening of the quality of the assets 
and the reduction of its profits. Consequently, the inclusion of the 
economic cycle, as shown by Salvador et al. (2014), enables testing the 
hypothesis as to whether the ratings are immune to the economic cycle and 
therefore adopt a through-the-cycle philosophy. The economic cycle is 
measured by the GDP growth rate (Cycle).  
Finally, to control for the time effects associated with each financial 
year, a continuous time variable (Time) is introduced, corresponding to the 
                                                          
27 Other studies highlighting the importance of considering the heterogeneity among countries 
when modelling ratings are: Rojas-Suarez (2001), Ferri et al. (2001), Ferri and Liu (2003), Purda 
(2003), Poon (2003), Poon and Firth (2005), Poon et al. (2009), Caporale et al. (2011), Bellotti 
et al. (2011) and Shen et al. (2012). 
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year in which the rating is issued. Its square (Time2) is also introduced 
with the aim of considering a non-linear effect in the ratings associated 
with the maximum reached just before the start of the crisis.  
The mean values of each of these factors between the periods before 
(2004-2008) and during (2009-2011) the financial crisis are reflected in 
Table 6. We can observe that as a result of the crisis the banks rated 
experienced, on average, a worsening of the economic and financial 
situation. Specifically, profitability, liquidity levels (except in Moody’s) 
and the conditions of the economic environment, i.e. economic growth and 
government effectiveness, all worsened. It has also to be emphasised that 
there was a reduction in the quality of the assets on the balance sheet, as 
shown by the increased level of provisions for doubtful debts. Despite the 
worsening of these indicators, there has been an increase in the banks’ 
capital level, size and efficiency. Justification for the increase in capital 
levels can be found both in the requirement by some banking systems to 
increase the level of own resources and in the injections of capital received 
by many banks from the economic authorities. The increase in the size and 
efficiency of banks may be justified by the fact that with the start of the 
crisis there was a set of bank mergers with the aim of preventing a possible 
failure. It must be taken into account, as referred by the rating agencies in 
their methodological reports, that although each of the factors defined is 
important when determining the asset situation of banks, by themselves 
they are not sufficient. In this sense, for example, a
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Table 6. Average values of bank solvency’s factors 
  Fitch Standard and Poor's Moody's 
  2004-2008 2009-2011 2004-2011 2004-2008 2009-2011 2004-2011 2004-2008 2009-2011 2004-2011 
ROA (%) 1.34% 0.34% 0.93% 1.36% 0.55% 1.02% 1.78% 0.41% 1.25% 
Capital (%) 8.06% 8.20% 8.12% 7.64% 7.79% 7.70% 8.99% 9.64% 9.24% 
Size 15.99 16.06 16.02 16.51 16.49 16.50 17.04 17.27 17.13 
Liquidity (%) 16.38% 15.76% 16.13% 20.22% 18.71% 19.59% 14.47% 14.69% 14.55% 
Credits (%) 57.78% 57.66% 57.73% 54.46% 54.64% 54.54% 60.04% 59.34% 59.77% 
Loanloss (%) 0.40% 0.96% 0.63% 0.37% 0.84% 0.57% 0.39% 1.34% 0.76% 
Efficiency (%) 63.62% 62.28% 63.08% 65.46% 60.63% 63.45% 67.32% 65.68% 66.69% 
Government 1.48 1.35 1.43 1.49 1.38 1.44 1.60 1.43 1.53 
Cycle (%) 2.88% -0.33% 1.57% 2.72% -0.31% 1.46% 2.75% -0.28% 1.59% 
Note: The table shows the mean of the factors that define the financial situation of the banks evaluated for each rating agency. 
Source: BankScope (Bureau Van Dijk), World Development Indicators (WDI), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and own elaboration. 
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bank may not maintain a high rating even though it presents a high capital 
level, since the quality of its assets is low (Fitch, 2011). 
4.5. Empirical results 
Table 7 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1) that models the 
so-called issuer bank ratings. In this table it can be appreciated that in 
general terms the coefficients of the factors defining the financial situation 
of the banks are significant, and furthermore present the expected signs. 
Specifically, an increase in profitability, size, liquidity, and/or an 
improvement of the economic environment, measured by the quality of the 
government under which the banks operate, means an increased probability 
of obtaining a higher rating. It should be emphasised that the level of 
capital has a significant and positive effect only in the case of Moody’s. 
On the other hand, though the total effect is not significant, in Standard and 
Poor’s and in Moody’s, we observe that a lower credit quality implies a 
reduction in the probability of being placed in the higher rating category. 
It should also be highlighted that the sign of the relative importance of 
credits in the total balance depends on the rating agency analysed. As 
commented in the previous section the sign of this variable is not defined 
a priori because it may be considered a factor that contributes more stable 
profits than another type of assets, such as shares, or, conversely,  credits 
may also be seen as a factor that increases the credit risk. The only 
discrepancy with regard to the expected sign in the factors that consider the 
agencies is found in Fitch and Standard and Poor’s, in the negative sign of 
the GDP growth rate that measures the economic cycle.   
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Table 7. Ordered probit model. Eq(1)-(2) 
 
Note: Results of the estimation of the models (Eq.1) and (Eq.2) for the issuer rating issued by each rating agency. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. RV likelihood ratio test between the model (Eq.1) 
(the restricted model) and model (Eq.2) (the general model), i.e, 
0 FC k
H : 0β β =  .
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
ROA 8.305 *** 1.01 14.72 *** 7.546 ** 22.17 *** 24.164 ***
Capital -0.865 -0.50 -1.058 -0.462 2.45 *** 2.5 ** 
Size 0.2 *** 0.25 *** 0.193 *** 0.24 *** 0.45 *** 0.517 ***
Liquidity 0.733 *** 0.61 * 1.227 *** 1.327 *** 1.36 *** 2.39 ***
Credits -0.661 *** -0.82 *** 0.313 0.122 -0.16 1.106 ** 
Loanloss 0.648 30.03 *** -7.64 21.506 *** -5.33 -16.672 *  
Eficiency 0.009 0.01 0.015 0.004 0.00 0    
Cycle -2.126 ** -6.51 *** -2.425 * -8.692 *** -0.66 8.571 *  
Goverment 0.746 *** 0.62 *** 0.959 *** 0.931 *** 0.66 *** 0.733 ***
TIME 0.333 *** 0.34 *** 0.448 *** 0.502 *** 0.65 *** 0.671 ***
TIME^2 -0.031 *** -0.03 *** -0.038 *** -0.043 *** -0.06 *** -0.066 ***
FC 0.38 0.818 4.98 ***
FC_ROA 10.71 ** 11.53 * 1.567    
FC_Capital 0.54 -0.357 -0.152    
FC_Size -0.07 *** -0.072 *** -0.128 ** 
FC_Liquidity 0.37 -0.325 -2.077 ** 
FC_Credits 0.39 0.34 -2.79 ***
FC_Loanloss -36.68 *** -37.368 *** 14.844    
FC_Eficiency -0.08 0.089 0.052    
FC_Cycle 5.92 *** 7.924 ** -8.727    
FC_Goverment 0.26 ** 0.068 -0.251    
Cut1 2.205 *** 2.53 *** 2.923 *** 3.475 *** 7.59 *** 9.939 ***
Cut2 2.782 *** 3.12 *** 3.877 *** 4.475 *** 8.16 *** 10.513 ***
Cut3 3.152 *** 3.50 *** 4.095 *** 4.705 *** 8.39 *** 10.736 ***
Cut4 3.516 *** 3.87 *** 4.599 *** 5.233 *** 8.79 *** 11.147 ***
Cut5 3.778 *** 4.14 *** 4.997 *** 5.646 *** 8.95 *** 11.31 ***
Cut6 4.309 *** 4.69 *** 5.371 *** 6.031 *** 9.69 *** 12.061 ***
Cut7 4.659 *** 5.05 *** 6.382 *** 7.051 *** 10.41 *** 12.796 ***
Cut8 5.784 *** 6.20 *** 7.026 *** 7.699 *** 11.17 *** 13.56 ***
Cut9 6.787 *** 7.21 *** 7.739 *** 8.419 *** 11.73 *** 14.128 ***
Cut10 7.746 *** 8.18 *** 8.42 *** 9.107 *** 12.39 *** 14.804 ***
N 1,898   1,898   1,385   1,385   810      810         
Log Lik -3472.59 -3433.21 -2484.52 -2462.71 -1424.97 -1413.32    
chi2 709.3   710.1   449.9   460.7   363.3   437.9      
RV 78.76   43.63   23.29   
P-val 0.000 0.000 0.010
2004-2011
Fitch Standard and Poor's Moody's
Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2) Eq(1) Eq(2)
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Finally, we highlight the positive sign of the trend (Time) and the 
negative sign of the square of this variable (Time2). This result implies, as 
already described, that ratings grow until they reach a maximum just before 
the start of the crisis, decreasing from then onwards. 
The second block of Table 7 presents the results of the estimation of 
equation (2), which analyses whether the rating agencies changed their 
criteria as a result of the financial crisis. In these estimations we observe 
that with the crisis there occurs a change in rating policies: the importance 
of each factor in the probability of obtaining a higher rating is modified. 
The coefficient of each variable without interacting with the dummy 
variable (FC) indicates the influence of each variable in the rating. 
However, the coefficient of the interaction indicates how much greater or 
smaller this effect is in the crisis years than in the previous sub-period. In 
this sense, it should be emphasised that the change in rating criteria is not 
homogeneous among the agencies, since the coefficient of the interaction 
of the dummy variable (FC) with each of the explanatory variables depends 
on the rating agency analysed. For example, we observe that with the 
financial crisis, in the case of Fitch the profitability (ROA) comes to have 
a significant positive effect. In Standard and Poor’s this factor increases its 
positive effect on the probability of obtaining a certain rating. On the other 
hand, in Moody’s the profitability has the same relative importance 
throughout the period analysed, i.e. the financial crisis has not affected the 
effect of this factor on the probability of obtaining a certain rating. On the 
contrary, in all three rating agencies we observe that with the crisis the 
effect of size on the probability of obtaining a certain rating is reduced. 
This shows that with the crisis the agencies assign less relative importance 
to the Size factor when they determine their asset situation. Although it 
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should be noted that the change in the effect of this factor is not the same 
in all agencies. 
In the same line regarding the impact of the crisis on the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables on modelling bank ratings, Table 
7 shows that the coefficient of the dummy variable (FC) is significant only 
in the case of Moody’s, and furthermore it is positive. This suggest that 
with the start of the financial crisis, this agency implemented a more 
flexible rating policy, since the banks evaluated increased the probability 
of obtaining a higher rating given the level of the rest of the variables. This 
policy, as will be referred to below, may be because in some countries 
Moody’s may have offset the steep fall in the asset situation of some banks 
with perhaps somewhat more lax criteria, with the aim of avoiding a steep 
fall in the ratings.  
In order to confirm the change in the rating policy in each of the 
agencies we propose the likelihood ratio test between equation (1) and 
equation (2) which considers the possible structural change occurring with 
the financial crisis. The results of these tests permit us to reject, for all the 
rating agencies, the null hypothesis of joint non-significance of the 
interaction between the dummy variable Crisis (FC) and the rest of the 
variables. Therefore, these results suggest that with the financial crisis the 
agencies readjusted their criteria. The change of rating is not due solely to 
the worsening of the banks’ asset situation, but also to the change in rating 
policies, i.e., to the relative importance of each variable in the probability 
of obtaining a certain rating. 
It has therefore been shown that in general terms the different 
importance of each factor that determine the banks ratings from the start of 
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the financial crisis in comparison with the pre-crisis period cannot be 
rejected.  
Next we perform various prediction exercises starting from the 
estimation of equation (2), that permit us to disaggregate the observed 
adjustment in the ratings into two factors: the change in the rating policy, 
associated with the change in the value of the coefficients, and the change 
in the asset situation of the banks evaluated, derived from the value of the 
explanatory variables before and during the financial crisis. Therefore, 
unlike other papers that study only the effects of the rating agencies’ 
change of behaviour during the periods of crisis (Ferri et al. 1999; Gärther 
et al 2011) we capture these two factors defining the Rating Change Index 
(RCI). This index measures the change in the ratings that is due both to the 
changes in the value of the explanatory variables (xt), i.e. what is called the 
banks’ asset situation, and to the change in the rating policies (It), according 
to expression (3) below: 
 
t
t
t -1
t -1
I ( x )RCI
I ( x )=
 (3)
 
where, I t - 1
 and I t ,  make reference to the rating policy (i.e the value of the 
coefficients in the equation (2) of the CRAs before and during the financial 
crisis, respectively). The rating policy before the financial crisis, I t - 1 ,  
refers to the value of the rating predicted by equation (2) when the dummy 
variable FC takes the value 0. On the other hand, the rating policy after the 
start of the financial crisis, I t , refers to the value of the rating predicted by 
equation (2) when the dummy variable FC takes the value 1. Likewise, xt-
1 and xt, refer to the asset situation (mean values of each determinant), 
before and during the financial crisis, respectively. Therefore, the 
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numerator of the above expression (3) indicates the rating predicted 
according to equation (2) with the rating policy, I t , and the asset situation, 
xt, existing in the crisis years. Likewise, the denominator, I t - 1(xt-1), 
indicates the rating obtained with the rating policy, I t - 1 , and the asset 
situation, xt-1, before the start of the crisis. If the value of this index is less 
than unity, it means that with the financial crisis there has been a 
generalised fall in ratings; if it is equal to one, it means that the rating has 
remained constant. If, on the contrary, the value of this index is greater than 
unity, it means that there has been an increase in the ratings. 
This index, as demonstrated in expression (4) can be decomposed 
multiplicatively into two factors. The first factor of this index, 
t
t
t -1
t
I ( x )
I ( x ) , 
refers to the effect that the change of rating policy would have had on the 
adjustment in the ratings if the determinants of the rating had not changed, 
i.e. if the banks’ asset situation had remained constant. To calculate this 
effect the asset situation in the crisis period is fixed, xt, and we calculate 
the quotient between the rating predicted in equation (2) with the rating 
policy applied during the crisis, I1(xt), and the rating predicted with the 
rating policy before the crisis, I t - 1(xt). If this quotient is less than unity, it 
means that with the crisis there was a fall in the rating due to the hardening 
of the rating policy, and if it is equal to unity, that there has been no change. 
If, on the contrary, it is greater than unity, it implies that with the outbreak 
of the crisis, the agencies have adopted a more flexible rating policy: 
 = =
t t t -1
t t t
t -1 t -1 t -1
tt -1 t -1
I ( x ) I ( x ) I ( x )RCI
I ( x ) I ( x ) I ( x )
 
  
 
×  (4) 
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The second factor of this index,
t-1
t
t-1
t-1
I ( x )
I ( x ) , measures the effect that the 
change in the banks’ asset situation has had on the adjustment in the 
ratings, assuming that the rating agencies had maintained their rating 
policy as in the period before the crisis. To calculate this effect, the rating 
policy is set in the pre-crisis period, I t - 1 , i.e. in equation (2) only the 
coefficients before the crisis are considered, and we calculate the quotient 
between the rating predicted with the asset situation during the crisis 
period, I t - 1(xt), and the rating predicted with the asset situation of the 
period before the crisis, I t - 1(xt-1). If this quotient is less than unity, it means 
that with the start of the crisis there was a worsening of the banks’ financial 
situation that translated into a reduction of the rating, if it is equal to unity 
it means that there was no adjustment in the rating due to change in the 
financial situation. 
Equation (4) takes as reference the values of the explanatory variables 
during the financial crisis and the rating policy (coefficients of the 
variables) previous of the crisis. However, changing the references would 
imply reaching different results in the value of the index. To avoid this and 
to achieve a measurement that is invariant to the moment of time selected, 
we calculate an indicator that is invariant to the point of reference used. 
For this, following the proposal by Färe et al. (1994), that analyse the 
change in productivity according to the Malmquist index (Malmquist, 
1953), we calculate the geometric mean of the points of reference. That 
means that the RCI of expression (3) is decomposed using a geometric 
mean between the two references possible according to the following 
expression (5): 
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(5) 
Table 8 gives the results of the RCI for each of the CRAs analysed. In 
this table we observe that with the financial crisis in all three CRAs there 
is a generalised fall in ratings, as already mentioned in previous sections. 
Specifically, we observe that in Fitch there is an average fall of 5.35% in 
ratings, in Standard and Poor’s 4.19% and in Moody’s 7.70%. In the case 
of Fitch and Standard and Poor’s this fall is explained both by the 
hardening of the rating policy (79.66% and 63.93%, respectively), and by 
the worsening of the asset situation of the banks evaluated, (20.34% and 
36.07%, respectively). On the other hand, in the case of Moody’s all the 
fall in ratings is due to a worsening of the asset situation of the banks 
evaluated, given that on average the rating policy applied by this agency 
underwent a slight improvement, as reflected in the negative sign of this 
factor in the RCI. This last result may be explained due to most of the banks 
evaluated by Moody’s, specifically 65.3% of them (Table 3) are located in 
the US, where the financial crisis was more intense, and consequently it 
was attempted to offset the steep worsening of the asset situation of the 
banks evaluated with a slight flexibilisation of the rating policy applied.  
Also in Table 8 the analysis is repeated distinguishing by geographical 
areas. Specifically, the index is replicated for the US, the EU, and within 
the latter, the PIGS. The results show that the adjustment in ratings and the 
contribution of each component to the RCI was not the same in all the 
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Table 8. Rating Change Index (RCI) 
  
Real 
Adjustment RCI 
RCI 
Adjustment % Policy % Solvency 
  
Fitch 
All 5.94% 94.65% 5.35% 79.66% 20.34% 
US 12.69% 92.36% 7.64% 73.62% 26.38% 
EU 2.77% 95.92% 4.08% 85.78% 14.22% 
No PIGS 0.73% 98.10% 1.90% 63.98% 36.02% 
PIGS 8.89% 90.84% 9.16% 87.69% 12.31% 
 
Standard and Poor's 
All 4.33% 95.81% 4.19% 63.93% 36.07% 
US 11.37% 91.09% 8.91% 53.84% 46.16% 
EU 1.51% 97.80% 2.20% 81.81% 18.19% 
No PIGS 1.27% 98.06% 1.94% 52.99% 47.01% 
PIGS 4.07% 94.29% 5.71% 94.76% 5.24% 
 
Moody's 
All 8.82% 92.30% 7.70% -136.67% 236.67% 
US 10.26% 90.45% 9.55% -133.78% 233.78% 
EU 6.27% 95.67% 4.33% -153.18% 253.18% 
No PIGS 0.26% 98.32% 1.68% -323.00% 423.00% 
PIGS 11.98% 92.40% 7.60% -118.13% 218.13% 
Note: This table shows the Real Adjustment in ratings, RCI and of its explanatory factors for the issuer rating issued 
by each rating agency (Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s). Real Adjustment and RCI Adjustment indicate the 
downward of ratings between the period before and during the crisis according to the real change in ratings and RCI, 
respectively. The columns, % Policy and % Solvency, indicate the weight that represents both factors above the RCI. 
In these sense, negative values of % Policy factor indicates that the rating agency has not toughened its rating policy 
following the crisis. The values above 100% indicates that the change in ratings is due only to the change in solvency. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
groups of countries. In this context, it should be emphasised that in all three 
agencies the greatest adjustment of ratings occurred among the banks of 
USA and the PIGS, where as well as the subprime crisis there was a crisis 
of sovereign debt. On analysing the factors explaining the adjustment in 
ratings, i.e. each of the components that define the RCI, we find that the 
relative importance of the adjustment in rating policy varies with the 
geographical area analysed. In this sense, we observe that in Fitch and 
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Standard and Poor’s the greatest importance of the adjustment in rating 
policy occurred among the PIGS, where it was 87.69% and 94.76 %, 
respectively. In the US the adjustment of the rating policy was also 
relatively important as it represents 73.62% of total rating variation in Fitch 
and 53.84% in Standard and Poor’s. On the other hand, the relative 
importance of the hardening of rating policy was less important in the 
countries of the EU that do not belong to the PIGS, where the adjustment 
in Fitch and Standard and Poor’s was 63.98% and 52.99%.  
Moody’s, unlike the other two rating agencies, eased their rating 
policies, offsetting the steep worsening of the banks’ economic and 
financial situation. This implies that if Moody’s had adjusted their rating 
policy like Fitch and Standard and Poor’s, the banks rated would have 
suffered a greater fall in their ratings.  
The change of the rating policies provides evidence of the procyclical 
character of the ratings issued by Fitch , Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. 
4.6. Conclusions 
This chapter analyses the impact of the financial crisis on the behaviour of 
the issuer ratings of the banks of the US and of the EU, during the period 
2004-2011. This period includes years of economic growth from 2004 to 
2008 and a sub-period of financial crisis from 2009 to 2011. The fact that 
it embraces a complete cycle permit us to test the hypothesis traditionally 
defended by the CRAs, namely that ratings are drawn up according to a 
medium and long term perspective (through-the-cycle) and consequently 
ignore the transitory changes that take place in the financial situation 
(point-in-time) of the banks evaluated. 
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The analysis of the impact that the financial crisis has had on the ratings 
of banks proceeds in two stages. In the first stage we model the bank ratings 
and tests the existence of a possible structural change as a result of the 
financial crisis. In the second stage we uses various prediction exercises to 
quantify the adjustment occurring in the ratings and disaggregates this 
observed change into two multiplicative factors: the effect of the change in 
rating policy and the effect of the change in the asset situation. Overall, the 
results obtained show that with the financial crisis there is a generalised 
fall in ratings. Specifically, we find that the average adjustment in Fitch, 
Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s was 5.35%, 4.19% and 7.70%, 
respectively. This adjustment in Fitch and Standard and Poor’s is 
respectively 79.66% and 63.93% justified by the change in rating policy. 
On the other hand, the adjustment in Moody’s is justified almost totally by 
the worsening of the financial situation of the banks rated, which in part 
has been offset by a more flexible rating policy. The significant hardening 
of the rating policy carried out by Fitch and Standard and Poor’s during the 
financial crisis points to a procyclical behaviour of these agencies. 
If the results are disaggregated by geographical areas (US, EU, and 
within these, the PIGS), we find that the factors explaining the adjustment 
in ratings do not have the same relative importance in all groups of 
countries. Specifically, we find that in Fitch and in Standard and Poor’s, 
the fall in ratings is greatest among the banks of the US and the PIGS, due 
to a greater importance of the hardening of the rating policy. On the other 
hand in Moody’s the fall in ratings is wholly due to the worsening of the 
asset situation, which in part has been offset by a more flexible rating 
policy. Therefore, these results points out that the rating agencies took a 
point-in-time perspective. 
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5. Conclusions 
THIS doctoral thesis focuses on the analysis of different aspects of the 
relationship between rating agencies and banks. The chapters are grouped 
around two specific issues. The first analyses the extent to which the rating 
agencies have a real impact on financial markets through their signals 
(rating changes, watchlists and/or outlooks), altering banks’ stock returns, 
or whether, in contrast, markets previously discount the information these 
agencies publish. The second issue explores the impact of the financial 
crisis on the behaviour of rating agencies. The hypothesis tested is whether, 
in addition to the rating change associated with the worst asset situation of 
banks in the crisis years, agencies have modified their criteria, either by 
hardening them or by relaxing them. 
Rating agencies play an important role in financial market operations 
by signalling the credit quality of financial products or entities on which 
they publish their opinions. As described in the introduction, the regulator 
has granted to the agencies an important role in evaluating implicit risks in 
operations. However, the question is whether financial markets really 
follow the signals issued by the rating agencies, or simply, issue 
information that is already flowing in the financial markets. The second 
chapter of the thesis analyses precisely this issue. If the rating agencies 
provide new relevant information to the financial markets, investors should 
react and change their investment strategies in line with signals from the 
rating agencies, thus altering stock returns. If, however, the information 
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they transmit through their signals already exists, stock returns will not 
change. This question is empirically tested by analysing the effect of rating 
signals from Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch on abnormal stock 
returns for a sample of EU banks over the period 2002-2012. This period 
also allows us to determine whether the financial crisis has brought about 
a change in investors’ perceptions on the information provided by the 
rating agencies. The results show that rating agency announcements do 
have an effect on the abnormal returns of bank stock prices. Further, it is 
shown that the crisis has led to a change in the financial markets’ 
perception of bank ratings, finding that while prior to the crisis only 
upgrades had a significant effect on the banks’ shares returns, with the start 
of the crisis, downgrades, watchlists and outlooks have a significant effect. 
This result suggests that with the crisis investors risk aversion has 
increased. 
Despite the considerable effect that rating signals have on the abnormal 
returns of bank stock prices, in large part, the information these include 
had already been discounted by the market by the time that the signal was 
issued. This effect can be explained by the leak of private information, the 
signals issued previously by the competing agencies and/or the signals 
issued about the sovereign rating given the existence of a country ceiling, 
meaning that corporate ratings cannot exceed the sovereign rating 
(Williams et al., 2013). 
This second chapter also analyses the possible causal link between 
bank ratings, abnormal returns of stocks and the risk premium. The results 
indicate not only that ratings have an impact on stock market returns, but 
the causation also occurs in the opposite direction: ratings also depend on 
changes in the financial markets. In times of growth, ratings are higher, 
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and in periods of decline the opposite occurs. Therefore, agencies do not 
seem to adopt a fully through-the-cycle strategy, as they defend in their 
methodology reports and some authors in the literature also hold (Altman 
and Rijken, 2004, 2006). The results obtained also show that during the 
crisis there is a causality relationship between the premium risk and the 
bank rating signals. This result adds more evidence that the investors react 
to the rating signals. Furthermore, this last result suggests that during the 
crisis there is a close interconnection in both directions between the 
perception of the investors and rating agencies about the asset situation of 
financial institutions and sovereigns.  
The third and fourth chapters analyse the extent to which the rating 
agencies have changed their rating policies, either hardening or relaxing 
their criteria as a result of the financial crisis. Specifically, chapter three 
examines the impact of the financial crisis on the behaviour of the ratings 
from Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. A two-stage methodology 
is developed for this purpose: in the first stage the rating behaviour is 
modelled according to the determining factors the agencies outline in their 
methodology reports and indicated by other authors in the literature. In the 
second stage the change observed in the rating is disaggregated into one 
effect associated with a change in the agencies’ rating criteria, and another 
associated with the banks’ asset situation. This methodology is applied to 
the specific case of the Spanish banking system (SBE) for the period 2000-
2009. Although the three main rating agencies are considered, the analysis 
focuses on Fitch, which predominates in the Spanish market. Fitch 
represents 63.01% of the ratings in the sample because it was one of the 
first agencies to become established in Spain and due to its expertise in 
rating financial entities. The analysis of the SBE is especially interesting 
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because from the mid-90s to the beginning of the financial crisis the 
banking system underwent strong growth based largely on lending to real 
estate activities. Subsequently, with the onset of the global financial crisis 
and the bursting of the housing bubble, the asset situation of banks, 
especially the savings banks, deteriorated with the consequent bank rating 
downgrades. The SBE therefore allows for analysis of how rating agencies 
adjusted their rating policy in a banking system that experienced a national 
property crisis in addition to the international crisis. 
The results in the case of the Spanish banking system show that the 
variation observed in bank ratings before and after the crisis of 10.88% is 
in Fitch, 74.85% – three quarters – due to the worsening of the banks’ 
financial condition and 25.15% to the hardening of the rating criteria. The 
significant weight of the change in rating policy provides evidence for the 
hypothesis of the procyclical nature of ratings as observed by other authors 
in the literature and the IMF (2010). 
Finally, the fourth chapter of the thesis analyses the same question 
using the same methodology as the third chapter, but for a set of banks in 
the US and the EU during the period 2004-2011. By using a sample of 
international banks, as compared to the analysis of the specific case of a 
single banking system, we were able to take into account variables that 
agencies state in their methodology reports, and that refer to the economic 
and legal environment in which the entities mainly operate. For example, 
the growth rate of national GDP and effectiveness of governance can be 
considered. Furthermore, this sample allows us to consider the possibility 
that not all banks are subject to the same banking shocks as when a single 
banking system is analysed. 
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The results from this fourth chapter show that during the financial crisis 
there was a general fall in ratings of 5.35%, 4.19% and 7.70% in Standard 
and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch, respectively. According to the 
disaggregation performed, most of this variation is due to hardening of the 
rating policy at Standard and Poor’s (79.66%) and Fitch (63.93%). This 
finding again evidences the procyclical nature of ratings characterised by 
the issue of high ratings during periods of economic growth and subsequent 
reductions as a result of stricter rating criteria in times of crisis. In the case 
of Moody’s, the ratings adjustment is entirely due to the deteriorating 
financial asset situation of banks, which is partly offset by the application 
of a more flexible rating policy. 
Disaggregating the results according to the geographical area in which 
the banks mainly operate (US, EU, and within the EU, the peripheral 
countries most affected by the sovereign debt problems, the so-called PIGS 
—Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain— shows that the largest 
downward adjustment in ratings occurred in the US and the PIGS. In 
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, much of this rating variation is due to 
greater weight of the stricter rating policy. By contrast, in Moody’s this 
adjustment is essentially explained by the worsening asset situation of the 
banks analysed. 
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Resumen 
DEBIDO a que ninguno de los cuatro capítulos de esta tesis doctoral está 
escrito en una lengua oficial de la Universitat de València28, para cumplir 
con su normativa en cuanto a publicación de tesis doctorales, procederé a 
resumir en español los principales objetivos planteados, la metodología 
utilizada, así como los principales resultados obtenidos.  
El principal objetivo de esta tesis doctoral es el análisis del 
comportamiento de las agencias de calificación a la hora de evaluar a 
entidades bancarias así como el impacto que tienen sus ratings sobre los 
mercados financieros durante la crisis que se inicia en el año 2007 con el 
estallido de la crisis subprime y la posterior crisis de deuda soberana en 
Europa. Si bien es cierto que en la literatura existen numerosos trabajos 
que se centran en el estudio de los ratings soberanos en cuanto a 
modelización e impacto que tienen sus ratings en los mercados financieros, 
prácticamente ninguno de ellos se centra en el caso de las entidades 
bancarias y menos en el contexto de crisis financiera. Es por ello, que la 
aportación de esta tesis doctoral a la literatura es doble. En primer lugar, se 
analiza el comportamiento de los ratings en el caso de los bancos y, en 
segundo lugar, tiene en cuenta el impacto de las tensiones financieras 
                                                          
28 Artículo 7.2 de la Normativa reguladora de los procedimientos de elaboración, autorización, 
nombramiento del Tribunal, defensa y evaluación de las tesis doctorales de la Universitat de 
València, aprobada en el Consejo de Gobierno del 29 de noviembre del año 2011. 
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originadas a raíz de la crisis subprime y de la crisis de deuda soberana en 
Europa.  
En este contexto, el segundo capítulo de la tesis doctoral tienen como 
principal objetivo el análisis del impacto que tienen los cambios de rating 
sobre los rendimientos bursátiles de las acciones de una muestra de bancos 
de la zona euro antes y durante la crisis financiera. Con ello se pretender 
dar respuesta a las siguientes cuestiones: ¿Los inversores tienen en cuenta 
los ratings a la hora de definir sus estrategias de inversión, es decir, las 
rentabilidades de las acciones se ven afectadas por los cambios de ratings? 
¿El grado de respuesta de los inversores a los anuncios de rating ha 
cambiado con la crisis financiera? ¿Tienen en cuenta las agencias de 
calificación los cambios que se producen en los mercados financieros y 
consecuentemente no llevan a cabo una estrategia Through the cycle como 
defienden en sus informes metodológicos? Para responder a estas 
cuestiones se sigue una metodología de eventos al igual que otros trabajos 
en la literatura (Hull et al., 2004; Hill and Faff, 2010). En primer lugar, se 
definen las rentabilidades anormales, AR, como la diferencia entre la 
rentabilidad de la acción del banco analizado en el momento t y la 
rentabilidad esperada tal y como se recoge en la siguiente ecuación (1): 
 
it it itAR =R -E(R )
  (1) 
En esta ecuación (1), ARit hace referencia a la Rentabilidad Anormal del 
banco i en el momento t. Rit hace referencia a la rentabilidad de la acción 
del banco i en el momento t expresada en logaritmos. La rentabilidad 
esperada del banco i en el momento t, E(Rit), se calcula como la 
rentabilidad media entre los 230 y 30 días de cotización previos al 
momento en el que se produce la señal de rating, es decir, cuando se 
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produce un cambio de rating o se emite una perspectiva. Una vez 
calculadas las rentabilidades anormales, ARit, estas se acumulan durante 
días consecutivos de cotización para dar lugar a lo que se denomina en la 
literatura como Rentabilidades Anormales Acumuladas (CARs). En este 
contexto, para analizar el impacto que tienen las señales de rating sobre las 
AR, las CARs se calculan para dos periodos. El primero periodo se define 
como el periodo de evento (0,+1) que comprende la rentabilidad anormal 
acumulada entre los días en el que la agencia de calificación emite la señal 
de ratings y el día siguiente (t=0 y t=1). El segundo periodo se define como 
el periodo pre-evento (-10,-1) que comprende la rentabilidad anormal 
acumulada entre los diez días previos al evento, t=-1 y t=-10. Este último 
periodo, como hace referencia Hull et al (2004) y Hill y Faff (2010), 
permite determinar si el impacto que tiene las señales de rating sobre las 
rentabilidades anormales de los bancos ha sido previamente descontado 
por el mercado y por lo tanto sus efectos son menores a los esperados. 
Una vez determinadas rentabilidades anormales acumuladas se estima 
la siguiente ecuación (2) que permite analizar el impacto que tienen las 
señales de los rating de los bancos sobre las rentabilidades anormales de 
los bancos: 
 
β β β β β
β β δ λ
γ γ γ ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
+ + + +
it 0 1 it 2 it 3 it 4 it
5 it 6 it 1 it 1 it
1 it 2 it 3 it it
CAR Prating Nrating Pwatchlist Nwatchlist
Poutlook Noutlook Index BeforeCAR
Tpremium Year Trend
 (2) 
En esta ecuación (2), CARsit se refiere a la Rentabilidad Anormal de 
cada banco analizado. Pratingit (Nratingit) es una variable dummy que 
toma un valor igual a uno si se produce una subida (rebaja) del rating en el 
banco (i). Pwatchlistit (Nwatchlistit) es una variable dummy que toma el 
valor igual a uno si el rating es puesto en lista de vigilancia para una posible 
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subida (rebaja) o ha sido confirmado tras haberse puesto en lista de 
vigilancia para una posible rebaja (subida). Poutlookit (Noutlookit) es una 
variable dummy que toma el valor igual a la unidad cuando se produce una 
perspectiva positiva (negativa) o se pasa de una perspectiva negativa a 
estable (positiva a estable). Para determinar si los mercados han 
descontado previamente la información que contienen las señales de rating 
se introduce, al igual que en Hull et al (2004) y Hill and Faff (2010), una 
variable que se define como la Rentabilidad Anormal Acumulada durante 
los diez días previos al evento, BeforeCARit. De modo que si esta variable 
es significativa, entonces los inversores han descontado previamente las 
señales de rating. En último lugar, Indexit, se define como el nivel de rating 
existente en el banco (i) en el momento inmediatamente anterior al 
momento en el que se produce el evento. Esta variable permite determinar 
si las señales de rating tienen un mayor efecto en los niveles de rating más 
altos o en cambio tienen un mayor efecto en los niveles de rating cercanos 
a la situación de default. 
Con el fin de determinar el impacto que ha tenido la crisis financiera 
sobre el efecto que tienen las señales de rating sobre los rendimientos 
bursátiles de los bancos, y consecuentemente determinar el cambio en el 
grado de aversión de los inversores, se estima la anterior ecuación (2), para 
el periodo antes y con la crisis financiera.  
Otra de las cuestiones que se plantea en este segundo capítulo es si los 
ratings de los bancos responden a las variaciones que se producen en los 
mercados de acciones y/o a las variaciones de las primas de riesgo. Es 
decir, ¿Las agencias de calificación tienen en cuenta los cambios que se 
producen en los mercados financieros? A su vez, se analiza si los 
inversores determinan sus decisiones sobre invertir fijándose únicamente 
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en los ratings o también tienen en cuenta otros factores como puede ser la 
prima de riesgo del país en el que cotiza la acción. Para responder a estas 
cuestiones se plantea el test de relación de causalidad de Granger entre las 
señales de rating, las rentabilidades anormales y la prima de riesgo. Para 
ello se estima de forma separada las siguientes ecuaciones: 
 
λ
ε+
∑ ∑ ∑
n n n
it 0 it-j it-j it-j
i=1 i=1 i=1
1 it 2 it
∆Index =β + α ∆AR +δ ∆Index + ∆Premium  
+ γ Year +γ Trend
 (3) 
 
λ
ε+
∑ ∑ ∑
n n n
it 0 it-j it-j it-j
i=1 i=1 i=1
1 it 2 it
∆AR =β + α ∆AR +δ ∆Index + ∆Premium  
+ γ Year +γ Trend
 (4) 
 
λ
ε+
∑ ∑ ∑
n n n
it 0 it-j it-j it-j
i=1 i=1 i=1
1 it 2 it
∆Premium =β + α ∆AR +δ ∆Index + ∆Premium  
+ γ Year +γ Trend
 (5) 
En estas ecuaciones, ∆Indexit se refiere a los cambios de rating que se 
producen en el banco i entre el día en el que se produce el evento de cambio 
de rating t y el día anterior t-1. ∆ARit se refiere a la variación de la 
rentabilidad anormal de la acción del banco i en el momento de tiempo t y 
∆Premiumit hace referencia a la variación de la prima de riesgo entre el día 
t y t-1. Si en el resultado de la estimación, el coeficiente que acompaña a 
los cambios en ∆ARit durante n días en la ecuación (3) es significativo, esto 
implica que los cambios en las rentabilidades de las acciones afectan a los 
cambios en los ratings y por lo tanto, los ratings no son totalmente 
independientes de los cambios que se producen en los mercados de 
acciones. Del mismo modo, si el coeficiente que acompaña a la variación 
de prima de riesgo, ∆Premiumit, es significativo, los ratings no son 
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independientes de los cambios que se producen en la prima de riesgo. Del 
mismo modo que en la ecuación (3), las ecuaciones (4) y (5) permiten 
determinar si las variaciones que se producen en los mercados de acciones 
y en la prima de riesgo dependen de las variaciones de los ratings. Si en 
dichas ecuaciones el coeficiente que acompaña a las variaciones del 
rating, ∆Indexit, es significativo, las variaciones en los ratings están 
asociadas a variaciones en las rentabilidades de las acciones y en la prima 
de riesgo. 
El tercer capítulo de la tesis doctoral tiene como objetivo determinar 
el impacto que ha tenido la crisis financiera sobre el comportamiento de 
los ratings bancarios. Por este motivo, en este tercer capítulo se plantean 
las siguientes cuestiones: ¿Se ha ajustado los ratings con la crisis 
financiera? ¿Las agencias han respondido ante las críticas recibidas y los 
cambios en la regulación con un endurecimiento de los criterios de 
calificación? ¿El ajuste de los ratings y en los criterios de calificación 
depende de la forma jurídica y el tamaño de las entidades analizadas? Para 
responder estas cuestiones de este capítulo se analiza el comportamiento 
de los ratings de las entidades bancarias en España durante el periodo 
2000-2009 fundamentalmente por dos motivos. En primer lugar, el Sistema 
Bancario Español es el caso de un sistema bancario que experimentó un 
ciclo económico completo caracterizado por un intenso crecimiento y una 
posterior recesión a raíz de la crisis financiera. Desde finales de los años 
90 hasta finales del año 2007, con el inicio de la crisis financiera, este 
sistema bancario experimentó un importante crecimiento basado en la 
concesión de créditos a actividades relacionadas con la construcción. En 
este contexto, las entidades bancarias presentaban elevados niveles de 
rentabilidad, bajos niveles de morosidad y acceso ilimitado a los mercados 
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internacionales. Sin embargo, con el inicio de la crisis internacional y el 
estallido de la crisis inmobiliaria, la situación patrimonial de las entidades 
bancarias empeoró rápidamente como demuestra el Informe de Estabilidad 
Financiera del Banco de España (2009, 2010). En segundo lugar, el análisis 
en particular de un sistema bancario permite tener una mayor 
disponibilidad y conocimiento sobre la información de aquellos factores 
que según los informes metodológicos de las agencias de calificación 
tienen en cuenta a la hora de emitir sus opiniones. 
En este capítulo se desarrolla una metodología que consta de dos etapas. 
En una primera etapa, se procede a la modelización de los ratings bancarios 
mediante la estimación de un modelo probit (ecuación (6)) que permite 
obtener la probabilidad de obtener un determinado rating de rating de 
acuerdo a los elementos en los que se fijan las agencias de calificación 
cuando emiten sus ratings. 
 
* '
it i it iY x u= + +   β ε
  (6) 
Además con el fin de contrastar si la crisis financiera ha supuesto un 
cambio en comportamiento de las agencias de calificación y 
consecuentemente de sus ratings bancarios se estima la ecuación (7). En 
esta ecuación se define una variable ficticia (SB) que toma el valor igual a 
la unidad para el periodo de crisis financiera y cero en caso contrario. La 
interacción de esta variable ficticia con el resto de variables explicativas 
que hacen referencia a la situación patrimonial de los bancos permite 
contrastar sin con el inicio de la crisis se ha producido un cambio en la 
política de calificación de las agencias. De modo que si el coeficiente que 
acompaña a la interacción de esta variable con el resto de variables 
explicativas es estadísticamente significativo, las agencias de calificación 
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con la crisis financiera no asignan el mismo peso a factores que definen el 
rating y consecuentemente las agencias han ajustado sus criterios de 
calificación en la evaluación de la situación patrimonial de los bancos. 
 
* ' '
it it it it iY x SB x u= + ⋅ + +   β β ε
  (7) 
En una segunda etapa, tras modelizar los ratings bancarios y contrastar 
empíricamente la posible existencia de un cambio en el comportamiento 
de las agencias de calificación, se realiza un ejercicio de predicción que 
permite desagregar el cambio que se produce en los ratings bancarios 
debido a la variación que se produce en la situación patrimonial de los 
bancos y el cambio que se debe a la modificación de los criterios de 
calificación. Para ello, en la ecuación (7) que tiene en cuenta el posible 
cambio estructural que se produce con el inicio de la crisis financiera, se 
remplazan los coeficientes estimados (R), y el valor de las variables que 
definen el nivel la situación patrimonial de los bancos (x), dependiendo del 
periodo en el que se realiza la predicción. A partir de este ejercicio de 
predicción se define el Índice de Cambio de Rating (RCI) como el cociente 
entre el rating obtenido en el periodo de crisis (t), Rt (xt), y el rating 
obtenido en el periodo antes de la crisis financiera (t-1), Rt-1 (xt-1).  
Este índice permite medir en promedio la variación del rating entre el 
periodo antes y después de la crisis. A su vez se puede desagregar en dos 
componentes multiplicativos como se recoge en la última igualdad de la 
siguiente expresión (8). El primero de estos productos hace referencia al 
cambio en la política de calificación asociado al cambio de los coeficientes 
estimados. El segundo componente se debe al cambio valor de cada una de 
las variables explicativas que definen la situación patrimonial de los 
bancos. 
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Debe resaltarse que a pesar de las ventajas anteriormente descritas, el 
análisis concreto de un sistema bancario, como es el caso del Sistema 
Bancario Español, plantea dos inconvenientes. En primer lugar, no se 
considera el papel de algunas variables relevantes que según los informes 
metodológicos de las agencias de calificación, son tenidas en cuenta y 
afectan al país en el que los bancos desarrollan su actividad. Por ejemplo, 
no se tiene en cuenta la tasa de crecimiento del PIB nacional y/o los 
cambios en las calificaciones crediticias soberanas. En segundo lugar, el 
análisis de un único sistema bancario implica que todos los bancos están 
sujetos a los mismos shocks bancarios. 
Por este motivo, en el cuarto capítulo de esta tesis doctoral se plantea 
las mismas cuestiones que el tercer capítulo pero para el caso de una 
muestra de bancos internacionales (Estados Unidos y Europa) durante el 
periodo de tiempo 2004-2011. Debe tenerse en cuenta que la consideración 
de una muestra de bancos internacionales permite además el planteamiento 
de las siguientes cuestiones: ¿El ajuste en los ratings se produce por igual 
en todos los sistemas bancarios? ¿Tiene el mismo peso en todos los 
sistemas bancarios, el endurecimiento de los criterios de calificación y el 
deterioro de la situación patrimonial de los bancos? 
Para responder a estas cuestiones se utiliza la misma metodología que 
en el tercer capítulo. En una primera etapa se procede a la modelización de 
los ratings bancarios según los factores que las agencias indican en sus 
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informes metodológicos y que hacen referencia a la situación patrimonial 
de las entidades bancarias. En una segunda etapa, mediante varios 
ejercicios de predicción se procede al cálculo del RCI que permite 
desagregar el ajuste en los ratings en dos factores multiplicativos: uno 
asociado al empeoramiento de la situación patrimonial de las entidades y 
otro asociado a los cambios en los criterios de calificación de las agencias. 
Este índice se calcula para cada agencia calificación tanto a nivel global 
como en función del área geográfica al que pertenecen los bancos 
analizados, es decir, diferenciando entre los bancos de los Estados Unidos, 
Unión Europea y dentro de estos los llamados PIGS. 
Conclusiones 
El segundo capítulo de la tesis doctoral analiza el efecto que tienen las 
señales de rating bancarios sobre los mercados financieros antes y con el 
inicio de la crisis financiera. Además se plantea si las agencias de 
calificación responden ante los cambios que se producen en las 
rentabilidades de las acciones de los bancos y las variaciones de la prima 
de riesgo del país en el que cotiza la acción del banco analizado. 
Los resultados obtenidos en este capítulo aportan evidencia a favor del 
efecto significativo que tienen las agencias de calificación en los mercados 
financieros. En concreto, se obtiene que los inversores responden y, por lo 
tanto, tienen en cuenta los anuncios de rating que emiten las agencias de 
calificación. Antes de la crisis únicamente las señales de rating tenían un 
efecto significativo sobre las rentabilidades de los bancos. En cambio, con 
el inicio de la crisis las rebajas de rating y/o los cambios en las perspectivas 
tienen un efecto significativo. Además, los resultados del análisis de 
causalidad entre los ratings y las variaciones que se producen en las 
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rentabilidades anormales y la prima de riesgo indican que las agencias de 
calificación no son totalmente inmunes a las variaciones que se producen 
en los mercados financieros. Esto se debe a que los ratings responden ante 
los cambios que se producen en las rentabilidades anormales y en la prima 
de riesgo. Por lo tanto, este resultado aporta evidencia empírica a favor de 
la hipótesis de que los ratings realmente no siguen una filosofía Through 
the cycle como así defienden las agencias de calificación en sus informes 
metodológicos. 
El tercer capítulo de la tesis doctoral analiza el impacto que ha tenido 
la crisis subprime sobre los ratings del Sistema Bancario Español. Los 
resultados obtenidos en este capítulo muestran que con el inicio de la crisis 
financiera se produce una caída generalizada en los ratings del 10.88% que 
se debe principalmente al empeoramiento de la situación patrimonial de las 
entidades bancarias (75%), aunque el endurecimiento de los criterios de 
calificación también tiene un papel significativo (25%). El cambio en los 
criterios de calificación aportan evidencia aporta evidencia a favor de la 
hipótesis de que los ratings presentan un comportamiento procíclico.  
Además si los resultados son desagregados en función del tamaño y de 
la forma legal de las entidades bancarias analizadas, se obtiene que las 
entidades de tamaño mediano y pequeño, y más concretamente las cajas de 
ahorro han experimentado un mayor ajuste en sus ratings. Esto se debe a 
la especialización de este tipo de entidades en la concesión de créditos a 
actividades relacionadas con la construcción y la promoción inmobiliaria. 
Lo que supuso que con el inicio de la crisis financiera y el estallido de la 
burbuja inmobiliaria en España estas entidades experimentaron un grave 
empeoramiento de su situación patrimonial y con ello de sus ratings. 
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En último lugar, el cuarto capítulo analiza el impacto que ha tenido la 
crisis financiera sobre los ratings bancarios de una muestra internacional 
de bancos de la Unión Europea y de los Estados Unidos. En este sentido 
los resultados obtenidos muestran que con el inicio de la crisis financiera 
se produce una caída generalizada en los ratings de Fitch, Standard and 
Poor’s y Moody’s del 5.35%, 4.19% y del 7.7%, respectivamente. Esta 
caída se debe tanto a un empeoramiento de la situación patrimonial de los 
bancos como al endurecimiento de los criterios de calificación. En 
concreto, se obtiene que en Fitch el 79.66% y en Standard and Poor’s el 
63.99% de la caída de los ratings se debe a un mayor endurecimiento de 
los criterios de calificación. En el caso de Moody’s, el ajuste en los ratings 
se debe en su totalidad al empeoramiento de la situación patrimonial de los 
bancos que en parte es compensado con la aplicación de una política de 
calificación quizás algo más flexible. Este resultado implica que si 
Moody’s hubiera ajustado sus criterios como Standard and Poor’s y Fitch 
el ajuste en sus rating hubiera sido mayor. El significativo peso que tiene 
el cambio en los criterios de calificación aporta evidencia empírica, al igual 
que el resto de capítulos de esta tesis doctoral, a favor de la hipótesis del 
carácter procíclico de los ratings emitidos por las principales agencias de 
calificación (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s y Fitch). Debe resaltarse que 
el distinto peso que tienen los determinantes del rating y el distinto peso 
que tiene el endurecimiento de los criterios de calificación sobre el ajuste 
de los ratings muestra que las agencias aplican distintas políticas de 
calificación. 
Si los resultados son desagregados en función de la área geográfica en 
el que los bancos llevan principalmente desarrollan su actividad (Estados 
Unidos, Unión Europea y los llamados PIGS) se obtiene que el mayor 
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ajuste a la baja en los ratings bancarios se produce en los Estados Unidos 
y en los PIGS. En Standard and Poor’s y Fitch, gran parte de esta variación 
del rating se debe al mayor peso que tiene el endurecimiento de la política 
de calificación que se ha producido a nivel global. Por el contrario, en 
Moody’s este ajuste se explica fundamentalmente por el empeoramiento 
de la situación patrimonial de los bancos analizados. 
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